Sync 2: device-token bearer auth + linked-devices UI (M8)
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Native clients (Tauri/Android) authenticate sync with a long-lived device
bearer token, alongside the existing web session cookie.

Backend:
- security.py: generate_token() (secrets.token_urlsafe) + hash_token()
  (SHA-256 — device tokens are already high-entropy, so no slow KDF; keeps
  per-request bearer auth cheap). Only the hash is stored.
- device_tokens table (migration 0016): id, user_id, token_hash (unique),
  name, created_at, last_used_at.
- login_required now accepts `Authorization: Bearer <token>` OR the session
  cookie. Session path stays DB-free (fast); bearer path looks up the token
  hash, sets g.user_id, and stamps last_used_at.
- Endpoints: POST /api/auth/device-login (public; email+password → token,
  the native first-link flow), POST /api/auth/devices (session/bearer →
  token, web "link a device"), GET /api/auth/devices (list), DELETE
  /api/auth/devices/<id> (revoke). All owner-scoped; token shown once.

Frontend:
- Per-user (not admin) /account view "Linked devices": create a token
  (one-time reveal + copy), list devices (name, linked/last-synced), revoke
  with confirm. Top-bar device icon for all users; devices Pinia store.

Tests (DB-free): token hash determinism + uniqueness; device endpoints
auth-guard (401 without auth, before DB); device-login input validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FRgehjoz7Yv8LkUfADxACm
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-22 22:59:52 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 58b88d2622
commit 3c76b50a9c
12 changed files with 475 additions and 3 deletions
+35
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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
import pytest
from thoughtsync.app import create_app
@pytest.fixture
def app():
return create_app()
async def test_create_device_requires_auth(app):
# No session cookie and no bearer header → 401 before any DB access.
client = app.test_client()
resp = await client.post("/api/auth/devices", json={"name": "phone"})
assert resp.status_code == 401
async def test_list_devices_requires_auth(app):
client = app.test_client()
resp = await client.get("/api/auth/devices")
assert resp.status_code == 401
async def test_revoke_device_requires_auth(app):
client = app.test_client()
resp = await client.delete("/api/auth/devices/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
assert resp.status_code == 401
async def test_device_login_validates_input(app):
# Missing credentials → 400 BEFORE any DB access, so it's checkable in the
# DB-free unit lane (invalid-cred and success paths are operator-verified).
client = app.test_client()
resp = await client.post("/api/auth/device-login", json={})
assert resp.status_code == 400
+15 -1
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
from thoughtsync.security import hash_password, verify_password
from thoughtsync.security import generate_token, hash_password, hash_token, verify_password
def test_password_roundtrip():
@@ -7,6 +7,20 @@ def test_password_roundtrip():
assert not verify_password("wrong password", h)
def test_hash_token_deterministic():
t = generate_token()
# Lookup hash is deterministic (same token → same hash) and SHA-256 hex (64 chars).
assert hash_token(t) == hash_token(t)
assert len(hash_token(t)) == 64
# Different tokens hash differently.
assert hash_token(t) != hash_token(generate_token())
def test_generate_token_unique():
assert generate_token() != generate_token()
assert len(generate_token()) >= 32
def test_password_hash_is_salted():
# Same input hashes differently each time (random salt).
assert hash_password("same-input") != hash_password("same-input")