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thoughtsync/tests/test_integration.py
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Security values move into the Settings UI
Operator: *"proxy hops defaults to 1 and should be in the settings UI not in the
envs, we need the security values to be in the UI."* Overrules the call I made
yesterday, and rule 25 is on your side — I argued deployment-topology, but the
operator has to be able to SEE what protects them, and reading a container's
environment is not seeing.

Six new settings in a **Security** group: trusted proxy hops (default 1), the
per-account and per-address sign-in limits with their shared window, and the
sign-up limit with its own. `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` is gone; the rate
limits are no longer hardcoded constants.

**The hard part was keeping the throttle cheap.** It consults these BEFORE opening
a database connection — deliberately, because a refused attempt is meant to cost
nothing, and the hop count is needed to know who is even asking. A query per
attempt would undo both. So there is a small cache seeded from the registry
defaults (the app works with no database at all, which is what the DB-free unit
lane relies on), loaded at boot, and refreshed on every settings save — the same
live-update contract `session_ttl_days` already had.

`SlidingWindow` now takes its limit and window as SUPPLIERS rather than values, so
a saved number applies to the next attempt instead of the next deploy.

**Bounds are rejected, not clamped.** A hop count of 99 would trust anything a
caller sent; a sign-in limit of 0 would lock every account out permanently. Both
now fail validation with a message naming the range, and the number input carries
min/max so the browser objects first. Silently storing a different number than the
one typed is how somebody ends up believing a protection is set to something it is
not.

`MAX_BUCKETS` stays a constant on purpose: it protects the limiter from itself
rather than the app from a caller, and there is no operator judgment to apply.

Two integration tests, because the whole point is the round trip: a dangerous
value refused, a legitimate one reaching the cache the throttle reads and
persisting; and every Security row reaching the admin payload with bounds and a
description that explains itself.
2026-08-23 15:24:15 -04:00

417 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""The real-Postgres lane (family rule 6).
Everything else in this suite is deliberately DB-free, which means the schema the
migrations build has never been checked against the models that read it. That gap is
what this file closes, and it is not theoretical: M13 dropped three columns and
rebuilt a generated column, and until now `alembic upgrade head` ran for the first
time when the operator's container started.
Marked `integration` and excluded from the unit lane by `-m "not integration"`, so a
workstation without Postgres runs the rest of the suite unchanged.
The schema comes from real migrations, never `metadata.create_all` (rule 82) — the
point is to test what actually ships, and `create_all` would build a schema no
deployment has ever seen.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import uuid
import pytest
import pytest_asyncio
from sqlalchemy import select, text
from thoughtsync import ratelimit
from thoughtsync.app import create_app
from thoughtsync.db import dispose_engine, session_scope
from thoughtsync.models.note import Note
from thoughtsync.models.note_item import NoteItem
from thoughtsync.models.user import User
from thoughtsync.settings import get_setting, live, refresh_live, reset_live, set_settings
from thoughtsync.notes.helpers import derive_display_title
from thoughtsync.models.note_link_preview import NoteLinkPreview
from thoughtsync.sync import _apply_note_items
from thoughtsync.unfurl_queue import _unfurl_new_urls, detect_urls
pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration
# Every table the tests touch, child-first so FKs never block the truncate.
# RESTART IDENTITY + CASCADE keeps this honest if a table gains children later.
_TABLES = "notes, note_items, note_revisions, note_labels, note_link_previews, labels, users"
@pytest_asyncio.fixture
async def db():
"""A session against the migrated database, wiped before each test.
Wiped BEFORE rather than after so a failed test leaves its rows behind to look at.
"""
async with session_scope() as session:
await session.execute(text(f"TRUNCATE {_TABLES} RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE"))
await session.commit()
yield session
await dispose_engine()
@pytest_asyncio.fixture
async def app_client(db):
"""A test client against the real app, over the migrated database.
The credential throttle is process-global and its counters outlive a single
test, so they are cleared here — otherwise a suite that registers a few times
starts handing out 429s for reasons that have nothing to do with the test.
"""
ratelimit.reset_all()
yield create_app().test_client()
ratelimit.reset_all()
@pytest_asyncio.fixture
async def owner(db):
"""A user to hang notes off — `notes.owner_id` is a real foreign key."""
user = User(email=f"{uuid.uuid4().hex}@example.test", display_name="Integration")
db.add(user)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(user)
return user
async def test_the_migrated_schema_matches_the_models(db, owner):
"""The check that has never run: insert through the ORM, read it back.
A column the models expect and the migrations never created — or the reverse —
fails right here, instead of when a container starts.
"""
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body="a thought", display_title="a thought")
db.add(note)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(note)
found = await db.scalar(select(Note).where(Note.id == note.id))
assert found is not None
assert found.body == "a thought"
assert found.display_title == "a thought"
async def test_the_dropped_columns_are_actually_gone(db):
"""M13 dropped three. If a migration silently no-opped, this is where it shows."""
cols = set(
(
await db.execute(
text("SELECT column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name = 'notes'")
)
)
.scalars()
.all()
)
assert "title" not in cols, "notes.title should have gone in 0026"
assert "kind" not in cols, "notes.kind should have gone in 0025"
assert "display_title" in cols and "body" in cols
rev_cols = set(
(
await db.execute(
text("SELECT column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name = 'note_revisions'")
)
)
.scalars()
.all()
)
assert "title" not in rev_cols, "note_revisions.title should have gone in 0026"
tables = set(
(await db.execute(text("SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema = 'public'")))
.scalars()
.all()
)
assert "note_links" not in tables, "note_links should have gone in 0024"
async def test_the_search_vector_was_rebuilt_over_the_name(db, owner):
"""0026 had to drop and recreate a STORED GENERATED column.
Postgres refuses to drop a column another generated column depends on, so getting
this wrong doesn't produce a subtly wrong ranking — it produces a migration that
won't run at all. Worth proving the replacement actually indexes something.
"""
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body="ferry tickets\nbook before friday", display_title="ferry tickets")
db.add(note)
await db.commit()
hit = await db.scalar(
text(
"SELECT count(*) FROM notes "
"WHERE search_vector @@ websearch_to_tsquery('english', :q)"
).bindparams(q="ferry")
)
assert hit == 1
# The NAME is weight A and the body weight B, which is what makes a name match
# rank above a body-only one. Both must be in the vector at all.
body_only = await db.scalar(
text(
"SELECT count(*) FROM notes "
"WHERE search_vector @@ websearch_to_tsquery('english', :q)"
).bindparams(q="friday")
)
assert body_only == 1
async def test_a_note_keeps_both_its_body_and_its_items(db, owner):
"""The shape M13 step 2 made normal: a note HAS a checklist, it isn't one."""
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body="weekend shop", display_title="weekend shop")
db.add(note)
await db.flush()
db.add_all(
[
NoteItem(note_id=note.id, text="milk", position=0),
NoteItem(note_id=note.id, text="eggs", position=1),
]
)
await db.commit()
items = (
await db.scalars(select(NoteItem).where(NoteItem.note_id == note.id).order_by(NoteItem.position))
).all()
assert [i.text for i in items] == ["milk", "eggs"]
assert (await db.scalar(select(Note.body).where(Note.id == note.id))) == "weekend shop"
async def test_sync_no_longer_deletes_items_from_a_note_with_a_body(db, owner):
"""The data-loss path step 2 removed, pinned against a real database.
`_apply_note_items` used to delete every item when the note wasn't `kind = "list"`.
Nothing can produce that state any more, but this is the regression that would
have silently eaten a checklist, and it deserves a test that would catch its
return.
"""
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body="packing", display_title="packing")
db.add(note)
await db.flush()
db.add(NoteItem(note_id=note.id, text="socks", position=0))
await db.commit()
# A change that says nothing about items must LEAVE them alone — absent means
# "not telling us", not "empty".
await _apply_note_items(db, note, {"body": "packing"})
await db.commit()
assert (await db.scalar(select(NoteItem.text).where(NoteItem.note_id == note.id))) == "socks"
# An explicit list replaces them.
await _apply_note_items(db, note, {"items": [{"text": "charger", "checked": True}]})
await db.commit()
rows = (await db.scalars(select(NoteItem).where(NoteItem.note_id == note.id))).all()
assert [(r.text, r.checked) for r in rows] == [("charger", True)]
async def test_a_note_with_only_items_still_has_a_name(db, owner):
"""The hole that made removing the title unsafe until step 2 closed it."""
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body="", display_title="")
db.add(note)
await db.flush()
db.add(NoteItem(note_id=note.id, text="milk", position=0))
await db.commit()
first = await db.scalar(
select(NoteItem.text).where(NoteItem.note_id == note.id).order_by(NoteItem.position).limit(1)
)
note.display_title = derive_display_title(note.body, first)
await db.commit()
assert (await db.scalar(select(Note.display_title).where(Note.id == note.id))) == "milk"
async def test_auto_unfurl_stores_a_preview_and_skips_what_is_cached(db, owner, monkeypatch):
"""The background pass, run inline so the assertions are deterministic.
The network is stubbed — this is about what reaches the DATABASE, not about
parsing someone's OpenGraph tags (unfurl.py's own tests cover that). What matters
here is the part only a real database can show: the unique constraint holding, the
upsert going to the right row, and a second pass not re-fetching.
"""
note = Note(
owner_id=owner.id,
body="read https://example.com/a and https://example.com/b",
display_title="read https://example.com/a and https://example.com/b",
)
db.add(note)
await db.commit()
calls: list[str] = []
async def fake_unfurl(url):
calls.append(url)
return {"url": url, "title": f"T {url}", "description": None, "image_url": None, "site_name": "example.com"}
monkeypatch.setattr("thoughtsync.unfurl_queue.unfurl", fake_unfurl)
await _unfurl_new_urls(note.id, note.body)
assert sorted(calls) == ["https://example.com/a", "https://example.com/b"]
rows = (await db.scalars(select(NoteLinkPreview).where(NoteLinkPreview.note_id == note.id))).all()
assert {r.url for r in rows} == {"https://example.com/a", "https://example.com/b"}
assert all(r.title.startswith("T ") for r in rows)
# A second pass over an unchanged body fetches nothing — the whole reason
# `schedule` is safe to call on every save.
calls.clear()
await _unfurl_new_urls(note.id, note.body)
assert calls == []
async def test_auto_unfurl_drops_a_preview_whose_url_left_the_body(db, owner, monkeypatch):
"""A slow fetch must not resurrect a link the person deleted mid-flight."""
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body="https://example.com/gone", display_title="x")
db.add(note)
await db.commit()
async def fake_unfurl(url):
# Simulate the body changing while the request was in the air.
return {"url": url, "title": "T", "description": None, "image_url": None, "site_name": None}
monkeypatch.setattr("thoughtsync.unfurl_queue.unfurl", fake_unfurl)
note.body = "changed my mind"
await db.commit()
await _unfurl_new_urls(note.id, "https://example.com/gone")
rows = (await db.scalars(select(NoteLinkPreview).where(NoteLinkPreview.note_id == note.id))).all()
assert rows == [], "a preview was stored for a URL the note no longer contains"
async def test_detection_agrees_with_what_gets_stored(db, owner, monkeypatch):
"""The detector and the storage path read the same body the same way."""
body = "one https://example.com/x. two (https://example.com/y) three"
assert detect_urls(body) == ["https://example.com/x", "https://example.com/y"]
note = Note(owner_id=owner.id, body=body, display_title="one")
db.add(note)
await db.commit()
async def fake_unfurl(url):
return {"url": url, "title": "T", "description": None, "image_url": None, "site_name": None}
monkeypatch.setattr("thoughtsync.unfurl_queue.unfurl", fake_unfurl)
await _unfurl_new_urls(note.id, body)
stored = {
r for r in (await db.scalars(select(NoteLinkPreview.url).where(NoteLinkPreview.note_id == note.id))).all()
}
assert stored == set(detect_urls(body))
async def test_registration_closes_itself_once_an_admin_exists(app_client, db):
"""The gap this removes: registration was open between "my account exists" and
"I remembered to turn it off", and on a public host that gap starts at DNS.
Runs against a real database because it is the interaction between two writes —
the user row and the settings row — inside one transaction.
"""
# The instance is empty (the fixture truncated it), so this is the first account:
# allowed unconditionally, and it becomes the admin.
first = await app_client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={"email": "owner@example.test", "password": "a-long-enough-password"},
)
assert first.status_code == 201
assert (await first.get_json())["is_admin"] is True
# …and the door shut behind it.
async with session_scope() as fresh:
assert await get_setting(fresh, "allow_registration") is False
second = await app_client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={"email": "stranger@example.test", "password": "a-long-enough-password"},
)
assert second.status_code == 403
# Re-opening it deliberately still works — that is how a second person gets in
# until invites exist.
async with session_scope() as fresh:
await set_settings(fresh, {"allow_registration": True})
await fresh.commit()
third = await app_client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={"email": "invited@example.test", "password": "a-long-enough-password"},
)
assert third.status_code == 201
assert (await third.get_json())["is_admin"] is False
async def test_security_settings_are_live_and_bounded(app_client, db):
"""The security values are settings now, not constants — so saving one has to take
effect without a restart, and a dangerous value has to be refused.
Real database because the whole point is the round trip: write through the admin
API, re-read into the cache the throttle consults, observe the new number.
"""
# An admin to authenticate as. First account, so it is allowed and becomes admin.
reset_live()
created = await app_client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={"email": "admin@example.test", "password": "a-long-enough-password"},
)
assert created.status_code == 201
# Defaults are what the registry says.
async with session_scope() as fresh:
await refresh_live(fresh)
assert live("trusted_proxy_hops") == 1
assert live("signin_limit_per_account") == 10
# A value that would disable the protection is REFUSED, not clamped — storing a
# different number than the one typed is how somebody ends up believing a limit
# is set to something it is not.
bad = await app_client.patch("/api/settings", json={"signin_limit_per_account": 0})
assert bad.status_code == 400
assert "at least" in (await bad.get_json())["error"]
# …and so is a hop count that would trust anything a caller sent.
bad_hops = await app_client.patch("/api/settings", json={"trusted_proxy_hops": 99})
assert bad_hops.status_code == 400
# A legitimate change applies to the cache the throttle reads, immediately.
ok = await app_client.patch(
"/api/settings", json={"signin_limit_per_account": 3, "trusted_proxy_hops": 2}
)
assert ok.status_code == 200
assert live("signin_limit_per_account") == 3
assert live("trusted_proxy_hops") == 2
# And it is persisted, not just cached.
async with session_scope() as fresh:
assert await get_setting(fresh, "trusted_proxy_hops") == 2
reset_live()
async def test_the_security_group_reaches_the_admin_ui(app_client, db):
"""Every security value has to be visible and editable, which is the whole reason
they moved out of the environment."""
created = await app_client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={"email": "admin2@example.test", "password": "a-long-enough-password"},
)
assert created.status_code == 201
resp = await app_client.get("/api/settings")
assert resp.status_code == 200
rows = (await resp.get_json())["settings"]
security = {r["key"]: r for r in rows if r["group"] == "Security"}
assert set(security) == {
"trusted_proxy_hops",
"signin_limit_per_account",
"signin_limit_per_address",
"signin_window_minutes",
"register_limit_per_address",
"register_window_minutes",
}
# The UI renders a number input from these, and it cannot offer a safe range it
# was never told about.
for row in security.values():
assert row["type"] == "int"
assert row["minimum"] is not None and row["maximum"] is not None
assert row["description"], f"{row['key']} has no description to explain itself"