4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	11ef044ef6	feat(library): merge duplicates without losing history (M400 #3911) ... Merge keeps one copy of a duplicate group and removes the rest. Every table that references tracks does so ON DELETE CASCADE, so deleting a duplicate's row outright would silently destroy its likes, plays, playlist entries and tags. The merge moves all of that onto the kept copy first, then deletes the empty row. In one transaction, holding a lock on the group: - repoints play_events, skip_events, contextual_likes, playback_errors, lidarr_requests.matched_track_id and playlist_tracks. The last is keyed by position, so every entry stays where it was. - merges general_likes one per user, dated to the earlier like - takes the union of track_tags, keeping the kept copy's own weight on a shared tag - rewrites track_similarity onto the kept copy, dropping edges that would point a track at itself and keeping the kept copy's existing edge on a collision - lets the kept copy take a recording MBID only the removed copy had - deletes the removed copies' rows, tidies emptied albums and artists, marks the group merged - logs sync changes: track deletes, and like and playlist-track delete/upsert pairs The removed copies' files are deleted first, before any row changes, through the same helper as DeleteTrackFile (now shared, along with the album tidy-up). A merge that left the file behind would be undone by the next scan re-importing it. An unwritable library answers 409 library_not_writable and nothing changes. tracks.Service.MergeDuplicates wraps it with the opt-in Lidarr unmonitor from RemoveTrack, skipped when the removed copy is a second file of the kept copy's own album track: unmonitoring that would stop Lidarr managing the kept file. It writes a duplicate_merge audit row after commit, per the audit package's best-effort contract, naming both paths. POST /api/admin/library/duplicates/{id}/merge takes an optional survivor_track_id (the report's proposal otherwise) and unmonitor. On the report page: - each copy gets a Keep choice, defaulting to the proposed one - Merge needs a second click, on a button that says how many files it removes, with the consequence stated beside an opt-in Lidarr checkbox Integration tests cover: - every piece of history landing on the kept copy exactly: likes deduped at the earlier time, plays and skips counted, playlist position unchanged, tags unioned, similarity rewritten with no duplicate or self-edge, MBID inherited - the removed file gone, and a second merge refused - an unwritable file leaving likes, plays, row and group untouched - a survivor outside the group refused Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SQ31KQpYbStyK5y58UmPLH	2026-09-11 17:25:06 -04:00
bvandeusen	d86af7397d	feat(auth): active sessions API with origin/current IP — #370 ... Server half of the active-sessions surface. Web UI follows. The operator wants this specifically to notice a compromised account, which sets the bar: the addresses have to be trustworthy, or the feature is worse than absent because it looks like evidence. Migration 0052 adds created_ip + last_ip. Two columns, not one, and the pair is the signal: a session issued at home and now being used from elsewhere is the shape of a stolen token, and neither column alone can show that. Typed text, matching the user_agent column beside it — these are displayed, never queried by subnet, and inet round-trips through pgx as a netip.Prefix that renders "1.2.3.4/32". The rest of the schema was already waiting. Migration 0004 anticipated this exactly: "last_seen_at enables an 'active sessions' UI later (not wired in this plan) without schema churn." last_seen_at is live data — the auth middleware already touches it per request — so last_ip rides that same UPDATE for free. Getting the address right is the substance here. Nothing extracted a client IP anywhere before, and both obvious approaches are wrong: - RemoteAddr alone shows the reverse proxy on every session, which is the normal self-hosted deployment. Noise shaped like data. - Trusting X-Forwarded-For lets any client choose what its victim sees. A security surface an attacker can write to is worse than none. So auth.ClientIP trusts the header only when the request actually arrived from a proxy range. Public RemoteAddr means a direct connection, so XFF is attacker-controlled and ignored outright. Private RemoteAddr means we walk XFF right-to-left — proxies append, so the right end is what our own infrastructure wrote — and take the first non-proxy address. A forged XFF only prepends to the left end, which that walk never reaches. Unit-tested, including both spoofing shapes. Fails closed on a public-addressed proxy (separate host, CDN): we report the proxy rather than trusting a forgeable header. Documented at the function. Endpoints, all scoped by user_id per rule #47: GET /api/me/sessions → list, flagging the current row DELETE /api/me/sessions/{id} → 204, or 404 if not yours POST /api/me/sessions/logout-others → {"revoked": n} Keyed on session id alone, any household member could revoke another's session by guessing a uuid, so the delete carries user_id in its WHERE and :execrows distinguishes "not yours" (404) from a false 204. There's a test that asserts the row actually survives, not merely that we returned 404. The middleware now also puts the session id in context. logout-others is defined by exclusion, and without knowing which session is ours the safe-looking action deletes everything including the caller's — so it refuses rather than guesses when the id is absent, and that refusal is tested for non-deletion too. audit_log.action is plain text with no CHECK, so the two new actions need no migration (rule #36 checked, not assumed). Codegen is real sqlc 1.31.1 via the container in `make generate` — docker is present on this workstation even though Go and sqlc aren't — rather than the hand-written .sql.go shortcut used in milestone #268.	2026-08-05 09:17:40 -04:00
bvandeusen	965df28127	refactor(server): audit.WriteOrLog wrapper; migrate 13 sites (T5) ... Add audit.WriteOrLog: a one-line wrapper around Write that logs at Warn and swallows the error, matching the package contract that audit failures must not break user-facing operations. Migrate the 13 call sites across 7 files in internal/api/ from the 3-line "if err != nil { logger.Warn(...) }" shape to a single call. audit.Write stays exported for tests + any future caller that needs strict semantics. Adds three tests: success (no log), failure-via-closed-pool (Warn record with action+err keys), and nil-logger (no panic). Tests skip when MINSTREL_TEST_DATABASE_URL is unset, matching the existing harness convention.	2026-05-07 21:33:14 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Sonnet 4.6	4845628ae4	feat(db/m7-user-mgmt): migration 0022 + audit helper ... Schema for user management U1: display_name on users; user_invites; registration_settings singleton (default 'invite_only'); audit_log. Plus the internal/audit package centralizing the action-name vocabulary and JSON metadata marshaling so handlers don't repeat boilerplate. Race-safe first-admin uses a query-shape primitive (CreateUserFirstAdminRace's WHERE NOT EXISTS subquery) rather than a schema-level constraint. Concurrent empty-state registrations both see 'no users yet' and both insert as admin — fine, having two admins from the start is benign; what matters is at-least-one. users.username uniqueness arbitrates if the two callers picked the same username. CreateUser signature gains display_name (nullable); existing bootstrap call sites pass nil. The audit package declares the full U1+U2+U3 action vocabulary upfront so subsequent slices are purely additive on the caller side. Tests cover audit Write with + without metadata and that every declared action constant persists correctly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-07 11:51:00 -04:00