Files
minstrel/internal/server/hygiene_test.go
T
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5.5 d411693bb2
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feat(server): security headers and a hash-based CSP for the web app (M462 #4980)
There were no security headers at all. Now:
- every response: nosniff, Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin,
  Permissions-Policy (no camera/mic/geolocation), X-Frame-Options DENY;
  each set only if the handler hasn't.
- HSTS only when the trusted proxy reports HTTPS (rule 94); never a redirect.
- index.html carries a Content-Security-Policy whose script-src is 'self'
  plus the sha256 of each inline script in the page as served, computed
  after the branding template runs. No 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval'
  for scripts. img-src admits remote https/http because Lidarr suggestion
  art is a remote poster URL.

Hashing in Go rather than via SvelteKit's kit.csp covers the inline scripts
SvelteKit doesn't know about (app.html's theme bootstrap and the branding
global injected at build) and stays correct whatever the app name is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 09:29:26 -04:00

129 lines
4.5 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/auth"
)
func okHandler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Body != nil {
if _, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return
}
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
})
}
func TestLimitRequestBody_RejectsOversizedBody(t *testing.T) {
h := limitRequestBody(okHandler())
big := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("x", maxRequestBody+1))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/playlists", big))
if w.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("oversized body: status = %d, want the handler's read to fail", w.Code)
}
small := strings.NewReader(`{"name":"ok"}`)
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/playlists", small))
if w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Errorf("small body: status = %d, want 204", w.Code)
}
}
// The cases a cross-site form or no-preflight fetch could produce must be
// refused when the session cookie rides along; everything a real client
// sends must pass.
func TestRequireJSONForCookieWrites(t *testing.T) {
cookie := &http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: "tok"}
tests := []struct {
name string
method string
path string
contentType string
body string
withCookie bool
want int
}{
{"form post with cookie", http.MethodPost, "/api/me/password", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "a=b", true, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType},
{"text/plain post with cookie", http.MethodPost, "/api/me/password", "text/plain", `{"a":1}`, true, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType},
{"multipart with cookie", http.MethodPut, "/api/me/profile", "multipart/form-data; boundary=x", "--x--", true, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType},
{"body without content type", http.MethodPost, "/api/me/profile", "", `{"a":1}`, true, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType},
{"json with cookie", http.MethodPost, "/api/me/password", "application/json", `{}`, true, http.StatusNoContent},
{"json with charset", http.MethodPost, "/api/me/password", "application/json; charset=utf-8", `{}`, true, http.StatusNoContent},
{"bodiless delete with cookie", http.MethodDelete, "/api/me/sessions/1", "", "", true, http.StatusNoContent},
{"form post without cookie (bearer client)", http.MethodPost, "/api/me/password", "text/plain", "x", false, http.StatusNoContent},
{"subsonic post is not /api", http.MethodPost, "/rest/scrobble", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "id=1", true, http.StatusNoContent},
{"GET is never checked", http.MethodGet, "/api/me", "text/plain", "", true, http.StatusNoContent},
}
h := requireJSONForCookieWrites(okHandler())
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var body io.Reader
if tc.body != "" {
body = strings.NewReader(tc.body)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, body)
if tc.contentType != "" {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", tc.contentType)
}
if tc.withCookie {
req.AddCookie(cookie)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != tc.want {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", w.Code, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
serve := func(hops int, proto string) http.Header {
h := securityHeaders(func() int { return hops })(okHandler())
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
if proto != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", proto)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w.Header()
}
base := serve(0, "")
for key, want := range map[string]string{
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"Referrer-Policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
} {
if got := base.Get(key); got != want {
t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", key, got, want)
}
}
if !strings.Contains(base.Get("Permissions-Policy"), "microphone=()") {
t.Errorf("Permissions-Policy = %q", base.Get("Permissions-Policy"))
}
// Rule 94's three cases for HSTS.
if got := serve(0, "https").Get("Strict-Transport-Security"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("hops 0 + forwarded https: HSTS = %q, want none", got)
}
if got := serve(1, "https").Get("Strict-Transport-Security"); got == "" {
t.Error("hops 1 + forwarded https: want HSTS")
}
if got := serve(1, "").Get("Strict-Transport-Security"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("plain request: HSTS = %q, want none", got)
}
}