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Operator: *"proxy hops defaults to 1 and should be in the settings UI not in the envs, we need the security values to be in the UI."* Overrules the call I made yesterday, and rule 25 is on your side — I argued deployment-topology, but the operator has to be able to SEE what protects them, and reading a container's environment is not seeing. Six new settings in a **Security** group: trusted proxy hops (default 1), the per-account and per-address sign-in limits with their shared window, and the sign-up limit with its own. `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` is gone; the rate limits are no longer hardcoded constants. **The hard part was keeping the throttle cheap.** It consults these BEFORE opening a database connection — deliberately, because a refused attempt is meant to cost nothing, and the hop count is needed to know who is even asking. A query per attempt would undo both. So there is a small cache seeded from the registry defaults (the app works with no database at all, which is what the DB-free unit lane relies on), loaded at boot, and refreshed on every settings save — the same live-update contract `session_ttl_days` already had. `SlidingWindow` now takes its limit and window as SUPPLIERS rather than values, so a saved number applies to the next attempt instead of the next deploy. **Bounds are rejected, not clamped.** A hop count of 99 would trust anything a caller sent; a sign-in limit of 0 would lock every account out permanently. Both now fail validation with a message naming the range, and the number input carries min/max so the browser objects first. Silently storing a different number than the one typed is how somebody ends up believing a protection is set to something it is not. `MAX_BUCKETS` stays a constant on purpose: it protects the limiter from itself rather than the app from a caller, and there is no operator judgment to apply. Two integration tests, because the whole point is the round trip: a dangerous value refused, a legitimate one reaching the cache the throttle reads and persisting; and every Security row reaching the admin payload with bounds and a description that explains itself.