users.api_token held each user's apiKey in plaintext and was looked up by
equality, so a leaked row or backup handed out working keys. Migration
0063 replaces it with api_token_hash (sha256, hex), computed in place
from the existing keys so every Subsonic client keeps working.
The key can no longer be read back: GET /api/me/api-token is gone, and
POST returns the new key once. Settings shows it right after Regenerate
with a copy button and a "won't be shown again" note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every password-shaped check was mounted bare, so guessing was limited only
by bcrypt cost. A shared in-memory AttemptLimiter now sits in front of them:
- login: 10 failures per account and 50 per address per 15 min, checked
before the user lookup and bcrypt; 429 with Retry-After. A success clears
the account's count but not the address's.
- unknown usernames run a dummy bcrypt compare, so timing no longer says
which accounts exist.
- register: 10 per address per hour; forgot-password: 5 per address and 3
per email per hour (applied whether or not the email matches); reset: 20
failed tokens per address per 15 min.
- Subsonic /rest: same limits as login, counting only wrong credentials,
since clients authenticate on every request.
Web login, register, reset and forgot-password screens say how long to
wait; web and Android carry copy for the rate_limited code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
apiKey (OpenSubsonic) is preferred. t+s uses md5(subsonic_password+salt)
with a constant-time compare. p is disabled by default and gated by
SubsonicConfig.AllowPlaintextPassword; enc:HEX obfuscation decoded.
Auth failures write a Subsonic "failed" envelope so clients don't see
HTTP 401.