Merges Renovate's kit 3 (PR #149) and adapter-static 4 (PR #148) bumps, plus the migration they need. The mechanical part is `sv migrate sveltekit-3`, run one task at a time and reviewed: - svelte.config.js is gone. Its options move into sveltekit() in vite.config.ts, exported as kitOptions so vitest.config.ts runs the same kit setup, including the $test-utils alias the tests import. - $lib becomes #lib through package.json "imports". There is no src/lib/index, so only the "#lib/*" entry is kept. - tsconfig extends $app/tsconfig. - Peer floors raised to kit 3's requirements: svelte ^5.57.1, vite ^8.0.12, svelte-check ^4.7.5. By hand, from the codemod's list of non-automated tasks: - goto's replaceState option is now replace; keepFocus becomes reset: false. For the search typeahead, reset: false also stops the scroll-to-top, which is wanted while typing. - The test setup mocks drop pushState/replaceState and $app/paths base/assets, which kit 3 removed, and mock refreshAll in place of invalidateAll. - The other flagged files only read page.url or goto internal routes, so they needed no change. TypeScript goes to ^6, not the ^7 Renovate offers: kit 3 declares typescript ^6 as a peer and svelte-check 4.7 accepts ^5 || ^6. Move to 7 once both accept it. With Tailwind 4 and kit 3 in, `npm audit` on the whole tree reports 0, so the web lane now audits every dependency rather than only what ships to browsers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
106 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
106 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security notes
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What Minstrel does to protect accounts, and the reasoning behind the
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decisions that look odd at first. For deployment steps, see
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[hosting](./hosting.md).
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## Accounts and sessions
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- **Passwords** are stored as bcrypt hashes.
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- **Login, registration and password reset are rate-limited:** 10 failed
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sign-ins per account and 50 per address per 15 minutes, with similar limits
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on register, forgot-password and reset. The Subsonic `/rest` API shares the
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login limits. An unknown username takes as long to reject as a wrong
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password, so timing doesn't reveal which accounts exist.
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- **Sessions** are random 256-bit tokens; the server stores only their
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SHA-256. A session ends after 30 days unused or 365 days in total. Changing
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your password signs out your other devices; a password reset, or an admin
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resetting it, signs out all of them.
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- **API keys** (the OpenSubsonic `apiKey`) are stored as SHA-256 too, so a
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key is shown once, when you generate it in Settings, and can only be
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replaced after that.
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- **The first account** on an empty server needs the setup token from the
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server log (see [hosting](./hosting.md#first-account)).
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- **Password-reset links** are built only from the configured public address,
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never from the request's `Host` header.
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## Requests
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- Request bodies are capped at 4 MiB and must arrive within 30 seconds.
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Streams and the live-event connection are unaffected.
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- Every response carries `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`,
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`Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, a restrictive
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`Permissions-Policy` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY`. The web app also gets a
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`Content-Security-Policy` that allows only its own scripts, by hash.
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- Media responses are `Cache-Control: private`, so a shared cache never keeps
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one user's audio or artwork for another.
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## CSRF: SameSite cookies plus JSON-only writes
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There are no CSRF tokens. The session cookie is `SameSite=Strict`, so
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browsers don't send it with requests that start on another site. That leaves
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one gap: SameSite treats every subdomain of the same registrable domain as the
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same site, so a different app on `other.example.com` could still send a
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request carrying the cookie. To close it, any state-changing `/api` request
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authenticated by the cookie must have a JSON body (`Content-Type:
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application/json`) or no body at all. An HTML form or a script on another
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origin can't send JSON without a CORS preflight, and Minstrel answers no
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cross-origin preflight. Requests authenticated with a bearer token or the
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Subsonic query parameters carry nothing a browser attaches on its own, so
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they aren't checked.
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## Subsonic sign-in, and the one password stored in plain text
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Classic Subsonic clients sign in with `t` and `s`: the MD5 of the password
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followed by a random salt. To check that, the server has to know the password
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itself, so supporting this sign-in method means storing a password Minstrel
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can read. That is the Subsonic password, and it is the only credential
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Minstrel keeps unhashed.
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- **The recommended way in is the API key.** Clients that support the
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OpenSubsonic `apiKey` should use it. The key is stored hashed and can be
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replaced at any time in Settings.
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- **The Subsonic password is never your login password.** Minstrel generates
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it (**Settings → Subsonic password**), shows it once, and lets you replace
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or turn it off. Because it is random, a copy of the database exposes access
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to this server's Subsonic API and nothing else: it can't be a password you
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also use somewhere else.
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- **`t`/`s` and `p=` sign-in are off for an account until it has a Subsonic
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password.** Plain `p=` sign-in is additionally off server-wide unless
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`subsonic.allow_plaintext_password` is enabled.
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- `minstrel admin reset-password` changes only the login password. Older
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versions also copied it into the Subsonic password; upgrading clears every
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Subsonic password once, so those copies are gone. An account that used
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`t`/`s` sign-in needs a new Subsonic password generated in Settings.
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## Android allows plain HTTP
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The Android app permits cleartext connections, for two reasons that can't be
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narrowed to a list of hosts. The server address is whatever the user types,
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and many self-hosted servers run plain HTTP on a LAN. And UPnP, DLNA and
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Sonos speakers are controlled over plain HTTP at addresses that are only
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known once they're discovered. The reasoning lives in
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`android/app/src/main/res/xml/network_security_config.xml`.
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This doesn't weaken app updates: an APK altered in transit fails the
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platform's signature check. It does mean a server reached over plain HTTP
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across the internet exposes the session cookie in transit, which is why the
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[hosting guide](./hosting.md) puts public servers behind HTTPS.
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On the phone, the session cookie is encrypted with a key held in the Android
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Keystore, so a copy of the app's files doesn't yield a usable session.
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## Build pipeline
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Nothing is published unless every check passes: the Go, integration, web and
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Android test suites, `govulncheck` against the toolchain that builds the
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image, and `npm audit` on every web dependency, build tooling included. See
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`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`.
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## Reporting a problem
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Open an issue on the
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[repository](https://git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/issues), or
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contact the maintainer privately first if it's something that shouldn't be
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public until fixed.
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