1b7fa635d81c4736aad4637ce0112771e691c3ec
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 bvandeusen
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381e9cedb7 |
feat(net): trusted-proxy depth so real client IPs survive a proxy — #2453
Fixes the defect the operator spotted in #370 immediately after it shipped: auth.ClientIP ignored X-Forwarded-For whenever RemoteAddr was public, so a proxy on a public address — a separate host, or a CDN, i.e. anyone running this publicly, since public means TLS means a proxy — recorded the PROXY for every session. created_ip and last_ip were then always equal and the "Address changed" signal could never fire. The feature looked like it worked and reported nothing. Replaced with the standard trusted-hop model (Rails, Caddy, Traefik, nginx). XFF grows left-to-right as each proxy appends the peer it received from, so for client -> CDN -> own-proxy -> app the app sees [client, CDN] with RemoteAddr = own-proxy, and the client sits at XFF[len - hops]: 0 RemoteAddr, XFF ignored — no proxy 1 the address your own proxy observed 2 through a CDN in front of your proxy Default 1, per the operator: publicly reachable means a TLS terminator in front. The cost is real and stated rather than hidden. hops >= 1 DECLARES that a proxy exists; set it with no proxy, or deeper than the actual chain, and the index reaches attacker-supplied entries, letting a visitor choose which address their own session shows — defeating exactly the detection #370 is for. That's inherent to the model, which is why 0 is a first-class value and the admin card says "count your proxies, don't guess high" instead of just exposing a number. Both mis-set shapes are pinned by tests so they stay known consequences rather than surprises. Migration 0053 + internal/netsettings, cached under an RWMutex. That's not an optimisation: ClientIP runs in RequireUser for every authenticated request, so a per-request query would put the database on the critical path of the whole API. New() always returns a usable service so a boot-time DB hiccup degrades to the default instead of breaking that path (rule #131), and Hops() is nil-safe because test routers construct middleware without it. RequireUser now takes a func() int rather than an int — the value is operator-editable at runtime while the middleware is built once at boot, and reading it per request is what makes a save take effect with no restart (rule #25). The admin card is verifiable, not just configurable: it reports the address the CURRENT setting resolves THIS request to, the raw forwarded chain, and the socket peer — so you set the number, save, and confirm the address matches the machine you're on. It also counts the arriving chain and says how many proxies that implies. GET/PUT both return that payload, PUT recomputed under the new value, so the effect is visible without a reload. Also fixes styling in the #370 card that CI could not catch: text-destructive and bg-destructive don't exist in this Tailwind config — the palette is colors.action.destructive — so the "Address changed" warning and the sign-out-others button were rendering unstyled. Both now use text-action-destructive / bg-action-destructive / text-action-fg. Not done here: requestlog.go still logs raw RemoteAddr and will disagree with the sessions UI about who connected. Left for its own change. |
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bvandeusen
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bf649f3beb |
feat(web): active sessions card in Settings — #370
test-web / test (push) Successful in 32s
Client half of #370. Lists every device signed in to your account, with a per-row sign-out and a "sign out all other devices" action. The card does one thing the API alone doesn't: it says "Address changed" when created_ip and last_ip differ, rather than printing two addresses and leaving you to compare them. That mismatch — same device string, different origin — is the shape of a stolen token, and it's the reason IP capture was worth a migration. Making the operator spot it by eye would have wasted the data. Placed with Password and API Token rather than at the bottom of the page: those three are the account-security group, and this is the one that tells you the other two need attention. Details worth naming: - The current session gets a "This device" badge and NO sign-out button — offering one would log you out of the page you're standing on. The server already excludes it from logout-others; this makes that visible. - Sign-out-all-others is a two-step confirm and states the count, so the button can't be a surprise. - A 404 on revoke reloads instead of erroring. It means the session is already gone — revoked elsewhere, or expired — so the list was simply stale and showing the truth is the right response. The code is `session_not_found`, not `not_found`: apierror.NotFound(what) prefixes it. - Empty and error states both handled (rule #24); the empty case is practically unreachable since listing requires an authenticated request, and is handled rather than assumed. - User-agent parsing is deliberately coarse. A real UA parser is a dependency and a maintenance burden for a string whose only job is "do you recognise this?" — the addresses carry the actual signal. Tests cover the parts that would be quiet if broken: the current-session badge suppressing its own sign-out button, the address-changed warning appearing and NOT appearing, the two-step confirm not firing on first click, and the load-failure retry. Android parity is a separate decision, not assumed. |