The cookie set Secure from r.TLS, which is nil whenever TLS terminates at Traefik or Cloudflare, so a public deployment's session cookie went out without Secure. auth.IsHTTPS now decides it from X-Forwarded-Proto, believed only through the trusted-hop count (rule 94) and read positionally like X-Forwarded-For. Plain-HTTP and LAN logins are unchanged; nothing redirects. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
142 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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// ClientIP returns the caller's address, reading through trustedProxyHops
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// reverse proxies (#2453).
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//
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// X-Forwarded-For grows left-to-right: every proxy APPENDS the peer it
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// received the request from. For client -> CDN -> own-proxy -> Minstrel the
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// app sees XFF = [client, CDN] and RemoteAddr = own-proxy. Each trusted proxy
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// therefore accounts for one entry counting from the right, and the first
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// address we were NOT told to trust is the client:
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//
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// hops 0 -> RemoteAddr; XFF ignored entirely
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// hops 1 -> XFF[1] = CDN — trusting only our own proxy, the most we can
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// honestly claim is the address it told us about
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// hops 2 -> XFF[0] = client
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//
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// This replaces an earlier heuristic that ignored XFF whenever RemoteAddr was
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// public. That was safe but useless in the deployment that matters: a proxy
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// on a public address (separate host, or a CDN) meant every session recorded
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// the proxy, so the active-sessions surface could never show an address
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// change (#370).
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//
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// # What the operator is asserting
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//
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// hops >= 1 is a DECLARATION that a proxy sits in front. Two ways to get it
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// wrong, both worth understanding rather than papering over:
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//
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// - Set to 1+ with NO proxy: any client can forge X-Forwarded-For and pick
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// what its own session row shows, defeating the compromise detection.
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// - Set HIGHER than the real chain: the index runs past the proxy-written
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// entries into attacker-supplied ones, same result.
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//
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// Both are inherent to the trusted-hop model — Rails, Caddy, Traefik and
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// nginx all behave this way — which is why 0 is a first-class value and the
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// admin card tells the operator to count their proxies.
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func ClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxyHops int) string {
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remote := hostOf(r.RemoteAddr)
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if trustedProxyHops <= 0 {
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return remote
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}
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chain := forwardedChain(r)
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if len(chain) == 0 {
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// No forwarding header: either there's genuinely no proxy, or one is
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// misconfigured. The socket peer is the only thing we actually know.
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return remote
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}
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// Clamp rather than reject: a chain shorter than the configured depth
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// means the operator over-counted, and the leftmost entry is the closest
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// thing to a client on offer. The caveat above covers the risk.
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idx := len(chain) - trustedProxyHops
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if idx < 0 {
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idx = 0
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}
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if ip := net.ParseIP(chain[idx]); ip != nil {
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return ip.String()
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}
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// A proxy wrote something that isn't an address. Positional meaning is
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// lost, so fall back to what we can verify ourselves.
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return remote
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}
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// IsHTTPS reports whether the client reached us over HTTPS, reading through
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// trustedProxyHops reverse proxies by the same rule as ClientIP.
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//
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// TLS terminates at the operator's proxy (rule 94), so r.TLS is nil in every
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// real deployment and only X-Forwarded-Proto can say what the client used.
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// That header is believed only when hops >= 1: with no trusted proxy it is
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// just something any client can send. Proxies that append rather than
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// overwrite produce a comma list, read positionally like X-Forwarded-For.
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//
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// This decides only HTTPS-only behaviour (the cookie Secure flag, HSTS). It
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// must never drive a redirect: plain-HTTP and LAN use keep working.
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func IsHTTPS(r *http.Request, trustedProxyHops int) bool {
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if r.TLS != nil {
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return true
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}
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if trustedProxyHops <= 0 {
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return false
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}
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raw := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
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if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
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return false
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}
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parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
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idx := len(parts) - trustedProxyHops
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if idx < 0 {
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idx = 0
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}
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return strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(parts[idx]), "https")
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}
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// forwardedChain returns the X-Forwarded-For entries in wire order, or the
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// single X-Real-IP value when XFF is absent.
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//
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// Entries are kept verbatim, including unparseable ones: their POSITION is
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// what carries meaning here, so silently dropping a malformed hop would
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// shift every index and could hand back an attacker-supplied entry.
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func forwardedChain(r *http.Request) []string {
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raw := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
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if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
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// Some proxies set only X-Real-IP, which by construction is a single
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// hop — the address that proxy saw.
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if real := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); real != "" {
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return []string{real}
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}
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return nil
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}
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parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
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out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
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for _, p := range parts {
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if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
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out = append(out, p)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// hopsOf reads a trusted-depth accessor, treating a nil one as "trust
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// nothing". Test contexts and any future caller that hasn't wired the
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// settings service get the safe reading rather than a panic.
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func hopsOf(fn func() int) int {
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if fn == nil {
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return 0
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}
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return fn()
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}
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// hostOf strips the port from a RemoteAddr, tolerating values that have none.
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func hostOf(remoteAddr string) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return strings.TrimSpace(remoteAddr)
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}
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return host
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}
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