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FabledSteward/docs/core/mcp.md
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feat(mcp): Steward's own backups: the runs, the next one, checking and making one (#5836)
list_backups, check_backup and make_backup are Settings → Backups for an
agent, admin only like the page. make_backup runs the page's job in the
background and is audited as "<user> via MCP". Restoring stays in the
browser. get_overview names a scheduled backup that failed, is two hours
past its slot, or has no bucket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 13:09:12 -04:00

157 lines
8.7 KiB
Markdown

# MCP server
Steward serves the [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) at
`/mcp`. An AI client connected to it can look into everything Steward watches
(hosts, monitors, alerts, metrics, containers, playbook runs) and, with a
high enough role, change it. A token's role sets that ceiling.
**Source:** `steward/mcp/`. The tools live in `steward/mcp/tools/`, and a
plugin's tools live in `plugins/<name>/mcp_tools.py`.
**Transport:** streamable HTTP, stateless. Every request carries its own
token, so a client survives a Steward restart without reconnecting.
---
## Connecting
1. In Steward, open **AI access** and create a token. Pick the lowest role
that does the job.
2. Copy the token (it is shown once) and use one of the recipes on that
page. They carry the real endpoint URL and the new token. For Claude Code:
```sh
claude mcp add --transport http steward https://steward.example/mcp \
--header "Authorization: Bearer stw_…"
```
3. Ask the client to call `whoami`. It answers with the user, the effective
role and what that role allows.
Claude Desktop connects through `mcp-remote`. Open WebUI and other clients
need an MCP server with the **Streamable HTTP** transport and bearer
authentication. The AI access page shows the recipes for both.
### Behind a reverse proxy
- The URL on the AI access page is **Settings → General → Public base URL**
plus `/mcp`. If that setting is empty, the URL is built from the request's
host instead.
- The proxy must pass the `Authorization` header through unchanged.
- It must not buffer responses. Replies may arrive as server-sent events
(`text/event-stream`). For nginx, set `proxy_buffering off;` on the
location.
- Steward does no Host-header (DNS-rebinding) check on `/mcp`, because the
bearer token is the security boundary. Serve it over HTTPS.
---
## Security model
| Rule | How it is enforced |
|---|---|
| Bearer tokens only, no OAuth | `steward/core/api_tokens.py`. Only a hash is stored, and the token is shown once. |
| A token never acts above its user | Effective role = min(token role, user's **current** role). Lowering a user lowers every token they hold; disabling the user stops them all. |
| Default deny | A tool is reachable only if it was registered with a role (`register_tool(fn, role=..., read_only=...)`). `tools/list` shows a caller only the tools their role allows. A call above the role is refused, and the refusal names the role it needs. |
| Plugin tools follow the plugin | A disabled plugin's tools are hidden and refused. The host agent is built in and always on (it can't be disabled), so its tools are always there. |
| Dry run first | `run_playbook`, `create_schedule` and `set_alert_action` default to Ansible check mode (`--check --diff`). Changes are applied only when the caller passes `check=false`. A playbook its author flagged `# steward:confirm: true` also needs `confirmed=true`. `prune_docker` previews unless `check=false`. |
| Secrets stay put | Playbook variables Steward detects as secret reach the run but are never stored, audited or returned. Schedules and alert actions refuse them, since they would have to store them. Inventory variables are listed by name only, and HTTP monitor header values are redacted. |
| Every change is audited | Each write records an audit event as `<user> via MCP`, with the token id in its detail. `list_audit_events(user="<user>")` includes those events. |
| Unknown arguments are refused | A misspelt argument is rejected with a "did you mean", rather than silently dropped. |
Tokens never mint or revoke tokens; that happens only on the AI access
page, in a browser session.
---
## Tools by role
Each role includes the tools of the roles above it in this list.
### Viewer: read everything
| Area | Tools |
|---|---|
| Start here | `whoami`, `get_overview` (what is wrong now, ranked, each finding with the call that shows its evidence) |
| Hosts and metrics | `list_hosts`, `get_host`, `get_host_metrics`, `query_metrics` |
| Monitors | `list_monitors`, `get_monitor` |
| Alerts | `list_alerts`, `get_alert_history`, `list_alert_rules`, `get_alert_rule_options`, `list_maintenance_windows` |
| Metric anomalies | `list_anomalies` (metrics that left their normal for the hour, to review first) |
| Automation | `list_playbooks`, `get_playbook`, `list_inventory`, `list_ansible_runs`, `get_ansible_run`, `wait_for_run`, `list_schedules` |
| Audit | `list_audit_events` |
| Docker plugin | `list_containers`, `get_container`, `list_swarm_services`, `search_container_logs`, `get_docker_disk_usage` |
| Host agent (built in, always on) | `list_agents`, `list_maintenance_plans` (each plan's group, weekly slot, next run and latest run: how far it got, who it skipped and why), `get_maintenance_job` (a host's update jobs or one job: state, packages updated, whether it rebooted, why it failed) |
### Operator: run playbooks, change monitoring
| Area | Tools |
|---|---|
| Automation | `run_playbook`, `cancel_ansible_run`, `create_schedule`, `update_schedule`, `delete_schedule`, `update_group_members` (put hosts into an inventory group or take them out; a group alert rule follows within a minute) |
| Monitors | `create_monitor`, `update_monitor`, `set_monitor_enabled` |
| Alerts | `create_alert_rule`, `update_alert_rule`, `acknowledge_alert`, `send_test_alert`, `create_maintenance_window`, `end_maintenance_window` |
| Metric anomalies | `review_anomaly` (mark one normal, so its hours are learned, or real) |
### Admin: destructive and remediation
`set_alert_action` (the playbook a rule runs when it fires), `delete_monitor`,
`delete_alert_rule`, `prune_docker`, `run_maintenance` (update a host now, rebooting
only if the update needs it, as the host page's Update now does).
`save_playbook` and `delete_playbook` write this instance's own playbooks into
`steward-local`, the same as Steward's editor (#5748). That is automation for
these hosts that isn't part of Steward itself; Steward's built-in playbooks are
changed in its repository, and a git source by its repo, so both are refused.
A save must parse as a list of plays or nothing is written; it won't overwrite
an existing playbook without `replace=true`; and it then runs
`ansible-playbook --syntax-check` (no host contacted) and says what that found.
The loop for building one is save → `run_playbook` in check mode on one target
→ `get_ansible_run` → fix and save again → apply with `check=false`. The audit
row records the size, never the content.
`list_backups`, `check_backup` and `make_backup` are Settings → Backups for an
agent (#5836), admin only like the page, since a backup holds every secret
Steward keeps. `list_backups` gives the schedule, the next run and the last 30
runs with the check each one got after it was sent (`bucket=true` also lists the
bucket, which an append-only key may refuse). `check_backup` fetches one and
compares it with what is in place, changing nothing. `make_backup` starts one in
the background and is audited. Restoring stays in the browser, behind its typed
confirmation. `get_overview` reports, for every role, a scheduled backup that
failed, is overdue, or has no bucket set up.
The client sees each tool's full contract: arguments, what an empty value
means, and what comes back. That contract is the tool's docstring, so read the
docstrings in `steward/mcp/tools/` for the detail.
---
## Response conventions
Every tool follows these conventions (`steward/mcp/tools/_shape.py`):
- **Times** are ISO-8601 UTC with a `Z`. Anything with a "when" also carries
`age_s`, so the client never does clock arithmetic.
- **Lists are bounded.** A list response carries `total` and `truncated`. When
it was cut, `more` names the argument that fetches the rest. Nothing is cut
silently.
- **Time series** come back as a summary (min/avg/max/p95/last) plus a series
of at most 60 points, never raw rows.
- **Lookup by name or id.** A miss suggests close matches and names the tool
that lists the valid choices.
- **Refusals are readable.** Bad input becomes a tool error that says what was
wrong, why, and what to do instead, and nothing is changed. The tools share
their validation with the web forms (`monitors/service.py`,
`alerts/service.py`), so a value the UI refuses is refused here for the same
reason.
- **Database outages** return a plain "Steward cannot reach its database"
rather than a stack trace.
---
## Adding tools
Core tools: add an `async def` to a module in `steward/mcp/tools/` and list it
in that module's `register()` with its minimum role and `read_only`. A plugin
exposes `register_mcp_tools(register)`, and optionally `mcp_overview(db)` to
contribute findings to `get_overview`. See
[Writing a plugin](../plugins/writing-a-plugin.md). A tool that changes
anything calls `audit_mcp(...)` from `steward/mcp/tools/_audit.py`.