Security values move into the Settings UI
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Operator: *"proxy hops defaults to 1 and should be in the settings UI not in the
envs, we need the security values to be in the UI."* Overrules the call I made
yesterday, and rule 25 is on your side — I argued deployment-topology, but the
operator has to be able to SEE what protects them, and reading a container's
environment is not seeing.

Six new settings in a **Security** group: trusted proxy hops (default 1), the
per-account and per-address sign-in limits with their shared window, and the
sign-up limit with its own. `THOUGHTSYNC_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` is gone; the rate
limits are no longer hardcoded constants.

**The hard part was keeping the throttle cheap.** It consults these BEFORE opening
a database connection — deliberately, because a refused attempt is meant to cost
nothing, and the hop count is needed to know who is even asking. A query per
attempt would undo both. So there is a small cache seeded from the registry
defaults (the app works with no database at all, which is what the DB-free unit
lane relies on), loaded at boot, and refreshed on every settings save — the same
live-update contract `session_ttl_days` already had.

`SlidingWindow` now takes its limit and window as SUPPLIERS rather than values, so
a saved number applies to the next attempt instead of the next deploy.

**Bounds are rejected, not clamped.** A hop count of 99 would trust anything a
caller sent; a sign-in limit of 0 would lock every account out permanently. Both
now fail validation with a message naming the range, and the number input carries
min/max so the browser objects first. Silently storing a different number than the
one typed is how somebody ends up believing a protection is set to something it is
not.

`MAX_BUCKETS` stays a constant on purpose: it protects the limiter from itself
rather than the app from a caller, and there is no operator judgment to apply.

Two integration tests, because the whole point is the round trip: a dangerous
value refused, a legitimate one reaching the cache the throttle reads and
persisting; and every Security row reaching the admin payload with bounds and a
description that explains itself.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-23 15:24:15 -04:00
parent a85c53ba2c
commit 09b5f874b6
11 changed files with 302 additions and 98 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from quart import Blueprint, current_app, jsonify, request
from .auth import require_admin
from .db import session_scope
from .settings import get_admin_settings, set_settings, validate_updates
from .settings import get_admin_settings, refresh_live, set_settings, validate_updates
bp = Blueprint("settings", __name__, url_prefix="/api/settings")
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ async def update_settings():
async with session_scope() as db:
await set_settings(db, clean)
await db.commit()
# Re-read the cached security values so a saved limit or hop count applies to
# the very next request. Unconditional: cheap, and a conditional here would be
# one more place that has to know which keys are hot.
await refresh_live(db)
result = await get_admin_settings(db)
# Apply the live-tunable knob without a restart (rule 25).