users.api_token held each user's apiKey in plaintext and was looked up by
equality, so a leaked row or backup handed out working keys. Migration
0063 replaces it with api_token_hash (sha256, hex), computed in place
from the existing keys so every Subsonic client keeps working.
The key can no longer be read back: GET /api/me/api-token is gone, and
POST returns the new key once. Settings shows it right after Regenerate
with a copy button and a "won't be shown again" note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four authenticated endpoints for the user's own account:
- PUT /api/me/password — change own password. Caller must
supply current_password (verified via bcrypt). Distinct from
admin-driven reset (which doesn't require knowing the old).
Audits ActionPasswordChangeSelf.
- PUT /api/me/profile — set display_name + email. Both fields
are nullable; empty string clears, omitted leaves unchanged.
Email is lowercased before store + format-validated. Unique
violation → 409 email_taken.
- GET /api/me/api-token — returns current API token (for
copy-paste into Subsonic clients).
- POST /api/me/api-token — regenerates token. Old one stops
working immediately. Audits ActionTokenRegenerate.
All four use the existing RequireUser middleware on the authed
sub-router; audit writes are best-effort (logged on failure).
Tests cover happy paths, wrong-password 401, password-too-short
400, email-invalid 400, email-taken 409, clear-by-empty-string,
omit-leaves-unchanged, token GET + regen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>