feat(auth): sessions expire server-side; password change and reset end other sessions (M462 #4978)
Sessions had no server-side expiry: only the web cookie's 30-day Max-Age limited them, and a bearer token (Android) lived until revoked by hand. GetSessionByTokenHash and ListSessionsForUser now ignore sessions idle for 30 days or older than a year, and the GC worker deletes them hourly. A password change was a plain UPDATE, so a session opened with the old password survived it. Now: - self-service change signs out every other device and keeps this one; - reset by email ends every session the account has; - an admin reset ends the target's sessions (keeping the admin's own when they reset themselves). The success copy on web and Android says the other devices were signed out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -7,7 +7,18 @@ VALUES ($1, $2, $3, sqlc.arg(ip), sqlc.arg(ip))
|
||||
RETURNING *;
|
||||
|
||||
-- name: GetSessionByTokenHash :one
|
||||
SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = $1;
|
||||
-- Expired sessions are invisible here, so they fail auth the moment they
|
||||
-- lapse rather than whenever the GC sweep next runs. Two limits:
|
||||
-- idle 30 days — a token nobody has used in a month is abandoned, and
|
||||
-- matches the web cookie's lifetime;
|
||||
-- absolute 1 year — even a token in daily use is re-issued yearly, so a
|
||||
-- stolen one that is being used quietly does not live
|
||||
-- forever.
|
||||
-- Keep in step with ListSessionsForUser and GcDeleteExpiredSessions.
|
||||
SELECT * FROM sessions
|
||||
WHERE token_hash = $1
|
||||
AND last_seen_at > now() - interval '30 days'
|
||||
AND created_at > now() - interval '365 days';
|
||||
|
||||
-- name: TouchSessionLastSeen :exec
|
||||
UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = now(), last_ip = $2 WHERE id = $1;
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +26,13 @@ UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = now(), last_ip = $2 WHERE id = $1;
|
||||
-- name: ListSessionsForUser :many
|
||||
-- Most-recently-active first: the row a user is most likely to act on is the
|
||||
-- one that moved last, and an unfamiliar entry at the top is the alarm.
|
||||
SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY last_seen_at DESC;
|
||||
-- Expired rows are left out: they no longer authenticate, so listing them
|
||||
-- as active would be wrong. Same limits as GetSessionByTokenHash.
|
||||
SELECT * FROM sessions
|
||||
WHERE user_id = $1
|
||||
AND last_seen_at > now() - interval '30 days'
|
||||
AND created_at > now() - interval '365 days'
|
||||
ORDER BY last_seen_at DESC;
|
||||
|
||||
-- name: DeleteSession :exec
|
||||
DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = $1;
|
||||
@@ -34,3 +51,9 @@ DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2;
|
||||
-- "Log out everywhere else." Excludes the caller's own session so the action
|
||||
-- doesn't log them out of the page they just used to invoke it.
|
||||
DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1 AND id <> $2;
|
||||
|
||||
-- name: DeleteSessionsForUser :execrows
|
||||
-- Every session the user has, the caller's included. A password reset uses
|
||||
-- it: whoever forgot the password is not signed in anywhere they trust, and
|
||||
-- whoever may have learned it must be signed out everywhere.
|
||||
DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1;
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user