Two connection-recovery gaps, both surfaced by a Postgres restart that left the app throwing tracebacks while the DB itself was healthy. pool_pre_ping + pool_recycle on the app engine [#2626]: when the database restarts, every connection already in the pool is dead at the socket level. SQLAlchemy only discovered that by failing a real query, so the first operation after a restart errored out on whatever triggered it. pre_ping checks liveness on checkout and swaps the dead connection transparently; pool_recycle caps connection age so a socket stranded by a NAT/conntrack timeout or a Docker network rebuild is retired on a timer instead. wait_for_database() gate at startup [#2627]: create_app touches the DB synchronously (migrations, secret re-encryption, settings load) and assumed it was both resolvable and accepting connections on the first try. Neither holds after a host reboot (Docker DNS not yet serving `db` -> gaierror -2) or an unclean shutdown (Postgres still replaying WAL -> "not yet accepting connections"). Both are transient, so retry with capped backoff behind one gate ahead of the first DB touch. Credential and missing-database errors are classified by SQLSTATE and still fail immediately -- waiting cannot fix those. Budget is bootstrap-configurable (STEWARD_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / database.connect_timeout, default 60s) since it governs reaching the DB and so cannot live in the DB-backed settings. Tests drive the retry loop off a fake clock, so backoff and timeout behaviour are deterministic rather than wall-clock dependent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
156 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
156 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
# steward/config.py
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
import logging
|
|
import os
|
|
import secrets
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
from typing import Any
|
|
|
|
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
|
|
_SECRET_KEY_FILE = Path("/data/secret.key")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _env(suffix: str) -> str | None:
|
|
return os.environ.get(f"STEWARD_{suffix}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def load_bootstrap(config_path: Path | str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
"""Return the minimum bootstrap config: database_url and secret_key.
|
|
|
|
This is the only config read from files/env vars at startup.
|
|
Everything else is stored in the app_settings DB table.
|
|
|
|
config_path is optional — used only for backwards compatibility with
|
|
existing config.yaml deployments. The file is not required.
|
|
"""
|
|
from dotenv import load_dotenv
|
|
load_dotenv()
|
|
|
|
raw: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
|
if config_path is None:
|
|
config_path = Path("config.yaml")
|
|
config_path = Path(config_path)
|
|
if config_path.exists():
|
|
import yaml
|
|
with config_path.open() as f:
|
|
raw = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
|
|
|
|
database_url = (
|
|
_env("DATABASE_URL")
|
|
or _env("DATABASE__URL")
|
|
or raw.get("database", {}).get("url")
|
|
)
|
|
if not database_url:
|
|
raise ValueError(
|
|
"Database URL is required. Set STEWARD_DATABASE_URL env var "
|
|
"or add 'database.url' to config.yaml."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
secret_key = _resolve_secret_key(raw)
|
|
|
|
db_connect_timeout = _resolve_db_connect_timeout(raw)
|
|
|
|
# Plugin discovery spans two roots (see load_plugins / migration_runner):
|
|
# • bundled — first-party plugins shipped inside the image at repo-root
|
|
# `plugins/`; they version atomically with core and are read-only at runtime.
|
|
# • external — operator-mounted dir for third-party plugins, persisted in the
|
|
# /data volume. Downloads/installs land here, never in the bundled dir.
|
|
# Bundled is scanned first, so on a name collision the first-party plugin wins.
|
|
bundled_plugin_dir = raw.get("plugin_dir", "plugins")
|
|
external_plugin_dir = (
|
|
_env("PLUGIN_DIR")
|
|
or raw.get("external_plugin_dir")
|
|
or "/data/plugins"
|
|
)
|
|
plugin_dirs = [bundled_plugin_dir]
|
|
if external_plugin_dir and external_plugin_dir != bundled_plugin_dir:
|
|
plugin_dirs.append(external_plugin_dir)
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
"database_url": database_url,
|
|
"secret_key": secret_key,
|
|
"db_connect_timeout": db_connect_timeout,
|
|
"plugin_dirs": plugin_dirs,
|
|
# Installs/downloads target the external (writable, persistent) dir.
|
|
"plugin_install_dir": external_plugin_dir or bundled_plugin_dir,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_db_connect_timeout(raw: dict) -> float:
|
|
"""How long to wait for the database at startup, in seconds.
|
|
|
|
Bootstrap-only by necessity: this governs reaching the DB, so it cannot
|
|
itself be read from the DB like the rest of Steward's settings.
|
|
|
|
A deployment whose database is slower to come up than the default (a large
|
|
cluster replaying WAL, a remote DB behind a link that takes a while) can
|
|
raise it rather than crash-looping the container.
|
|
"""
|
|
from .database import DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
|
|
|
|
value = _env("DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT") or raw.get("database", {}).get("connect_timeout")
|
|
if value is None or value == "":
|
|
return DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
|
|
try:
|
|
parsed = float(value)
|
|
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Invalid database connect timeout %r — using default %.0fs",
|
|
value, DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
|
|
)
|
|
return DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
|
|
if parsed <= 0:
|
|
# 0/negative would mean "never wait", which is the broken behaviour this
|
|
# setting exists to fix — treat it as a mistake, not as an opt-out.
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Database connect timeout %.0fs is not positive — using default %.0fs",
|
|
parsed, DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
|
|
)
|
|
return DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
|
|
return parsed
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_secret_key(raw: dict) -> str:
|
|
"""Resolve secret_key: env var → file → auto-generate.
|
|
|
|
Refuses to start if a new key must be generated but cannot be persisted: an
|
|
ephemeral key changes on every restart, which silently renders every
|
|
encrypted secret (managed SSH key, SMTP/OIDC/LDAP credentials) unrecoverable.
|
|
Failing loudly with a fix beats limping along and losing data on the next
|
|
boot — exactly the footgun that bit the vdnt-docker02 deployment.
|
|
"""
|
|
from_env = _env("SECRET_KEY") or raw.get("secret_key")
|
|
if from_env:
|
|
return from_env
|
|
|
|
if _SECRET_KEY_FILE.exists():
|
|
try:
|
|
key = _SECRET_KEY_FILE.read_text().strip()
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
f"App secret key file {_SECRET_KEY_FILE} exists but cannot be read "
|
|
f"({exc}). Make it readable by the container user (uid 1000), or set "
|
|
f"STEWARD_SECRET_KEY."
|
|
) from exc
|
|
if key:
|
|
return key
|
|
|
|
key = secrets.token_hex(32)
|
|
try:
|
|
_SECRET_KEY_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
|
_SECRET_KEY_FILE.write_text(key)
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
f"Generated a new app secret key but could not persist it to "
|
|
f"{_SECRET_KEY_FILE} ({exc}). An ephemeral key changes on every restart, "
|
|
f"which makes all encrypted secrets (managed SSH key, SMTP/OIDC/LDAP "
|
|
f"credentials) unrecoverable. Fix one of:\n"
|
|
f" • set STEWARD_SECRET_KEY to a stable value "
|
|
f"(recommended for Swarm / multi-node), or\n"
|
|
f" • make {_SECRET_KEY_FILE.parent} writable by the container user "
|
|
f"(uid 1000)."
|
|
) from exc
|
|
logger.info("Generated new secret key and saved to %s", _SECRET_KEY_FILE)
|
|
return key
|