bvandeusen
d86af7397d
Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.
4 lines
74 B
SQL
4 lines
74 B
SQL
ALTER TABLE sessions
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DROP COLUMN created_ip,
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DROP COLUMN last_ip;
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