16 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	a0c789b3ba	docs: the image tag list said something step 6 stopped being true ... `:<git-sha>` is on `main` only now — a sha tag per dev push was a rollback target nobody had ever pulled — and `:<version>` never existed as an image tag after rule 145 was narrowed. Both were still documented. `docs/android-distribution.md` also said `:dev`, `:latest` and `:<version>` all ship a client, which is now two-thirds true and misses the more useful fact: the channel IS the image you run, so a stable server serves a stable client. Worth saying because until step 3 it was hard-wired to the dev release on every branch and did the opposite. This push is also the skip-if-exists verification. It touches neither client's file set, so both `decide` jobs should report the channel already serving the current version and skip a 6- and a 9-minute build — while the guard still runs on that path (§6.3). #3146 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-29 00:27:43 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	fa89da1fab	notes: color leaves the model, the wire and all three surfaces ... Step 3 of M315, and the destructive half. Steps 1 and 2 stopped every read of this field: a card is one neutral surface per theme, and the only coloured thing on a board is a tag. What was left was a column written by a picker and read by nothing. Rule 22 — the old path comes out completely. No flag, no fallback, no "override if set". Server: the column, the `?color=` facet, the create/update/serialise paths, the sync assignment, the front-matter line, and Keep's colour map. Alembic 0029 drops it and sweeps `"color"` out of stored saved-filter params — a view that silently filtered on a field the app no longer has would return nothing and never say why. That sweep is Python, not `params::jsonb - 'color'`, because Postgres has no try-cast and one malformed blob would abort a migration that is running over somebody's saved views. `NOTE_COLORS` moves from `models/note.py` to `colors.py`. A palette defined on the model that lost one is an invitation to put the column back; labels still name a colour, so the vocabulary belongs where the normalizer already is. Core: the field, the facet, the `NoteCreateInput`, and every read and write in store/push/pull. Local schema v9 drops the column and does the same saved-filter sweep, guarded on `json_valid` so a corrupt blob loses a key rather than becoming NULL. The uniffi layer drops `NoteEdit::Color` and `NoteDraft.color` with it. Web: `ColorPicker.vue`, the per-card swatch popover and its stylesheet rule, the FilterBar colour row, the facet in the query round-trip, and the colour half of the editor's baseline-and-save. Android: the `ColorSheet`, the `Picker.COLOR` case, the toolbar's swatch dot, `EditorAction.SetColor`. ## The protocol: v4, and the floor deliberately stays at 3 Checked against `compat.rs` and the push handler rather than trusting the `#[serde(default)]` annotation, because the v2 precedent points the other way: v2 dropped `kind` and `title` and DID raise both floors, on the rule that dropping a field a client sends and expects back is breaking. `color` fails the second half of that test. A v3 client reading a v4 note gets `"default"` from its own serde default and draws the colour it derives locally — the board it drew yesterday. A v3 client pushing `color` has the key ignored, since `_assign_note_fields` reads its payload key by key and never validates the shape. Neither direction errors and neither shows anything wrong. `title` was the note's NAME; this is a field that no longer renders. So `SYNC_PROTOCOL_VERSION` and `CLIENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION` go to 4, and both floors stay at 3. `docs/sync.md` carries the reasoning and the per-version history, and its push example is brought back in line — it still listed `title`, `kind` and `items`, all gone before this. Import stays tolerant: a pre-M315 export or a Keep takeout carrying `color:` imports fine, the key simply read past. Old exports must still import. #3041 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-28 14:07:03 -04:00
bvandeusen	abe01da5f7	compose: say which of the three deployment shapes you're in ... The operator asked why `THOUGHTSYNC_BIND` isn't just defaulted to the safe value. Fair question, and the answer exposed that my own advice was incomplete: I told them to set it to 127.0.0.1 without asking where their proxy runs, and for a proxy inside Docker that is the wrong fix. There are three shapes, not two: 1. **LAN, no proxy** — the default. Binds every interface so a phone and a desktop can reach the server. This is why the default is NOT the locked-down value: a server reachable only from the machine it runs on isn't hardened, it's broken, and that is the primary documented use of this app. 2. **Proxy in Docker** — delete the `ports:` block entirely. The proxy reaches the app over the compose network; publishing a host port is a second, unauthenticated way in that bypasses whatever the proxy does about TLS. Safer than 127.0.0.1, because there is no host port to reach even from the host. 3. **Proxy on the host** — `THOUGHTSYNC_BIND=127.0.0.1`. The compose file now spells out all three where the decision is made, and `docs/public-hosting.md` item 4 asks where your proxy runs before telling you what to do, plus how to check: `curl http://<lan-ip>:5000/api/health` from another machine should NOT answer once you're proxied. No default changed. Changing it would silently break every LAN install on the next `docker compose pull` — the phone would just stop syncing, with nothing saying why.	2026-08-23 15:30:01 -04:00
bvandeusen	09b5f874b6	Security values move into the Settings UI ... Operator: *"proxy hops defaults to 1 and should be in the settings UI not in the envs, we need the security values to be in the UI."* Overrules the call I made yesterday, and rule 25 is on your side — I argued deployment-topology, but the operator has to be able to SEE what protects them, and reading a container's environment is not seeing. Six new settings in a **Security** group: trusted proxy hops (default 1), the per-account and per-address sign-in limits with their shared window, and the sign-up limit with its own. `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` is gone; the rate limits are no longer hardcoded constants. **The hard part was keeping the throttle cheap.** It consults these BEFORE opening a database connection — deliberately, because a refused attempt is meant to cost nothing, and the hop count is needed to know who is even asking. A query per attempt would undo both. So there is a small cache seeded from the registry defaults (the app works with no database at all, which is what the DB-free unit lane relies on), loaded at boot, and refreshed on every settings save — the same live-update contract `session_ttl_days` already had. `SlidingWindow` now takes its limit and window as SUPPLIERS rather than values, so a saved number applies to the next attempt instead of the next deploy. **Bounds are rejected, not clamped.** A hop count of 99 would trust anything a caller sent; a sign-in limit of 0 would lock every account out permanently. Both now fail validation with a message naming the range, and the number input carries min/max so the browser objects first. Silently storing a different number than the one typed is how somebody ends up believing a protection is set to something it is not. `MAX_BUCKETS` stays a constant on purpose: it protects the limiter from itself rather than the app from a caller, and there is no operator judgment to apply. Two integration tests, because the whole point is the round trip: a dangerous value refused, a legitimate one reaching the cache the throttle reads and persisting; and every Security row reaching the admin payload with bounds and a description that explains itself.	2026-08-23 15:24:15 -04:00
bvandeusen	a85c53ba2c	Trust proxy headers by hop count, and log every credential event ... Operator, before exposing the instance: *"I'd expect that we should have a proxy hops setting for how many proxy hops we should trust a shared real-ip at… and is there any session logging."* Neither existed, and the first one was a real hole. **The address was forgeable.** `client_address()` read the LEFTMOST `X-Forwarded-For` entry — nominally "the original client", and precisely the one a caller controls, because anything they send arrives before what proxies append. So `curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"`, rotated per request, minted a fresh rate-limit bucket every time. Concretely: stuffing ONE account stayed limited (the account key is unforgeable and that is why it exists), but spraying MANY accounts from one source was not — each account got its own budget, and the per-address cap meant to bound the total was defeated by a header. On a LAN that is nothing. It is not nothing on a public host. Now it counts in from the RIGHT by `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS`, default 1. Each hop appends what it saw, so the rightmost entries are the ones our own infrastructure wrote and a forged prefix lands to the left of them where it can never be selected — proven for the honest, forged, padded, CDN and shorter-than-configured cases. 0 ignores the header entirely; 2 is Cloudflare in front of a proxy. Too high is the dangerous direction, so a header shorter than configured falls back to the socket address rather than reaching further left. `X-Forwarded-Proto` had the same bug and now shares the same rule. Both live in a new `proxy.py` rather than being written twice — two places holding one decision is how issue 2183 happened, and this is the same decision. Env rather than the Settings UI, against rule 25's usual pull: it is deployment topology rather than preference, and the limiter consults it BEFORE opening a database connection, which is the entire point of checking a throttle before doing expensive work. Easy to move if that reads wrong. **And there was no logging at all** — `auth.py` had no logger, and the only record of anything was `device_tokens.last_used_at`. Sign-ins, failures, throttle trips, new accounts and device-token issuance now all log, with the attempted email and the trusted address. Deliberately including the email: it is the operator's own server, and "somebody failed a login" without saying against which account is not actionable. `basicConfig` at INFO in `create_app`, because hypercorn configures its own loggers and leaves the root at WARNING — without it every line above would have gone nowhere, which is a worse failure than not writing them. This is the app log, not an audit table. Not queryable, not retained past log rotation. The table is task 2939; this is what makes the next few days observable.	2026-08-23 15:12:14 -04:00
bvandeusen	2141a0ac45	Registration closes itself once the instance has an owner ... Operator: *"registration should be open only for the first user and they get granted admin privileges. then registration is closed."* The old shape had a window in it. The first account was always allowed and became admin; every account after that was gated by `allow_registration` — which defaulted to ON. So the door stayed open between "my account exists" and "I remembered to turn it off in Settings", and on a public host that gap is the entire exposure: it starts the moment DNS resolves and lasts until someone remembers. Now the door shuts as a CONSEQUENCE of the admin account existing, in the same transaction that creates it. Not "defaults closed" — that would still need the first person to get in somehow. There is no window to remember, because there is no window. Re-opening it is a deliberate act in Settings → Access: turn it on, have the person register, turn it off. Crude, and it is the only mechanism there is — **there is no invite system**, not even a stub. That is real work (a token table, admin create/revoke, a redemption flow, expiry) and is filed as later work rather than smuggled into a release. An integration test covers it, because it is the interaction between two writes in one transaction: first register → 201 and `is_admin: true`; the setting is then false; a second register → 403; re-open deliberately and a third → 201, not admin. **This does not retroactively close an instance that already has users.** The close fires on first-account creation, so a server whose admin predates this keeps whatever the setting was — which was on. `docs/public-hosting.md` now says so explicitly, and step 1 of the checklist is "check" rather than "do" for exactly that reason.	2026-08-23 14:18:58 -04:00
bvandeusen	bc22f8e249	Remove [[wiki-links]], backlinks and the graph ... Operator, 2026-08-22 (note 2897): ThoughtSync is an intermediary surface. You write here because it's easy — a notebook in your pocket — and later you recall the thing and go finish it somewhere else. Recall is the product; organization is secondary. A linking system is organization, and it isn't what this is for. So: `[[wiki-links]]`, backlinks, the `[[` autocomplete, the note_links table, `/api/notes/link-search`, `/api/notes/<id>/backlinks`, the whole graph blueprint and GraphView. Rust core loses `extract_links`, `backlinks`, `link_search` and `create_titled`; the desktop loses the three Tauri commands that exposed them. This subsumes 982d24c rather than reverting it. That commit bound links to a note id so a rename would stop rewriting other notes' bodies — real infra, but infra for a feature that is now gone, and nothing it added survives. Alembic 0023 stays in the chain anyway: it shipped in an image and may already be applied, and deleting an applied revision strands a database's version pointer. 0024 drops the table and takes the column with it. The history stays honest about the fact that it existed for a day. Two things deliberately kept, because they were serving recall and only incidentally serving links: - `/api/notes/titles` and the titles store. The command palette lists them so you can jump to a note by name. `resolve()` — the name→note lookup that only linking needed — is gone. - `display_title`. Every note still has a name for search results and export filenames. What that name is FOR changed; that it exists did not. `notes/links.py` is now `notes/tags.py`, holding the #tag→label reconciliation it always also owned. A file called links.py with no links in it would have been exactly the drift this removal is meant to end. Also swept out on the way: `_escape_like`, whose only caller was link-search, and the `graph` icon. Nothing lost that a person typed — note_links was always derived, and the `[[text]]` is still sitting in every body it was written in.	2026-08-22 12:00:57 -04:00
bvandeusen	b6152ec18b	server: harden the surfaces a public deployment leaves exposed ... On a LAN the login form is reachable by people you already trust. Exposed, it is reachable by everyone, and nothing in front of it was counting. Three credential routes — /login, /register and /device-login — now throttle. Every attempt is counted against BOTH the account and the calling address, and either can refuse it. The account key is the one that matters and the one that cannot be forged: it stops stuffing against a known email no matter how many addresses the attempts arrive from. The address key bounds one source spraying many accounts, and is best-effort by nature — behind a proxy it comes from X-Forwarded-For, which a caller can set to anything if the app is exposed directly. That is exactly why it isn't the only key. The check runs BEFORE the password is verified, which is the other half of what this protects. bcrypt is deliberately slow; an unauthenticated caller who can trigger it without limit has a CPU exhaustion primitive as well as a guessing one. Sliding rather than fixed windows, because a fixed one lets twice the limit through across a boundary. Bucket count is capped so a rotating forged header can't turn the limiter into the exhaustion it prevents. A sign-in against an email with no account now spends a real bcrypt against a throwaway hash first. Without it "no such account" returned in microseconds while a wrong password took ~100ms, which is a reliable oracle for which emails are registered here. Every response carries a CSP with script-src 'self', object-src 'none' and frame-ancestors 'none', plus nosniff, a referrer policy and a permissions policy. The app has no inline and no third-party scripts, so this concedes nothing; the exceptions are honest — inline STYLE (Vue writes it itself for v-show and the FLIP), and remote images (a link preview renders the og:image of an arbitrary host, over either scheme, since a LAN install is served over http). HSTS only where the request already arrived over TLS, and scoped to the one host: no includeSubDomains, no preload, neither of which is this app's to commit. X-Forwarded-Proto detection moved into one `_is_https()` — the session cookie's Secure flag and HSTS are the same question, and answering it twice is how the two drift apart. docs/public-hosting.md is the rest of it: the four things only the operator can do (close registration, terminate TLS and forward the scheme, stop publishing the app port, back up the attachment volume as well as the database), and an honest list of what the app does NOT have — no email verification, no password reset, no second factor, no per-user quota, no audit log. Those aren't blockers for an instance whose accounts are people you know. They're the reason not to leave signups open to strangers.	2026-08-21 22:01:37 -04:00
bvandeusen	010e9a2f85	server: bake the newest Android client into every image (operator call) ... Reverses the placement decision made an hour ago. That one put the APK only on the data volume, reasoning that ~55 MiB should not be charged to installs that never touch Android. The operator's call is that ending the manual copy is worth the megabytes, and it is their deployment. CI now fetches the newest published client into the build context immediately before the image build, so `:dev`, `:latest` and `:<version>` all ship one and a `docker compose pull` delivers a new server and a new client together. **Always the rolling `dev` release — the newest build there is.** A versioned image therefore carries the newest client rather than one pinned to that version. Deliberate: the two negotiate a sync protocol version before linking, so a mismatch is caught by the handshake, and pinning would buy nothing the handshake does not already provide. **Fetched by the JOB, never by the Dockerfile.** The release is private, and a token used inside a build ends up in the context or a layer. **It cannot fail the image build.** No release yet, a network blip, a first-ever build — all of them log a warning and produce an image with no client, which is a state the server already supports. Half a pair is cleaned up rather than shipped: a sidecar without its APK is worse than neither, because the server would be describing something it cannot serve. **The volume still wins.** `DATA_DIR/client/` is checked first and the baked copy second, so an operator who deliberately drops a build in gets that build — and a BROKEN drop-in falls through to the image's copy rather than taking the feature offline, which is what makes the copy-order advice survivable instead of load-bearing. Three tests cover the precedence, including that last case. The baked copy lives inside the package, not under DATA_DIR: that path is a volume mount, and anything the image wrote there would disappear behind it the moment one is attached. `client/.keep` is tracked so `COPY client/` cannot fail on a tree where the CI step never ran; the artifacts themselves are gitignored, since a 55 MiB binary does not belong in git history and is re-fetched on every build anyway.	2026-08-20 21:19:47 -04:00
bvandeusen	d77a79859c	server: hand out the Android client this server syncs with (2726) ... A self-hoster should not need an account on someone else's forge to get the app for their own notes. The Fabled-Git instance is private — which is why `install.sh` already cannot fetch for anyone but the operator — so a release page is no use as a distribution point. The server holding the notes is something the person already trusts and already reaches. It also keeps the pair in step by construction. Client and server negotiate a sync protocol version before linking, so a server that also serves the client cannot hand out a phone it is unable to talk to. **Two files, and both must be present**: `thoughtsync.apk` and a `thoughtsync-android.json` sidecar carrying `{version_name, version_code, size, sha256}`. The sidecar exists because an APK keeps its version in a binary AXML manifest, which Python cannot read and which is not worth putting `aapt` on a Quart server to reach. CI writes it beside the APK, where the values are already known — including the digest, computed over the same bytes it uploads, so a phone can tell a truncated download from a complete one before handing it to the installer. Not a trust anchor; the signature is that. **Under DATA_DIR, not baked into the image.** Baking charges ~55 MiB to every self-hoster including everyone who never touches Android. `/var/thoughtsync` is already the mounted volume that holds attachments, so a build dropped there survives container recreation. **Absence is an ordinary state, not an error.** No APK means the key is absent from `/api/config` — absent rather than null, so a client testing for it cannot confuse "this server has no client" with "this server predates the field" — the web UI hides the card instead of offering a button that 404s, and the metadata route answers 404. A server whose owner does not use Android is not misconfigured. **A mismatched pair also counts as no client.** If the sidecar's recorded size does not match the file on disk, the two did not arrive together; serving one build while advertising another is worse than serving none, because the phone would compare versions against a promise the bytes do not keep. That makes the copy order in docs/android-distribution.md load-bearing, and it is written down there: APK first, sidecar last. **The version is public, the bytes are not.** An updater has to be able to ask "is there something newer?" cheaply and before it has done anything; 55 MiB is not for anyone who can reach the port. `login_required` already accepts either a session cookie or a device bearer token, so the browser and a linked phone both work with no second auth path. The Android lane now publishes both files to the same rolling `dev` release the desktop bundles use, reusing `publish-release.sh` — its nullglob asset list was already built for several jobs in separate workspaces publishing to one release, which is exactly this. Signed builds only: publishing an unsigned APK would offer people something they cannot install over what they already have. Nine tests, DB-free like the rest of the suite — this lane runs no Postgres, so the advertisement is asserted through `advertisement()` rather than through `/api/config`, whose other half needs a database. Both routes ARE exercised, because neither opens a session.	2026-08-20 20:11:32 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	0a7480cf9b	core: extract the store and sync engine into a shared crate (M12 step 1) ... Android becomes a native Kotlin client over this same code (Scribe note 2730), so the local store and sync engine stop being modules of the desktop app and become `thoughtsync-core`, a crate with no UI framework in it at all. This is a move, not a rewrite, and the measurement is why: every file in local/ and sync/ already carried ZERO Tauri references — 4,980 of 6,372 lines. The coupling was 473 lines of command shim, which stays behind in the desktop crate as src/commands/. Kept as git renames so history follows the files. The desktop imports them under their old names (`use thoughtsync_core::{local, sync}`) so every call site reads exactly as before. What moved is where they live, not what they are. Two things a workspace changes that are easy to miss, both caught before pushing: [profile.release] now lives at the workspace ROOT. Cargo silently ignores profiles declared by a non-root member — leaving it in the desktop crate would have dropped lto/strip/opt-level from every release build with only a warning. And a workspace shares ONE target dir, so the bundles moved from desktop/src-tauri/target to target/. Thirteen references across publish-release, debundle-graphics, verify.sh, package-prebuilt and the workflow now point there. Pinning target-dir back would have been the smaller diff, but the Android lane also produces Rust artifacts and they do not belong under desktop/. Also retires the Tauri Android lane in the same push rather than leaving a path that is being replaced: gen/android, android.yml and docs/android-dev.md are gone, the mobile_entry_point attribute with them, and the lib drops to rlib — staticlib/cdylib existed for Tauri mobile, and the .so Android loads will be built from the core crate instead. Rule 22, no parallel path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 23:12:26 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	c28f2bc00e	docs: how to run the Android client locally (task 1864) ... Two things stop a fresh clone from opening in Android Studio, and both fail with errors that name the wrong culprit — so they are written down rather than rediscovered. Android Studio runs Gradle on its bundled JDK 25, which Gradle 8.14.3 rejects with an "Incompatible Gradle JVM version" message that reads like a project misconfiguration. And settings.gradle applies tauri.settings.gradle, which is generated per build and gitignored, so sync fails before anything can create it — one CLI build fixes that permanently. Also records why the Gradle pin is what it is, since the question came up and the answer was not what it first looked like: the wrapper, the AGP pin and the buildSrc file using the removed project.exec are all TRACKED in this repo. It is scaffolding tauri android init wrote once, ours to bump when it is worth doing, not a constraint of the framework. Tauri's own Android layer targets compileSdk 36 and registers back handling through OnBackPressedDispatcher — the library is current, only the generated template trails. Known gaps are listed so a tester does not file them as bugs: no safe-area handling yet (2706), no enableOnBackInvokedCallback so predictive back will not animate, and the templated app-wide usesCleartextTraffic that Minstrel already hit as a Play Protect smell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 22:46:38 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	2cfe049f9c	sync: unlinking a device now revokes its token on the server (issue 2110) ... Unlink was local-only. It cleared the server URL, token and cursor from the device, and left the bearer token valid on the server indefinitely — so someone who unlinked because the laptop was being sold or handed on believed they had revoked access when they hadn't. The blocker was identification, not intent: a token pasted from the web app never carried a device id, and /api/auth/me describes the user, not the device row, so DELETE /devices/<id> could only ever have worked for one of the two ways this app can be linked. DELETE /api/auth/devices/self keys off the token in the Authorization header instead, which the caller always holds — one route that works for both paths, owner-scoped like the rest, and no local schema change. Unlinking is never blocked on the network. Wanting to stop syncing is a local decision, so the revoke is attempted first, its outcome carried back, and the link cleared either way. When the token survives — server unreachable, or older than the route — the Sync screen says so in place, with where to revoke it. A toast would have been the wrong shape for that: it disappears, and this is exactly what someone returns to the screen to check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-16 10:31:06 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	e64d67e904	Expire trash after 30 days, and make the deadline something you can see ... Trash had no end. A note sat in /trash until someone emptied it by hand, and its attachment BYTES sat on disk the whole time — the pile-up the operator asked about. Nothing purged; there was no scheduler at all. Retention is server-owned: `trash_retention_days` (default 30, 0 = keep forever) in the settings registry, so it lands in admin Settings with no migration and takes effect without a restart. A background sweep started in before_serving does the work. Clients learn about a purge the way they learn about any deletion — as a tombstone on the delta feed. An auto-purge nobody can see coming is data loss on a timer, so the window is now visible: /api/config publishes it, notes carry `deleted_at`, Trash leads with the policy, and each card counts down. The countdown rounds DOWN — saying "1 day left" for a note with ten minutes on the clock is the one error here that actually costs someone a note. Three things this turned up on the way: - `DELETE /api/notes/<id>` hard-deleted the row, leaving no tombstone at all. A permanent delete in the web UI never reached a linked device, which would keep its copy forever and push it back on the next edit. It now purges through the same path as everything else. - The purge left `note_revisions` and `note_link_previews` behind. A revision holds the full body, so the text of a "permanently deleted" note was still sitting in the database. - `deleted_at` now SURVIVES a purge instead of being cleared. It's still true, and it means every query that says "not trashed" excludes tombstones for free — without it a content-less row reads as a perfectly normal active note and shows up on the board as a blank card. Desktop keeps its own clock only when there's nobody else to keep one: the sweep runs at startup on an UNLINKED device and refuses otherwise. A linked client that expired notes on its own schedule could destroy something the server was deliberately keeping, then push that delete upstream. Local policy must never outrank the server's — so it also adopts the server's window for the countdown rather than showing its offline default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SreJkbxB4gx8pPsu8QbLPi	2026-07-26 16:20:13 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	fbbe877c46	M10.6: client↔server sync protocol handshake (task 1995) ... Version the sync WIRE PROTOCOL separately from either program's release version, so a self-hosted server and the desktop app can sit on different releases and still work out whether they can talk. Each side declares two numbers — what it speaks, and the oldest counterpart it accepts. Either side can therefore mark a change breaking without the other shipping in step, which is the whole point: no app↔server lockstep. Server advertises on the existing public /api/config (a client must be able to ask "can I talk to you?" before it holds a device token, or even has an account): sync_protocol_version, min_client_protocol_version, sync_features. sync_features exists because a version number can only say newer/older. An ADDITIVE change earns a capability name instead of a minimum bump, so a newer client meeting an older server drops that one feature and syncs the rest, rather than refusing. Raising a minimum is reserved for genuinely breaking changes — it's the switch that hard-blocks the other side. Client half is pure decision logic (sync/compat.rs), no I/O, so every branch is unit-testable — there's no live-server lane in CI. Three outcomes: ok / degraded{unavailable} / incompatible{reason, client_must_update}. The last names which side can fix it, so the message is actionable. A server that predates the handshake sends no protocol fields at all; that reads as "update the server", deliberately not as a parse error, which would look to the user like they mistyped the URL. normalize_base_url defaults a bare host to https://, never http:// — silently downgrading would put a long-lived device token on the wire in cleartext because someone omitted five characters. Plain HTTP on a trusted LAN stays supported; the user types http:// and thereby chooses it. Transport (the actual fetch) lands next, separately: it needs an HTTP/TLS stack, and that's a real risk to the Windows cross-compile lane, so it gets its own CI run to bisect against rather than riding along with this. No UI here by design — the link/settings surface it feeds is M10.7's, per this task's own sequencing. Policy documented in docs/sync.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SreJkbxB4gx8pPsu8QbLPi	2026-07-25 22:40:25 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.8	7dd74d2946	Sync 6: sync protocol doc (docs/sync.md) ... The contract the Tauri/Android clients implement against: device-token auth, the shared-sequence revision cursor, note-as-sync-unit (+ derived links/tags not synced), trash vs purge tombstones, pull (GET /changes) + push (POST /push) request/response shapes, last-write-wins + history conflict policy, attachment blob sync by id + sha256, and the idempotent/resumable sync cycle (initial since=0 + resume). Docs only — CI paths exclude *.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FRgehjoz7Yv8LkUfADxACm	2026-07-22 23:13:38 -04:00