Silent self-update, active sessions with real client IPs, genre/year browsing, handoff fix #119
Merged
bvandeusen
merged 15 commits from 2026-08-05 15:14:49 -04:00
dev into main
15
Commits
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78aa9befb6 |
fix(connectivity): probe on foreground; a burst can't corroborate ServerDown — #1209
android / Build + lint + test (push) Successful in 4m12s
Two changes so a network handoff stops making the app refuse to play music. ## Correction first: half of what I proposed already existed I recommended "require corroboration before ServerDown, since Unstable is non-gating." ReachabilityMachine has done exactly that since it was written — onProbeFailure takes Reachable → Unstable, and escalates only on corroboration or the 120s backstop. There is even a test named `single probe failure is unstable not down`. I proposed building a thing that shipped months ago. Reading the machine properly turned up the real gap, which is narrower and more specific. ## 1. Probe when the app returns to the foreground The genuine missing piece, and #1209's own note had it backwards: it listed this as "already happens via link probe." It doesn't. `recheck()` had exactly two callers — a button in VersionTooOldBanner and pull-to-refresh — and nothing observed ProcessLifecycleOwner. The link probe fires on a connectivity *change*, so an app backgrounded on stable Wi-Fi gets none. That made a stale ServerDown outlive its cause: the poll loop's delay() is throttled while screen-off/doze, so recovery waited for whenever the OS next let the loop run. June's capture recovering at "EXACTLY 22:31:10 app_foreground" was the throttled delay resuming, not a deliberate probe — same timestamp, different mechanism, and that difference is the whole bug. NetworkStatusController now implements DefaultLifecycleObserver and calls the existing recheck() on ON_START. force = true, so it also bypasses ARBITRATE_MIN_GAP_MS: a user opening the app is exactly when a stale banner and a refused track are most visible, and it's once per foreground. ## 2. A burst of op failures no longer corroborates itself The actual defect in the escalation path. Corroboration required 2 op failures within 30s — but a link handoff fails every in-flight request at once, so a burst is ONE event producing N failures, not N independent observations that the server is gone. Two simultaneous failures walked straight to Unreachable. onOpFailure now drops a failure landing within CORROBORATION_MIN_SPACING_MS (3s) of the last recorded one. Above the sub-second window a handoff occupies, low enough that a real outage still corroborates within seconds once anything retries. ## Why this matters more than the task implied #1209 called the follow-ups "cosmetic in the diagnostics". They aren't. OfflineGatedDataSource.gateOnHealth() throws OfflineException on ServerDown BEFORE touching the network, and TrackRow disables rows. So a spurious ServerDown means the app declines to play uncached tracks that would play fine — for a blip that already resolved. The note's "captured skips advanced fine" was timing luck, not evidence the gate is harmless. ## Tests `two op failures plus a failed probe escalate immediately` used timestamps 500ms apart, which the new rule treats as a burst — so I re-spaced it and renamed it `two SPACED op failures...`. That's a deliberate reversal of an encoded expectation, not a broken test being patched. Also re-spaced `stale op failures do not corroborate` (used 0 and 1_000): left alone it would still have passed, but for the wrong reason — burst-dropping rather than staleness — and a test that can't fail for its stated reason is worse than no test. Added: a burst of four failures plus a failed probe stays Unstable, and a burst that never recovers still escalates via the sustained backstop, so dropping duplicates can't make a real outage undetectable. The foreground hook itself is unverifiable in a JVM test (ProcessLifecycleOwner needs the framework, and there's no instrumentation lane). Checked instead that nothing constructs NetworkStatusController outside Hilt, so init's ProcessLifecycleOwner.get() only runs on the main thread during Application.onCreate — the same pattern LiveEventsDispatcher already uses. |
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a9ca49dc4e |
feat(library): genre + year quick-jumps on album and artist detail — #367
Last bullet of #367. From an album you like, one click to everything else from that year or in that genre. Year was free — AlbumRef already carried it. Genre was not: AlbumDetail is AlbumRef + tracks and neither carried genre, because genre lives on TRACKS. So both detail responses gained a derived `genres` array, computed from the entity's tracks rather than stored, since an album's tracks can legitimately disagree about genre. Split and trimmed identically to the browse index. That's the invariant this whole task turned on: if the chip's matching diverged from the index's splitting, a chip would lead to a page that doesn't contain the album you clicked from. No year link on artist detail. An artist spans many years, so a single one would be a lie about the discography — genres only there. Genre lookup failure is logged and degrades to no chips rather than failing the request; a navigation nicety must not 404 a detail page that otherwise loaded. `genres` is always an array at JSON, never null, matching how every other list field in this package is emitted. ## Type widening, and the TypeScript version of a lesson from earlier today Adding a required field to AlbumDetail/ArtistDetail breaks every typed fixture that constructs one. Six of them across three test files. That's the same shape as the Go signature changes that cost three CI rounds in #2453 — change a type, then go find everything that builds it — so I searched for the constructions before pushing instead of after. All six updated. Tests: the encoded href for a slash-bearing genre ("Rock/Pop" → ?g=Rock%2FPop), the year href, and the no-tags case rendering no chips at all. gofmt verified clean via docker rather than guessed. |
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feb1c2eca8 |
feat(web): genre and year browse pages — #367
test-web / test (push) Successful in 33s
Client half of #367. Two new Library tabs, each an index plus a drill-down. Genres are ordered by track count rather than alphabetically. Raw ID3 carries a long tail of one-off tags, so alphabetical would bury the handful of genres you actually have a library's worth of. Years are grouped into decades — a flat list of every year in a decades-deep library is a wall of numbers, and the decade is how people actually think about it. ## Selection travels in the query string, not the path `?g=Rock%2FPop`, not `/library/genres/Rock%2FPop`. A slash-bearing genre cannot survive a path segment — the server sees two segments, and a hard reload wouldn't reconstruct it through the SPA fallback either. There's a test pinning the encoded href and another pinning that the DECODED value reaches the API. ## Why these two pages don't use svelte-query for their lists The indexes do — fetched once per mount, so static options suffice and the cache survives bouncing in and out of a drill-down. The drill-down lists deliberately don't. Their selection comes from the URL and changes WITHOUT remounting the page, and this codebase has no reactive-query-options pattern anywhere; inventing one here would be a larger change than the feature justifies, and one I can't exercise locally. So they use $effect keyed on the derived selection with an explicit Load more. The stale-response guard is a plain `let`, not $state, and that's load-bearing: as reactive state, reading the token inside the fetch path would make the effect depend on its own writes. Its job is to discard a late response for a previously selected genre instead of painting it over the current one. ## Also Added the year filter to /library/albums' contract but NOT to that page's UI — its infinite scroll is a svelte-query infinite query, and making it react to a filter is the same reactive-options problem. The dedicated pages cover the capability, which is the shape the task offered as its alternative. Library tab bar's comment claims it mirrors Android's LibraryScreen. These two tabs have no Android equivalent, so I noted that inline rather than leaving the claim quietly false. Parity remains an open call. Not yet done from #367's bullet list: genre/year quick-jump links on album and artist detail. Year is free (AlbumRef already carries it) but genre is exposed nowhere client-side — AlbumDetail is AlbumRef + tracks, and neither carries genre — so it needs a small API addition. Following as its own commit. |
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f8f2273aec |
style: gofmt alignment in library_browse_test — #367
One space. `name:` had to align with `query:` inside a composite literal where
both sat on their own lines.
Found via `docker run golang:1.25-alpine gofmt -l`, which is the actual point
of this commit: gofmt is available here the same way sqlc is, and there is no
reason to have let CI discover a formatting nit. Whole tree verified clean, not
just this file.
The substance of
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1126bfcf78 |
feat(library): genre + year browse queries and endpoints — #367
Server half of #367. Web UI follows. Genres are exposed AS-IS per the operator: split on the delimiter, trimmed, but no case folding and no synonym mapping. So "Rock" and "rock" appear as separate rows, as does "Rock/Pop" alongside "Rock" and "Pop". The raw spread has to be visible before anyone can judge whether it needs normalising, and the alternative is a mapping table to invent and then maintain. Trimming is not an exception to that. Splitting "Rock; Pop" yields " Pop", and showing that as a genre distinct from "Pop" would be a bug in OUR splitting, not fidelity to the operator's tags. ## The correctness trap this had to avoid ListAlbumsByGenre compared tracks.genre verbatim, while recommendation.sql and discover.sql have always split it on [;,]. Building the browse index by splitting while matching exactly would have listed genres whose pages are empty — every multi-genre track unreachable from either of its genres. So ListAlbumsByGenre now splits too. That also fixes Subsonic getAlbumList?type=byGenre, its only caller, which silently missed every multi-genre track. Its Genre param went *string → string as a result. EXISTS rather than JOIN + DISTINCT ON throughout: the lateral split emits one row per (track, fragment), so a join multiplies rows per album and needs DISTINCT to undo itself. EXISTS asks the question directly, and the count query then matches the list query by construction rather than by coincidence. ## Genre is a query parameter, not a path segment Because "Rock/Pop" is a real ID3 tag — the one the task itself cites — and a slash cannot survive a path segment: Go normalises %2F and the router would split the value in two. So filtering rides GET /api/library/albums?genre=, which also reuses the existing paged album surface instead of adding a parallel one. Endpoints: GET /api/library/genres unpaged index + track counts GET /api/library/years unpaged index + album counts GET /api/library/albums?genre= filtered page GET /api/library/albums?year_from=&year_to= filtered page, either edge open The indexes are unpaged deliberately: a client needs the whole set to render a browsable picker, and paging would let it show only a prefix of an ordering the user didn't choose. Two refusals rather than guesses: genre+year together is a 400 (the UI browses them as separate axes, and quietly dropping half a filter would report a narrower result than it returned), and an inverted year range is a 400 rather than being silently swapped. Undated albums are absent from the year axis rather than bucketed under 0 — "unknown" is not a year, and a 0 row would sort to one end of a chronological list looking like data. Tests: parseYearFilter is pure and runs in the fast lane. The integration tests assert the thing that would otherwise be silently broken — that a "Rock;Pop" track is reachable from BOTH genres, that "Rock/Pop" survives as a filter value, that fragment whitespace is trimmed, and that undated albums stay out of every year range. Reused the existing seedAlbum/seedTrackWithGenre fixtures, which already took exactly the year and genre arguments needed. |
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5b36d79ff9 |
fix(server): access log reports the real client, not the proxy — #2453
Closes the disagreement left open by #2453: requestlog.go logged raw r.RemoteAddr while the Active-sessions surface resolved through the operator's configured proxy depth. Behind a proxy — the normal deployment for anything public — every access-log line carried the same useless proxy address, and the two surfaces contradicted each other about who connected. Logs and UI disagreeing is worse than either being wrong alone, because it costs you trust in both. `remote` now holds auth.ClientIP(r, hops). The attribute KEY is deliberately unchanged so existing log greps keep working; only its accuracy improved. Wiring note. The access log covers /healthz and the SPA, so it's registered before the pool-bearing branch that used to build the settings service. Rather than close over a variable reassigned later — which works, but leaves a mutable-after-registration seam and an awkward question about races — I hoisted netsettings.New above the router entirely. It already handles a nil pool by returning a default-valued service, so no branch is needed and the accessor stays a plain method value. Applied the lesson from the last three CI failures BEFORE pushing this time: a bare-identifier grep for `requestLog(` found three call sites in requestlog_test.go that a qualified pattern could never have matched, since the function is package-private and its tests are in-package. Also swept netsettings.New and ClientIP the same way. Tests: the behaviour change gets its own table — nil accessor and depth 0 log the socket peer, depth 1 through a PUBLIC-addressed proxy logs the client (the exact case the old heuristic got wrong forever), depth 2 reaches through a CDN. Added `remote` to the required-keys assertion so the attribute can't quietly disappear. |
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11538095be |
fix(net): validate hop range before checking availability — #2453
TestSetHops_RejectsOutOfRange caught a real ordering bug in code I wrote in the same commit: the nil-pool guard sat ahead of the range check, so SetHops(-1) on a service with no pool returned "network settings unavailable" instead of ErrHopsOutOfRange. Range first is correct, and the distinction is user-visible rather than cosmetic: the argument is invalid regardless of whether the database is reachable, and admin_network.go maps ErrHopsOutOfRange to 400 while anything else becomes 500. The old order blamed the server for the caller's input. Note this is the first failure in this sequence that wasn't a missed call site — vet and golangci-lint both passed, and a test asserting a specific sentinel error found it. Worth the extra assertion; `err != nil` would have passed happily. |
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d5ab3b0764 |
fix(net): update the in-package Mount call site in library_test — #2453
Third attempt at the same class of mistake, so worth naming precisely. TestRoutesRegisteredInMount calls Mount() from INSIDE package api, so the call reads `Mount(...)` unqualified. My verification grep was `api.Mount(`, which cannot match it. Same shape as the previous failure, where I grepped `auth.ClientIP(` and missed nothing — but only because those callers happened to be in other packages. The lesson generalises: after changing an exported signature, search for the bare identifier, not the package-qualified form. In-package callers — which in Go means most tests — are invisible to the qualified pattern. This time I swept every signature I touched (Mount, RequireUser, ClientIP, TouchSessionLastSeen) with an unqualified pattern before pushing, rather than letting CI enumerate them one per run. Passing h.netSettings (nil in test handlers) is deliberate, not a placeholder: this test asserts route registration, and Hops() is nil-safe by design so the middleware reads "trust nothing" rather than panicking. Also gave netsettings' logger field a use — it was assigned and never read, which staticcheck's unused pass can flag. A hop-count change alters how much of a client-supplied header the server believes, so it earns a log line for anyone later debugging odd addresses in the sessions list. |
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a07fb3867a |
fix(net): thread hops into session creation; disambiguate card tests — #2453
Two CI failures from
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381e9cedb7 |
feat(net): trusted-proxy depth so real client IPs survive a proxy — #2453
Fixes the defect the operator spotted in #370 immediately after it shipped: auth.ClientIP ignored X-Forwarded-For whenever RemoteAddr was public, so a proxy on a public address — a separate host, or a CDN, i.e. anyone running this publicly, since public means TLS means a proxy — recorded the PROXY for every session. created_ip and last_ip were then always equal and the "Address changed" signal could never fire. The feature looked like it worked and reported nothing. Replaced with the standard trusted-hop model (Rails, Caddy, Traefik, nginx). XFF grows left-to-right as each proxy appends the peer it received from, so for client -> CDN -> own-proxy -> app the app sees [client, CDN] with RemoteAddr = own-proxy, and the client sits at XFF[len - hops]: 0 RemoteAddr, XFF ignored — no proxy 1 the address your own proxy observed 2 through a CDN in front of your proxy Default 1, per the operator: publicly reachable means a TLS terminator in front. The cost is real and stated rather than hidden. hops >= 1 DECLARES that a proxy exists; set it with no proxy, or deeper than the actual chain, and the index reaches attacker-supplied entries, letting a visitor choose which address their own session shows — defeating exactly the detection #370 is for. That's inherent to the model, which is why 0 is a first-class value and the admin card says "count your proxies, don't guess high" instead of just exposing a number. Both mis-set shapes are pinned by tests so they stay known consequences rather than surprises. Migration 0053 + internal/netsettings, cached under an RWMutex. That's not an optimisation: ClientIP runs in RequireUser for every authenticated request, so a per-request query would put the database on the critical path of the whole API. New() always returns a usable service so a boot-time DB hiccup degrades to the default instead of breaking that path (rule #131), and Hops() is nil-safe because test routers construct middleware without it. RequireUser now takes a func() int rather than an int — the value is operator-editable at runtime while the middleware is built once at boot, and reading it per request is what makes a save take effect with no restart (rule #25). The admin card is verifiable, not just configurable: it reports the address the CURRENT setting resolves THIS request to, the raw forwarded chain, and the socket peer — so you set the number, save, and confirm the address matches the machine you're on. It also counts the arriving chain and says how many proxies that implies. GET/PUT both return that payload, PUT recomputed under the new value, so the effect is visible without a reload. Also fixes styling in the #370 card that CI could not catch: text-destructive and bg-destructive don't exist in this Tailwind config — the palette is colors.action.destructive — so the "Address changed" warning and the sign-out-others button were rendering unstyled. Both now use text-action-destructive / bg-action-destructive / text-action-fg. Not done here: requestlog.go still logs raw RemoteAddr and will disagree with the sessions UI about who connected. Left for its own change. |
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bf649f3beb |
feat(web): active sessions card in Settings — #370
test-web / test (push) Successful in 32s
Client half of #370. Lists every device signed in to your account, with a per-row sign-out and a "sign out all other devices" action. The card does one thing the API alone doesn't: it says "Address changed" when created_ip and last_ip differ, rather than printing two addresses and leaving you to compare them. That mismatch — same device string, different origin — is the shape of a stolen token, and it's the reason IP capture was worth a migration. Making the operator spot it by eye would have wasted the data. Placed with Password and API Token rather than at the bottom of the page: those three are the account-security group, and this is the one that tells you the other two need attention. Details worth naming: - The current session gets a "This device" badge and NO sign-out button — offering one would log you out of the page you're standing on. The server already excludes it from logout-others; this makes that visible. - Sign-out-all-others is a two-step confirm and states the count, so the button can't be a surprise. - A 404 on revoke reloads instead of erroring. It means the session is already gone — revoked elsewhere, or expired — so the list was simply stale and showing the truth is the right response. The code is `session_not_found`, not `not_found`: apierror.NotFound(what) prefixes it. - Empty and error states both handled (rule #24); the empty case is practically unreachable since listing requires an authenticated request, and is handled rather than assumed. - User-agent parsing is deliberately coarse. A real UA parser is a dependency and a maintenance burden for a string whose only job is "do you recognise this?" — the addresses carry the actual signal. Tests cover the parts that would be quiet if broken: the current-session badge suppressing its own sign-out button, the address-changed warning appearing and NOT appearing, the two-step confirm not firing on first click, and the load-failure retry. Android parity is a separate decision, not assumed. |
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d86af7397d |
feat(auth): active sessions API with origin/current IP — #370
Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268. |
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2e1a8a62d8 |
refactor(android): move cleartext opt-out into a networkSecurityConfig — #2439
android / Build + lint + test (push) Successful in 3m46s
`android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"` sat on <application> as a bare opt-out of the platform's network-security default, with nothing recorded about why. It's now a res/xml/network_security_config.xml carrying the same permission and the reasoning behind it. Behaviour is unchanged. networkSecurityConfig supersedes the attribute on API 24+ and our minSdk is 26, so the attribute is removed rather than kept alongside. Cleartext stays permitted because two independent things need it, and neither can be narrowed to a domain list: - The Minstrel server's host is user-entered at runtime, and plenty of self-hosters run plain HTTP on a LAN. - UPnP/DLNA/Sonos — device-description and SOAP control URLs arrive in SSDP responses at runtime and are plain HTTP essentially always. This one wasn't in the original ticket, which only considered the server; it independently rules out the "tighten it later to RFC1918" idea, since <domain-config> matches literal hostnames, not CIDR ranges, and renderer IPs are unknowable ahead of time. Trust anchors deliberately left at the platform default. Adding <certificates src="user" /> would let self-hosters use HTTPS with a private CA — which Mihon does, and which suits this product — but it also trusts every CA on the device including a corporate MITM proxy. Raised separately rather than assumed as a default. tools:ignore="InsecureBaseConfiguration" mirrors Mihon's config and keeps lintVitalRelease quiet about a choice that is deliberate and now documented. |
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1bf0e388cb |
docs(readme): state scope and responsible use up front
Minstrel integrates with Lidarr, and that integration is the kind of thing a reader can misread as content sourcing. It isn't, and the README never said so explicitly. Now it does, before the Quickstart rather than buried at the bottom. The section states what is simply true: Minstrel indexes files already on disk and streams them; it ships no indexers, no trackers, no torrent/Usenet/NZB client, and no DRM circumvention; the Lidarr integration is optional, inert until an operator supplies a URL and API key, and points at an instance they already run. Library contents and configured sources are the operator's responsibility. Plus a non-affiliation line for Lidarr, ListenBrainz, MusicBrainz and Subsonic. Also made the Lidarr highlight explicit that the instance is yours and the integration is off by default — the bullet previously read as though Minstrel brought Lidarr with it. Written as scope-setting rather than legalese, deliberately: a confident description of what the software does is both more useful to a reader and better evidence of intent than an anxious disclaimer would be. Docs only — no workflow path filter matches README.md, so no CI lane runs. |
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a4b6f22d86 |
feat(update): silent self-update via PackageInstaller session — #2438
android / Build + lint + test (push) Successful in 3m54s
Replaces the ACTION_VIEW + application/vnd.android.package-archive handoff with a PackageInstaller session, and declares UPDATE_PACKAGES_WITHOUT_USER_ACTION so the update can land with no confirm dialog at all. The platform grants the silent path when the installer opts in via setRequireUserAction(USER_ACTION_NOT_REQUIRED), the installed app targets API 29+, the installer holds that permission, and the target is the installer itself. Minstrel updating Minstrel satisfies all four. Where it can't be granted — anything pre-S — the platform returns STATUS_PENDING_USER_ACTION and we show its dialog instead, so this degrades rather than failing. Prior art: Mihon, which is out-of-store and self-updating and whose updates are quiet for exactly this reason. It also confirmed REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES is not what draws install warnings — Mihon declares it too. No setRequestUpdateOwnership(true), despite it reading like the obvious declaration for a self-updater. Ownership can only be claimed on initial installation (a no-op on update) and additionally wants the privileged ENFORCE_UPDATE_OWNERSHIP permission. It's an API for app stores claiming the apps they install. Also: the install now has an outcome. The old path fired an intent and assumed, so a failure and a user declining were indistinguishable. Sessions report back, so InstallOutcome distinguishes Installed / Cancelled / Failed, and cancelling returns to IDLE rather than showing an error — the user chose it. DOWNLOADING and INSTALLING became separate stages because the install half now genuinely waits, and "Downloading…" through a confirm dialog is a lie. The FileProvider and res/xml/file_paths.xml are gone. They existed only to expose the cached APK as a content:// URI for the old intent; a session takes a stream. Nothing else used that authority. Two judgement calls worth naming: - The pending-user-action intent is only launched if it resolves to a system component. Below API 34 a dynamically registered receiver can't declare itself unexported, so another app can broadcast at us, and an unchecked startActivity on an attacker-supplied extra would be an escalation primitive. The real confirm activity is a system app, so the check costs the legitimate path nothing. - Cancellation unregisters the receiver but deliberately does NOT abandon the session. By then it's committed, and killing an install because the user navigated away from the banner misreads their intent. Untestable here: no androidTest source set and no Robolectric, so the gesture-level behaviour is operator on-device verification. |