Comment blocks in cmd/minstrel and 30 smaller internal packages, rewritten
to rule 32's standard with each citation read in context: task, milestone
and rule ids go, and so do the stories they were attached to ("used to",
"Before #N", measurements from one install, quotes, pointers to Fabled
Librarian's records and to docs/superpowers files that are not in the
repo). Where a story wrapped a real constraint, the constraint stays as a
present-tense fact.
Comments that had gone stale are corrected:
- taste.Config: the tuned values are overlaid by internal/recsettings;
it is no longer "a later follow-up".
- StorageConfig: the data dir holds art, caches and the stream secret,
not only playlist covers.
- the Subsonic album list and getUser comments describe what they do
today rather than a milestone that would change it.
Checked: the non-comment token stream of every changed file matches
HEAD, and gofmt -l is empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
212 lines
8.3 KiB
Go
212 lines
8.3 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/db/dbq"
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)
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// sessionTokenBytes is the raw entropy per session token. 32 bytes of
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// crypto/rand gives ~256 bits; after base64 url-safe encoding the cookie
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// value is 43 chars with no padding.
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const sessionTokenBytes = 32
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// MintSessionToken returns a freshly-generated, url-safe opaque token.
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// The token is what the client carries; the DB only ever sees its sha256.
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func MintSessionToken() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, sessionTokenBytes)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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// HashSessionToken is the single source of truth for mapping a raw token to
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// the `sessions.token_hash` column. sha256 is fine here — we're not guarding
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// against offline brute force (the token has 256 bits of entropy); we only
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// want "leaked DB row can't be replayed without also having the raw token."
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func HashSessionToken(token string) []byte {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return sum[:]
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}
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// HashAPIToken maps a raw API key (the OpenSubsonic apiKey) to the
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// `users.api_token_hash` column: sha256, hex. The key is minted with
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// MintSessionToken, so it carries the same 256 bits and the same reasoning
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// as HashSessionToken applies. Hex rather than bytes so the column stays
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// text and a migration can compute it in SQL from the old plaintext.
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func HashAPIToken(token string) string {
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return hex.EncodeToString(HashSessionToken(token))
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}
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// VerifyPassword is the canonical bcrypt comparison. Returns false on a
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// malformed hash so callers don't need to distinguish "hash invalid" from
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// "password wrong" — both are auth failures from the client's perspective.
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func VerifyPassword(hash, plaintext string) bool {
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return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(plaintext)) == nil
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}
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// SessionCookieName is the cookie the web SPA rides. Exported because handlers
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// that issue/clear the cookie (handleLogin / handleLogout) need to match it.
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const SessionCookieName = "minstrel_session"
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// RequireUser resolves the caller from a session cookie OR Authorization
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// bearer header and puts the dbq.User in request context via userCtxKey.
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// Requests without a valid session return 401 with no body so callers don't
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// leak whether the username existed (matches the /rest/* auth posture).
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//
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// trustedHops supplies the reverse-proxy depth used to record the session's
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// current address. It's a func rather than an int because the value
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// is editable at runtime and this middleware is constructed once at
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// boot — reading it per request is what makes an admin change take effect
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// without a restart. Passing nil means "trust nothing", i.e. the socket peer.
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func RequireUser(pool *pgxpool.Pool, trustedHops func() int) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := sessionTokenFromRequest(r)
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, "unauthenticated", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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if pool == nil {
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// Test-only path: the test at the top of this file constructs
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// the middleware with nil pool to prove the no-token case
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// short-circuits without a DB call. Any real token here is
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// programmer error.
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http.Error(w, "unauthenticated", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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q := dbq.New(pool)
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sess, err := q.GetSessionByTokenHash(r.Context(), HashSessionToken(token))
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthenticated", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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slog.Error("api: session lookup failed", "err", err)
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http.Error(w, "auth lookup failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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user, err := q.GetUserByID(r.Context(), sess.UserID)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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// Session points at a deleted user — treat as unauth,
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// best-effort cleanup.
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_ = q.DeleteSession(r.Context(), sess.ID)
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http.Error(w, "unauthenticated", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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slog.Error("api: user lookup failed", "err", err)
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http.Error(w, "auth lookup failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// Best-effort last-seen update. A failure here shouldn't fail the
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// request; the session is still valid and this is observability.
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// last_ip rides the same UPDATE — a session whose address has
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// moved since it was issued is the signal the active-sessions
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// surface exists to show, and it costs nothing extra here.
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if err := q.TouchSessionLastSeen(r.Context(), dbq.TouchSessionLastSeenParams{
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ID: sess.ID,
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LastIp: ClientIP(r, hopsOf(trustedHops)),
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}); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("api: touch session last_seen failed", "err", err)
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), userCtxKey, user)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, sessionIDCtxKey, sess.ID)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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// UserCtxKeyForTest is exported ONLY for tests in sibling packages that need
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// to inject a dbq.User into request context without going through the
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// middleware. Do not use this outside _test.go files.
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func UserCtxKeyForTest() any { return userCtxKey }
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// SessionIDCtxKeyForTest is the sibling of UserCtxKeyForTest for the session
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// id, so handler tests can exercise the current-session logic (which row is
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// "this device", which one logout-others must spare) without standing up the
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// middleware. Do not use this outside _test.go files.
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func SessionIDCtxKeyForTest() any { return sessionIDCtxKey }
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// OptionalUser is RequireUser's permissive sibling: it resolves the caller
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// from the session cookie or bearer header and attaches the user to context
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// when present + valid, but does NOT 401 on absence. The downstream handler
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// runs unconditionally and is responsible for its own auth check via
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// UserFromContext (or its own bespoke path — see /api/tracks/{id}/stream's
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// streamAuthOk, which accepts EITHER a user-in-context OR a signed query
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// token for UPnP / Sonos speakers that don't carry the user's cookie).
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//
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// Invalid tokens (stale session row, deleted user) silently drop through
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// without attaching the user. The handler treats "no user in context" as
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// "not authenticated" the same way it treats a missing cookie.
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//
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// Database lookup failures fall through too — a transient DB blip should not
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// 5xx a stream request that may have a perfectly valid signed token. The
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// error is logged so it can be correlated.
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func OptionalUser(pool *pgxpool.Pool, logger *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := sessionTokenFromRequest(r)
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if token == "" || pool == nil {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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q := dbq.New(pool)
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sess, err := q.GetSessionByTokenHash(r.Context(), HashSessionToken(token))
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if err != nil {
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if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) && logger != nil {
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logger.Warn("api: optional session lookup failed", "err", err)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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user, err := q.GetUserByID(r.Context(), sess.UserID)
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if err != nil {
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if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) && logger != nil {
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logger.Warn("api: optional user lookup failed", "err", err)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), userCtxKey, user)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, sessionIDCtxKey, sess.ID)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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func sessionTokenFromRequest(r *http.Request) string {
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if c, err := r.Cookie(SessionCookieName); err == nil && c.Value != "" {
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return c.Value
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}
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return extractBearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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}
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// extractBearerToken pulls the token out of an Authorization header in
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// either "Bearer xyz" or "bearer xyz" form. Returns "" when the header is
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// missing, malformed, or uses a different scheme.
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func extractBearerToken(header string) string {
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if header == "" {
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return ""
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}
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const prefix = "bearer "
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lower := strings.ToLower(header)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(lower, prefix) {
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return ""
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(header[len(prefix):])
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}
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