Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows.
The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which
sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse
than absent because it looks like evidence.
Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair
is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is
the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed
text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never
queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that
renders "1.2.3.4/32".
The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this
exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in
this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth
middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same
UPDATE for free.
Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client
IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong:
- RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the
normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data.
- Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A
security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none.
So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived
from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is
attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk
XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own
infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF
only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested,
including both spoofing shapes.
Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the
proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function.
Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47:
GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row
DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours
POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n}
Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's
session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and
:execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test
that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404.
The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is
defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the
safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it
refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is
tested for non-deletion too.
audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no
migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed).
Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is
present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the
hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.
Adds SignStreamToken / VerifyStreamToken (HMAC-SHA256 over
trackID|exp) and modifies handleGetStream to accept either the
existing session cookie OR a valid signed token. Stream route
moved out of the authed group so the handler's own auth check
runs and the token bypass is reachable.
Enables Sonos / UPnP speakers to fetch the stream URL without
carrying the user's session cookie - they cannot. The token is
short-lived (max 24h per the design); expiry checked at request
time only, not per-byte, so long tracks play through.
streamSecret field on handlers is nil for now; Task 2 wires the
loader (env var with auto-generated fallback persisted in
app_preferences).
Adds auth.OptionalUser - the permissive sibling of RequireUser
that attaches the user to context when a valid cookie / bearer is
present but does NOT 401 on absence. The stream route is wrapped
with it so the handler can fall through to the token path when
no session is present.
newLibraryRouter (test fixture) gets a synthetic-user middleware
on the stream route so existing media_test tests keep passing
without seeding a real session row - production traffic uses
auth.OptionalUser, the test path uses auth.UserCtxKeyForTest().
Five tests cover round-trip, tampered token rejection, expiry,
wrong-track-ID, and wrong-secret rejection. CI verifies.
Deletes the session row keyed by the cookie/bearer token and
clears the cookie on the client. Best-effort DB delete — logout
still succeeds for the client if the row's already gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves /api/* callers from session cookie first, Authorization
bearer second. Touches last_seen on success for future active-
sessions UI. Adds GetUserByID query used by the middleware.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shared primitives for /api/* auth: mint a url-safe opaque token,
hash it for storage, verify a bcrypt password hash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
bvandeusen
