2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusen	09b5f874b6	Security values move into the Settings UI ... Operator: *"proxy hops defaults to 1 and should be in the settings UI not in the envs, we need the security values to be in the UI."* Overrules the call I made yesterday, and rule 25 is on your side — I argued deployment-topology, but the operator has to be able to SEE what protects them, and reading a container's environment is not seeing. Six new settings in a **Security** group: trusted proxy hops (default 1), the per-account and per-address sign-in limits with their shared window, and the sign-up limit with its own. `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` is gone; the rate limits are no longer hardcoded constants. **The hard part was keeping the throttle cheap.** It consults these BEFORE opening a database connection — deliberately, because a refused attempt is meant to cost nothing, and the hop count is needed to know who is even asking. A query per attempt would undo both. So there is a small cache seeded from the registry defaults (the app works with no database at all, which is what the DB-free unit lane relies on), loaded at boot, and refreshed on every settings save — the same live-update contract `session_ttl_days` already had. `SlidingWindow` now takes its limit and window as SUPPLIERS rather than values, so a saved number applies to the next attempt instead of the next deploy. **Bounds are rejected, not clamped.** A hop count of 99 would trust anything a caller sent; a sign-in limit of 0 would lock every account out permanently. Both now fail validation with a message naming the range, and the number input carries min/max so the browser objects first. Silently storing a different number than the one typed is how somebody ends up believing a protection is set to something it is not. `MAX_BUCKETS` stays a constant on purpose: it protects the limiter from itself rather than the app from a caller, and there is no operator judgment to apply. Two integration tests, because the whole point is the round trip: a dangerous value refused, a legitimate one reaching the cache the throttle reads and persisting; and every Security row reaching the admin payload with bounds and a description that explains itself.	2026-08-23 15:24:15 -04:00
bvandeusen	a85c53ba2c	Trust proxy headers by hop count, and log every credential event ... Operator, before exposing the instance: *"I'd expect that we should have a proxy hops setting for how many proxy hops we should trust a shared real-ip at… and is there any session logging."* Neither existed, and the first one was a real hole. **The address was forgeable.** `client_address()` read the LEFTMOST `X-Forwarded-For` entry — nominally "the original client", and precisely the one a caller controls, because anything they send arrives before what proxies append. So `curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"`, rotated per request, minted a fresh rate-limit bucket every time. Concretely: stuffing ONE account stayed limited (the account key is unforgeable and that is why it exists), but spraying MANY accounts from one source was not — each account got its own budget, and the per-address cap meant to bound the total was defeated by a header. On a LAN that is nothing. It is not nothing on a public host. Now it counts in from the RIGHT by `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS`, default 1. Each hop appends what it saw, so the rightmost entries are the ones our own infrastructure wrote and a forged prefix lands to the left of them where it can never be selected — proven for the honest, forged, padded, CDN and shorter-than-configured cases. 0 ignores the header entirely; 2 is Cloudflare in front of a proxy. Too high is the dangerous direction, so a header shorter than configured falls back to the socket address rather than reaching further left. `X-Forwarded-Proto` had the same bug and now shares the same rule. Both live in a new `proxy.py` rather than being written twice — two places holding one decision is how issue 2183 happened, and this is the same decision. Env rather than the Settings UI, against rule 25's usual pull: it is deployment topology rather than preference, and the limiter consults it BEFORE opening a database connection, which is the entire point of checking a throttle before doing expensive work. Easy to move if that reads wrong. **And there was no logging at all** — `auth.py` had no logger, and the only record of anything was `device_tokens.last_used_at`. Sign-ins, failures, throttle trips, new accounts and device-token issuance now all log, with the attempted email and the trusted address. Deliberately including the email: it is the operator's own server, and "somebody failed a login" without saying against which account is not actionable. `basicConfig` at INFO in `create_app`, because hypercorn configures its own loggers and leaves the root at WARNING — without it every line above would have gone nowhere, which is a worse failure than not writing them. This is the app log, not an audit table. Not queryable, not retained past log rotation. The table is task 2939; this is what makes the next few days observable.	2026-08-23 15:12:14 -04:00