1b7fa635d81c4736aad4637ce0112771e691c3ec
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 bvandeusen
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381e9cedb7 |
feat(net): trusted-proxy depth so real client IPs survive a proxy — #2453
Fixes the defect the operator spotted in #370 immediately after it shipped: auth.ClientIP ignored X-Forwarded-For whenever RemoteAddr was public, so a proxy on a public address — a separate host, or a CDN, i.e. anyone running this publicly, since public means TLS means a proxy — recorded the PROXY for every session. created_ip and last_ip were then always equal and the "Address changed" signal could never fire. The feature looked like it worked and reported nothing. Replaced with the standard trusted-hop model (Rails, Caddy, Traefik, nginx). XFF grows left-to-right as each proxy appends the peer it received from, so for client -> CDN -> own-proxy -> app the app sees [client, CDN] with RemoteAddr = own-proxy, and the client sits at XFF[len - hops]: 0 RemoteAddr, XFF ignored — no proxy 1 the address your own proxy observed 2 through a CDN in front of your proxy Default 1, per the operator: publicly reachable means a TLS terminator in front. The cost is real and stated rather than hidden. hops >= 1 DECLARES that a proxy exists; set it with no proxy, or deeper than the actual chain, and the index reaches attacker-supplied entries, letting a visitor choose which address their own session shows — defeating exactly the detection #370 is for. That's inherent to the model, which is why 0 is a first-class value and the admin card says "count your proxies, don't guess high" instead of just exposing a number. Both mis-set shapes are pinned by tests so they stay known consequences rather than surprises. Migration 0053 + internal/netsettings, cached under an RWMutex. That's not an optimisation: ClientIP runs in RequireUser for every authenticated request, so a per-request query would put the database on the critical path of the whole API. New() always returns a usable service so a boot-time DB hiccup degrades to the default instead of breaking that path (rule #131), and Hops() is nil-safe because test routers construct middleware without it. RequireUser now takes a func() int rather than an int — the value is operator-editable at runtime while the middleware is built once at boot, and reading it per request is what makes a save take effect with no restart (rule #25). The admin card is verifiable, not just configurable: it reports the address the CURRENT setting resolves THIS request to, the raw forwarded chain, and the socket peer — so you set the number, save, and confirm the address matches the machine you're on. It also counts the arriving chain and says how many proxies that implies. GET/PUT both return that payload, PUT recomputed under the new value, so the effect is visible without a reload. Also fixes styling in the #370 card that CI could not catch: text-destructive and bg-destructive don't exist in this Tailwind config — the palette is colors.action.destructive — so the "Address changed" warning and the sign-out-others button were rendering unstyled. Both now use text-action-destructive / bg-action-destructive / text-action-fg. Not done here: requestlog.go still logs raw RemoteAddr and will disagree with the sessions UI about who connected. Left for its own change. |
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bvandeusen
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d86af7397d |
feat(auth): active sessions API with origin/current IP — #370
Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268. |