Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.
130 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
130 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/apierror"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/auth"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/db/dbq"
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)
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// sessionCookieMaxAge is the cookie lifetime. Sessions don't auto-expire
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// server-side yet (future work); the cookie still caps browser-side lifetime
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// so an abandoned laptop doesn't stay logged in forever.
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const sessionCookieMaxAge = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
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func (h *handlers) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// The session token can be on the cookie OR bearer header — RequireUser
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// accepted either. Re-resolve it here so we can delete the row.
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token := sessionTokenFromHTTP(r)
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if token != "" {
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if err := dbq.New(h.pool).DeleteSessionByTokenHash(r.Context(), auth.HashSessionToken(token)); err != nil {
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h.logger.Warn("api: delete session failed", "err", err)
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// Continue — logout is best-effort; the client still gets the
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// cookie cleared.
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}
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}
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: auth.SessionCookieName,
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Value: "",
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Path: "/",
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HttpOnly: true,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
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MaxAge: -1,
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})
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// sessionTokenFromHTTP duplicates the internal helper in internal/auth
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// because that one is unexported. Cheap to repeat here; keeping the auth
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// package's internal helper package-private is worth more than DRY. Must
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// match that helper's trimming behavior exactly — otherwise a bearer with
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// trailing whitespace authenticates via RequireUser (which trims) but logout
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// hashes the padded value and silently no-ops, leaving the session alive.
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func sessionTokenFromHTTP(r *http.Request) string {
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if c, err := r.Cookie(auth.SessionCookieName); err == nil && c.Value != "" {
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return c.Value
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}
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h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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const prefix = "bearer "
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if len(h) > len(prefix) && (h[:7] == "Bearer " || h[:7] == "bearer ") {
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return strings.TrimSpace(h[len(prefix):])
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}
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return ""
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}
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func (h *handlers) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req LoginRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, apierror.BadRequest("bad_request", "invalid JSON body"))
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return
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}
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if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
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writeErr(w, apierror.BadRequest("bad_request", "username and password required"))
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return
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}
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q := dbq.New(h.pool)
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user, err := q.GetUserByUsername(r.Context(), req.Username)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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writeErr(w, apierror.Unauthorized("invalid_credentials", "invalid username or password"))
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return
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}
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h.logger.Error("api: user lookup failed", "err", err)
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writeErr(w, apierror.InternalMsg("lookup failed", err))
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return
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}
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if !auth.VerifyPassword(user.PasswordHash, req.Password) {
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writeErr(w, apierror.Unauthorized("invalid_credentials", "invalid username or password"))
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return
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}
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token, err := auth.MintSessionToken()
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("api: mint session token failed", "err", err)
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writeErr(w, apierror.InternalMsg("mint failed", err))
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return
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}
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if _, err := q.InsertSession(r.Context(), dbq.InsertSessionParams{
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UserID: user.ID,
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TokenHash: auth.HashSessionToken(token),
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UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
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// Origin address, frozen at issue time. Compared against last_ip in
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// the active-sessions surface: a session that was born somewhere the
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// user recognises but is being used from somewhere they don't is the
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// case this whole surface exists to surface.
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Ip: auth.ClientIP(r),
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}); err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("api: insert session failed", "err", err)
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writeErr(w, apierror.InternalMsg("insert failed", err))
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return
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}
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: auth.SessionCookieName,
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Value: token,
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Path: "/",
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HttpOnly: true,
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Secure: r.TLS != nil, // dev over http stays functional; prod over https gets Secure
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SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
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MaxAge: int(sessionCookieMaxAge.Seconds()),
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})
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(LoginResponse{
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Token: token,
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User: UserView{
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ID: user.ID,
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Username: user.Username,
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IsAdmin: user.IsAdmin,
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},
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})
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}
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