AGPL-3.0, SECURITY and CONTRIBUTING; the install path pulls :latest, not :dev #244

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bvandeusen merged 2 commits from dev into main 2026-08-31 17:01:20 -04:00

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	bc4eba636d	fix: the documented install path pulled :dev, not :latest (#3270) ... docker-compose.yml pinned :dev on all five app services — web, worker, scheduler, maintenance-long, ml-worker. The README documents `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` as the production path, and -f means "use only this file", skipping the override and its build: directives. So Compose pulled image:, and image: was the rolling development channel. The documented way to install this product shipped development builds. It went unnoticed for a structural reason rather than a careless one: nobody who works on the project takes that path. The operator deploys from a swarm stack file; contributors get docker-compose.override.yml, which sets build: for all five services, and build: wins over image:. The broken path is reachable only by a stranger following the README — which is exactly the audience that did not exist until now. :latest, per rule 147: main IS production. It is also what the agent stack (agent/docker-compose.yml) already pinned, so this makes the two stacks agree rather than introducing a new convention. Both paths verified with `docker compose config`, which merges and prints without starting anything: dev path — build: present on all five, image: not pulled -f production — 0 build: directives, five :latest images resolved Also checked the base file for anything a stranger could not satisfy: no host-absolute volume paths, no operator-specific port bindings, no device mappings. The tag was the only defect in the consumer path. The comment on web.image is deliberately long (rule 32). A line reading :latest inside a file a developer is debugging with is exactly the line someone flips back to :dev to test something and then commits, and the consequence — strangers silently installing bleeding edge — is invisible to everyone who works here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-08-31 16:55:43 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	dbc4e8b0c6	docs: AGPL-3.0, plus SECURITY and CONTRIBUTING (#3269) ... The repo had no LICENSE, which meant all rights reserved by default: nobody could legally run or modify it, and "public availability" was a contradiction no amount of install documentation could fix. This is the hard blocker in milestone 328; everything else in it is quality. AGPL-3.0, at the operator's explicit choice, for the reason the operator gave: this should not become something another party runs as a hosted proprietary service. Section 13 is what makes it fit — for a self-hosted web app, distribution otherwise never happens, so the GPL's obligation would never actually bite. AGPL reaches the case that matters here: running a MODIFIED copy as a service for others. LICENSE is the FSF text fetched from gnu.org and verified byte-identical (34,523 bytes, 661 lines, §13 "Remote Network Interaction" present), not retyped. README's old "Personal project; use at your own discretion" said nothing legally and is replaced with what the licence actually asks — including the part worth being clear about, that running an unmodified copy for yourself carries no obligation whatsoever. SECURITY.md names what this software actually holds, because that is what makes a report serious here: live third-party session cookies for accounts with payment methods attached, the extension API key, the multi-user sharing ACL, and arbitrary downloaded media that gets decoded and fed to models. It also states the plain-HTTP posture up front, so "served over HTTP" and "no HSTS" are understood as the documented design rather than filed as findings. There is no private disclosure channel yet, so the reporting instruction is to open an issue containing NOTHING but the fact that a report exists, and wait for a private contact. Awkward on purpose: an issue tracker is public the moment it is written to, and every self-hosted instance stays vulnerable until its operator can update. Worth replacing with a real contact address — that decision is the operator's, since it publishes one. CONTRIBUTING records the two things that actually catch people: ruff's order-by-type import sorting, and that a model change and its migration belong in the same commit. The second is not style — the models and the chain silently diverged for a long time (#3275) and autogenerate was unsafe as a result. Pre-publication scan, since the repo is about to get attention: .env.example is placeholders only (`changeme_*`), `.env` is gitignored with an `!.env.example` exception, no credential-shaped literals are committed, and there are no private IPs or operator home paths. The only hostnames are the project's own forge, which is public by design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-08-31 14:53:06 -04:00