Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.
227 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
227 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/auth"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/db/dbq"
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)
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// seedSession inserts a session for userID and returns its id.
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func seedSession(t *testing.T, pool *pgxpool.Pool, userID pgtype.UUID, ip string) pgtype.UUID {
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t.Helper()
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token, err := auth.MintSessionToken()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
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}
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sess, err := dbq.New(pool).InsertSession(context.Background(), dbq.InsertSessionParams{
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UserID: userID,
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TokenHash: auth.HashSessionToken(token),
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UserAgent: "test-agent",
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Ip: ip,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("insert session: %v", err)
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}
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return sess.ID
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}
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// withSession attaches the user and current-session id the handlers expect
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// from RequireUser.
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func withSession(r *http.Request, user dbq.User, sessionID pgtype.UUID) *http.Request {
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), userCtxKeyForTest(), user)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.SessionIDCtxKeyForTest(), sessionID)
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return r.WithContext(ctx)
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}
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// withURLParam wires a chi route param, which handlers read via chi.URLParam.
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func withURLParam(r *http.Request, key, value string) *http.Request {
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rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
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rctx.URLParams.Add(key, value)
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return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx))
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}
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// The rule #47 assertion. A delete keyed only on session id would let any
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// household member revoke any other member's session by id — this pins that
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// the user scope is actually in the WHERE clause and not just intended.
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func TestRevokeMySession_CannotRevokeAnotherUsersSession(t *testing.T) {
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h, pool := testHandlers(t)
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alice := seedUser(t, pool, "alice", "hunter2", false)
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bob := seedUser(t, pool, "bob", "hunter2", false)
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bobSession := seedSession(t, pool, bob.ID, "203.0.113.9")
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aliceSession := seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "203.0.113.1")
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target := uuidToString(bobSession)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/me/sessions/"+target, nil)
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req = withURLParam(req, "id", target)
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req = withSession(req, alice, aliceSession)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.handleRevokeMySession(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
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t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404 (not another user's to revoke)", w.Code)
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}
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// The 404 must mean "didn't happen", not merely "wasn't reported".
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var stillThere bool
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if err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(),
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`SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE id = $1)`, bobSession,
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).Scan(&stillThere); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("exists check: %v", err)
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}
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if !stillThere {
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t.Error("bob's session was deleted by alice's request")
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}
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}
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func TestRevokeMySession_DeletesOwnSession(t *testing.T) {
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h, pool := testHandlers(t)
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alice := seedUser(t, pool, "alice", "hunter2", false)
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current := seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "203.0.113.1")
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other := seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "198.51.100.7")
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target := uuidToString(other)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/me/sessions/"+target, nil)
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req = withURLParam(req, "id", target)
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req = withSession(req, alice, current)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.handleRevokeMySession(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 204", w.Code)
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}
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var gone bool
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if err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(),
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`SELECT NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE id = $1)`, other,
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).Scan(&gone); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("exists check: %v", err)
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}
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if !gone {
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t.Error("session survived its own owner's revoke")
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}
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}
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// "Log out everywhere else" must spare the caller — otherwise the button
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// signs you out of the page you pressed it on, which is indistinguishable
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// from the compromise it's meant to remedy.
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func TestRevokeMyOtherSessions_SparesCurrentAndOtherUsers(t *testing.T) {
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h, pool := testHandlers(t)
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alice := seedUser(t, pool, "alice", "hunter2", false)
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bob := seedUser(t, pool, "bob", "hunter2", false)
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current := seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "203.0.113.1")
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seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "198.51.100.7")
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seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "198.51.100.8")
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bobSession := seedSession(t, pool, bob.ID, "203.0.113.9")
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/me/sessions/logout-others", nil)
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req = withSession(req, alice, current)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.handleRevokeMyOtherSessions(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", w.Code)
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}
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var body revokedResp
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if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
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}
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if body.Revoked != 2 {
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t.Errorf("revoked = %d, want 2 (alice's other two, not bob's)", body.Revoked)
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}
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var aliceRemaining, bobRemaining int
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if err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(),
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`SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1`, alice.ID,
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).Scan(&aliceRemaining); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("count alice: %v", err)
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}
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if aliceRemaining != 1 {
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t.Errorf("alice sessions = %d, want 1 (the current one)", aliceRemaining)
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}
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if err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(),
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`SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE id = $1`, bobSession,
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).Scan(&bobRemaining); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("count bob: %v", err)
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}
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if bobRemaining != 1 {
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t.Error("bob's session was caught in alice's logout-others")
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}
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}
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// Without a current-session id the exclusion has nothing to exclude, so the
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// handler must refuse rather than delete everything.
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func TestRevokeMyOtherSessions_RefusesWithoutCurrentSession(t *testing.T) {
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h, pool := testHandlers(t)
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alice := seedUser(t, pool, "alice", "hunter2", false)
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seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "203.0.113.1")
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/me/sessions/logout-others", nil)
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req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), userCtxKeyForTest(), alice))
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.handleRevokeMyOtherSessions(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
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t.Errorf("status = %d, want 500", w.Code)
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}
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var remaining int
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if err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(),
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`SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1`, alice.ID,
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).Scan(&remaining); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("count: %v", err)
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}
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if remaining != 1 {
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t.Errorf("sessions = %d, want 1 — refusing must not delete", remaining)
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}
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}
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func TestListMySessions_FlagsCurrentAndScopesToUser(t *testing.T) {
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h, pool := testHandlers(t)
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alice := seedUser(t, pool, "alice", "hunter2", false)
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bob := seedUser(t, pool, "bob", "hunter2", false)
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current := seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "203.0.113.1")
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seedSession(t, pool, alice.ID, "198.51.100.7")
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seedSession(t, pool, bob.ID, "203.0.113.9")
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me/sessions", nil)
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req = withSession(req, alice, current)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.handleListMySessions(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", w.Code)
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}
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var got []sessionResp
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if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&got); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
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}
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if len(got) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("sessions = %d, want 2 (bob's must not appear)", len(got))
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}
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currentCount := 0
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for _, s := range got {
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if s.Current {
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currentCount++
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if s.ID != uuidToString(current) {
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t.Errorf("current flagged on %s, want %s", s.ID, uuidToString(current))
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}
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}
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if s.CreatedIP == "" {
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t.Error("created_ip empty — the whole point of the surface")
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}
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}
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if currentCount != 1 {
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t.Errorf("current-flagged rows = %d, want exactly 1", currentCount)
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}
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}
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