Fixes the defect the operator spotted in #370 immediately after it shipped:
auth.ClientIP ignored X-Forwarded-For whenever RemoteAddr was public, so a
proxy on a public address — a separate host, or a CDN, i.e. anyone running
this publicly, since public means TLS means a proxy — recorded the PROXY for
every session. created_ip and last_ip were then always equal and the
"Address changed" signal could never fire. The feature looked like it worked
and reported nothing.
Replaced with the standard trusted-hop model (Rails, Caddy, Traefik, nginx).
XFF grows left-to-right as each proxy appends the peer it received from, so
for client -> CDN -> own-proxy -> app the app sees [client, CDN] with
RemoteAddr = own-proxy, and the client sits at XFF[len - hops]:
0 RemoteAddr, XFF ignored — no proxy
1 the address your own proxy observed
2 through a CDN in front of your proxy
Default 1, per the operator: publicly reachable means a TLS terminator in
front.
The cost is real and stated rather than hidden. hops >= 1 DECLARES that a
proxy exists; set it with no proxy, or deeper than the actual chain, and the
index reaches attacker-supplied entries, letting a visitor choose which
address their own session shows — defeating exactly the detection #370 is
for. That's inherent to the model, which is why 0 is a first-class value and
the admin card says "count your proxies, don't guess high" instead of just
exposing a number. Both mis-set shapes are pinned by tests so they stay known
consequences rather than surprises.
Migration 0053 + internal/netsettings, cached under an RWMutex. That's not an
optimisation: ClientIP runs in RequireUser for every authenticated request, so
a per-request query would put the database on the critical path of the whole
API. New() always returns a usable service so a boot-time DB hiccup degrades
to the default instead of breaking that path (rule #131), and Hops() is
nil-safe because test routers construct middleware without it.
RequireUser now takes a func() int rather than an int — the value is
operator-editable at runtime while the middleware is built once at boot, and
reading it per request is what makes a save take effect with no restart
(rule #25).
The admin card is verifiable, not just configurable: it reports the address
the CURRENT setting resolves THIS request to, the raw forwarded chain, and the
socket peer — so you set the number, save, and confirm the address matches the
machine you're on. It also counts the arriving chain and says how many proxies
that implies. GET/PUT both return that payload, PUT recomputed under the new
value, so the effect is visible without a reload.
Also fixes styling in the #370 card that CI could not catch: text-destructive
and bg-destructive don't exist in this Tailwind config — the palette is
colors.action.destructive — so the "Address changed" warning and the
sign-out-others button were rendering unstyled. Both now use
text-action-destructive / bg-action-destructive / text-action-fg.
Not done here: requestlog.go still logs raw RemoteAddr and will disagree with
the sessions UI about who connected. Left for its own change.
Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows.
The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which
sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse
than absent because it looks like evidence.
Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair
is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is
the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed
text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never
queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that
renders "1.2.3.4/32".
The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this
exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in
this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth
middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same
UPDATE for free.
Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client
IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong:
- RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the
normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data.
- Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A
security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none.
So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived
from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is
attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk
XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own
infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF
only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested,
including both spoofing shapes.
Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the
proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function.
Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47:
GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row
DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours
POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n}
Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's
session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and
:execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test
that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404.
The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is
defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the
safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it
refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is
tested for non-deletion too.
audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no
migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed).
Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is
present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the
hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.
Adds SignStreamToken / VerifyStreamToken (HMAC-SHA256 over
trackID|exp) and modifies handleGetStream to accept either the
existing session cookie OR a valid signed token. Stream route
moved out of the authed group so the handler's own auth check
runs and the token bypass is reachable.
Enables Sonos / UPnP speakers to fetch the stream URL without
carrying the user's session cookie - they cannot. The token is
short-lived (max 24h per the design); expiry checked at request
time only, not per-byte, so long tracks play through.
streamSecret field on handlers is nil for now; Task 2 wires the
loader (env var with auto-generated fallback persisted in
app_preferences).
Adds auth.OptionalUser - the permissive sibling of RequireUser
that attaches the user to context when a valid cookie / bearer is
present but does NOT 401 on absence. The stream route is wrapped
with it so the handler can fall through to the token path when
no session is present.
newLibraryRouter (test fixture) gets a synthetic-user middleware
on the stream route so existing media_test tests keep passing
without seeding a real session row - production traffic uses
auth.OptionalUser, the test path uses auth.UserCtxKeyForTest().
Five tests cover round-trip, tampered token rejection, expiry,
wrong-track-ID, and wrong-secret rejection. CI verifies.
Deletes the session row keyed by the cookie/bearer token and
clears the cookie on the client. Best-effort DB delete — logout
still succeeds for the client if the row's already gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves /api/* callers from session cookie first, Authorization
bearer second. Touches last_seen on success for future active-
sessions UI. Adds GetUserByID query used by the middleware.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shared primitives for /api/* auth: mint a url-safe opaque token,
hash it for storage, verify a bcrypt password hash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
bvandeusen
