The host page gains a "Who's sending" panel, and the MCP a tool, that put the host's outbound (or inbound) traffic down to its containers and NFS mounts: read in shared time buckets, so the host's busiest bucket says who was sending in it. A swarm service's tasks add up under its name; what none of them accounts for is the host itself. Also fixes CI 9488: per-container net_rx_bps / net_tx_bps join the docker alert catalog, so a rule can catch a container flooding the uplink. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MCP server
Steward serves the Model Context Protocol at
/mcp. An AI client connected to it can look into everything Steward watches
(hosts, monitors, alerts, metrics, containers, playbook runs) and, with a
high enough role, change it. A token's role sets that ceiling.
Source: steward/mcp/. The tools live in steward/mcp/tools/, and a
plugin's tools live in plugins/<name>/mcp_tools.py.
Transport: streamable HTTP, stateless. Every request carries its own
token, so a client survives a Steward restart without reconnecting.
Connecting
-
In Steward, open AI access and create a token. Pick the lowest role that does the job.
-
Copy the token (it is shown once) and use one of the recipes on that page. They carry the real endpoint URL and the new token. For Claude Code:
claude mcp add --transport http steward https://steward.example/mcp \ --header "Authorization: Bearer stw_…" -
Ask the client to call
whoami. It answers with the user, the effective role and what that role allows.
Claude Desktop connects through mcp-remote. Open WebUI and other clients
need an MCP server with the Streamable HTTP transport and bearer
authentication. The AI access page shows the recipes for both.
Behind a reverse proxy
- The URL on the AI access page is Settings → General → Public base URL
plus
/mcp. If that setting is empty, the URL is built from the request's host instead. - The proxy must pass the
Authorizationheader through unchanged. - It must not buffer responses. Replies may arrive as server-sent events
(
text/event-stream). For nginx, setproxy_buffering off;on the location. - Steward does no Host-header (DNS-rebinding) check on
/mcp, because the bearer token is the security boundary. Serve it over HTTPS.
Security model
| Rule | How it is enforced |
|---|---|
| Bearer tokens only, no OAuth | steward/core/api_tokens.py. Only a hash is stored, and the token is shown once. |
| A token never acts above its user | Effective role = min(token role, user's current role). Lowering a user lowers every token they hold; disabling the user stops them all. |
| Default deny | A tool is reachable only if it was registered with a role (register_tool(fn, role=..., read_only=...)). tools/list shows a caller only the tools their role allows. A call above the role is refused, and the refusal names the role it needs. |
| Plugin tools follow the plugin | A disabled plugin's tools are hidden and refused. The host agent is built in and always on (it can't be disabled), so its tools are always there. |
| Dry run first | run_playbook, create_schedule and set_alert_action default to Ansible check mode (--check --diff). Changes are applied only when the caller passes check=false. A playbook its author flagged # steward:confirm: true also needs confirmed=true. prune_docker previews unless check=false. |
| Secrets stay put | Playbook variables Steward detects as secret reach the run but are never stored, audited or returned. Schedules and alert actions refuse them, since they would have to store them. Inventory variables are listed by name only, and HTTP monitor header values are redacted. |
| Every change is audited | Each write records an audit event as <user> via MCP, with the token id in its detail. list_audit_events(user="<user>") includes those events. |
| Unknown arguments are refused | A misspelt argument is rejected with a "did you mean", rather than silently dropped. |
Tokens never mint or revoke tokens; that happens only on the AI access page, in a browser session.
Tools by role
Each role includes the tools of the roles above it in this list.
Viewer: read everything
| Area | Tools |
|---|---|
| Start here | whoami, get_overview (what is wrong now, ranked, each finding with the call that shows its evidence) |
| Hosts and metrics | list_hosts, get_host, get_host_metrics, query_metrics |
| Monitors | list_monitors, get_monitor |
| Alerts | list_alerts, get_alert_history, list_alert_rules, get_alert_rule_options, list_maintenance_windows |
| Metric anomalies | list_anomalies (metrics that left their normal for the hour, to review first), get_anomaly (one anomaly with each occurrence against what is usual at that hour, the metric around it, what else happened on its host — alerts, Ansible runs, container deaths and starts, maintenance, reboots, other anomalies — and how earlier ones on the same metric were judged), get_metric_normal (the learned normal slot by slot, and the level that would be flagged), get_anomaly_settings (the review window and each floor) |
| Automation | list_playbooks, get_playbook, list_inventory, list_ansible_runs, get_ansible_run, wait_for_run, list_schedules |
| Audit | list_audit_events |
| Docker plugin | list_containers, get_container, list_swarm_services, search_container_logs, get_docker_disk_usage |
| Host agent (built in, always on) | list_agents, list_maintenance_plans (each plan's group, weekly slot, next run and latest run: how far it got, who it skipped and why), get_maintenance_job (a host's update jobs or one job: state, packages updated, whether it rebooted, why it failed), get_host_senders (who sent or received a host's network traffic over a window: its containers and NFS mounts ranked at the host's peak, and what none of them accounts for) |
| Traefik plugin | list_routers (each router graded as the Traefik page grades it, with the status codes behind a problem, what they mean and the swarm service behind it), get_router (one router's history, codes, normal and anomalies), list_certificates (served certificates, days left, the routers they cover), get_traffic (the access log's clients, countries and routers, and Traefik's own figures) |
| UniFi plugin | get_network (the WAN, clients, Wi-Fi networks, speed tests and devices by status), list_devices, list_clients (everyone seen, or the newest poll's top talkers), list_network_events, list_alarms, get_network_config (networks and VLANs, port forwards, firewall rules) |
| SNMP plugin | list_snmp_devices (each device's state, newest readings in their units and the readings it didn't return), get_snmp_device (one device's readings over a range). Never the community or v3 keys |
| Syslog plugin | list_syslog_sources (the devices sending syslog: added, offered or ignored, each with its rate, last heard and newest line), search_syslog (an added source's kept lines, or a host's, filtered by text, severity and worse, app and time, newest first) |
| Prometheus plugin | list_prometheus_targets (each target's state and its newest scrape: series kept, dropped and over the cap), get_prometheus_target (a target's stored series by metric, with labels and newest values). Never the token, and a password in a URL is masked |
Operator: run playbooks, change monitoring
| Area | Tools |
|---|---|
| Automation | run_playbook, cancel_ansible_run, create_schedule, update_schedule, delete_schedule, update_group_members (put hosts into an inventory group or take them out; a group alert rule follows within a minute) |
| Monitors | create_monitor, update_monitor, set_monitor_enabled |
| Alerts | create_alert_rule, update_alert_rule, acknowledge_alert, send_test_alert, create_maintenance_window, end_maintenance_window |
| Metric anomalies | review_anomaly (mark one or several normal, so their hours are learned, or real, with a note saying why) |
Admin: destructive and remediation
set_anomaly_settings (the anomaly review window and each normal's floor, as
Settings → Thresholds sets them), set_alert_action (the playbook a rule runs when it fires), delete_monitor,
delete_alert_rule, prune_docker, run_maintenance (update a host now, rebooting
only if the update needs it, as the host page's Update now does).
save_playbook and delete_playbook write this instance's own playbooks into
steward-local, the same as Steward's editor (#5748). That is automation for
these hosts that isn't part of Steward itself; Steward's built-in playbooks are
changed in its repository, and a git source by its repo, so both are refused.
A save must parse as a list of plays or nothing is written; it won't overwrite
an existing playbook without replace=true; and it then runs
ansible-playbook --syntax-check (no host contacted) and says what that found.
The loop for building one is save → run_playbook in check mode on one target
→ get_ansible_run → fix and save again → apply with check=false. The audit
row records the size, never the content.
list_backups, check_backup and make_backup are Settings → Backups for an
agent (#5836), admin only like the page, since a backup holds every secret
Steward keeps. list_backups gives the schedule, the next run and the last 30
runs with the check each one got after it was sent (bucket=true also lists the
bucket, which an append-only key may refuse). check_backup fetches one and
compares it with what is in place, changing nothing. make_backup starts one in
the background and is audited. Restoring stays in the browser, behind its typed
confirmation. get_overview reports, for every role, a scheduled backup that
failed, is overdue, or has no bucket set up.
The client sees each tool's full contract: arguments, what an empty value
means, and what comes back. That contract is the tool's docstring, so read the
docstrings in steward/mcp/tools/ for the detail.
Response conventions
Every tool follows these conventions (steward/mcp/tools/_shape.py):
- Times are ISO-8601 UTC with a
Z. Anything with a "when" also carriesage_s, so the client never does clock arithmetic. - Lists are bounded. A list response carries
totalandtruncated. When it was cut,morenames the argument that fetches the rest. Nothing is cut silently. - Time series come back as a summary (min/avg/max/p95/last) plus a series of at most 60 points, never raw rows.
- Lookup by name or id. A miss suggests close matches and names the tool that lists the valid choices.
- Refusals are readable. Bad input becomes a tool error that says what was
wrong, why, and what to do instead, and nothing is changed. The tools share
their validation with the web forms (
monitors/service.py,alerts/service.py), so a value the UI refuses is refused here for the same reason. - Database outages return a plain "Steward cannot reach its database" rather than a stack trace.
Adding tools
Core tools: add an async def to a module in steward/mcp/tools/ and list it
in that module's register() with its minimum role and read_only. A plugin
exposes register_mcp_tools(register), optionally mcp_overview(db) to
contribute findings to get_overview, and optionally
mcp_events(db, host_id, host_name, since, until): what it knows happened on a
host in a window, as a list of steward.mcp.tools._events.event(...), which
get_anomaly shows beside an anomaly; for a resource with no host, optionally
mcp_resource_events(db, source, resource, since, until). Core adds the
stretches Steward itself wasn't recording to every anomaly. See
Writing a plugin. A tool that changes
anything calls audit_mcp(...) from steward/mcp/tools/_audit.py.