Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.
137 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
137 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/apierror"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/audit"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/auth"
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"git.fabledsword.com/bvandeusen/minstrel/internal/db/dbq"
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)
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// errNoCurrentSession means the request authenticated but the middleware
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// didn't record which session did it — which should be impossible on a route
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// behind RequireUser. It matters because "log out everywhere else" is defined
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// by exclusion: without knowing which session is ours, the safe-looking
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// action would sign the caller out too.
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var errNoCurrentSession = errors.New("no session id in request context")
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// sessionResp is one row of the active-sessions list.
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//
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// token_hash is absent, and that is the point of storing only a hash: it
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// never leaves the database, so this surface can list sessions without
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// handing out anything that could be replayed.
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type sessionResp struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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UserAgent string `json:"user_agent"`
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// CreatedIP is frozen at issue time; LastIP moves with the session. The
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// pair is what makes a stolen token legible — same device string, but an
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// address the user doesn't recognise.
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CreatedIP string `json:"created_ip"`
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LastIP string `json:"last_ip"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
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LastSeenAt time.Time `json:"last_seen_at"`
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// Current marks the session making this request so the UI can label it
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// and not offer a "log out" that signs the user out of the page they're
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// standing on.
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Current bool `json:"current"`
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}
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type revokedResp struct {
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Revoked int `json:"revoked"`
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}
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// handleListMySessions implements GET /api/me/sessions.
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func (h *handlers) handleListMySessions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := requireUser(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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// Absent id is tolerated here (unlike logout-others): the list still
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// renders, it just won't flag a current row.
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currentID, _ := auth.SessionIDFromContext(r.Context())
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rows, err := dbq.New(h.pool).ListSessionsForUser(r.Context(), user.ID)
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("list sessions: query failed", "err", err)
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writeErr(w, apierror.Internal(err))
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return
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}
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out := make([]sessionResp, 0, len(rows))
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for _, s := range rows {
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out = append(out, sessionResp{
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ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
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UserAgent: s.UserAgent,
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CreatedIP: s.CreatedIp,
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LastIP: s.LastIp,
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CreatedAt: s.CreatedAt.Time,
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LastSeenAt: s.LastSeenAt.Time,
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Current: s.ID == currentID,
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})
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
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}
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// handleRevokeMySession implements DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id}.
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func (h *handlers) handleRevokeMySession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := requireUser(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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id, ok := parseUUID(chi.URLParam(r, "id"))
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if !ok {
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// Malformed and belongs-to-someone-else collapse to one answer on
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// purpose: a distinguishable response would let a caller probe
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// whether another user's session id exists.
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writeErr(w, apierror.NotFound("session"))
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return
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}
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n, err := dbq.New(h.pool).DeleteSessionForUser(r.Context(), dbq.DeleteSessionForUserParams{
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ID: id,
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UserID: user.ID,
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})
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("revoke session: delete failed", "err", err)
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writeErr(w, apierror.Internal(err))
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return
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}
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if n == 0 {
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writeErr(w, apierror.NotFound("session"))
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return
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}
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audit.WriteOrLog(r.Context(), h.pool, h.logger, user.ID, user.ID, audit.ActionSessionRevoke, nil)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// handleRevokeMyOtherSessions implements POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others.
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func (h *handlers) handleRevokeMyOtherSessions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := requireUser(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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currentID, ok := auth.SessionIDFromContext(r.Context())
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if !ok {
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// Refuse rather than guess: deleting "all but unknown" is deleting
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// all, which would log the caller out of the page they invoked this
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// from and look exactly like the attack they were defending against.
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h.logger.Error("revoke other sessions: no session id in context")
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writeErr(w, apierror.Internal(errNoCurrentSession))
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return
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}
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n, err := dbq.New(h.pool).DeleteOtherSessionsForUser(r.Context(), dbq.DeleteOtherSessionsForUserParams{
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UserID: user.ID,
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ID: currentID,
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})
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("revoke other sessions: delete failed", "err", err)
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writeErr(w, apierror.Internal(err))
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return
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}
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audit.WriteOrLog(r.Context(), h.pool, h.logger, user.ID, user.ID, audit.ActionSessionRevokeOthers, nil)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, revokedResp{Revoked: int(n)})
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}
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