da79c4389100e373ff6ebcd1df9ab0e2dcfc8a24
22
Commits
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98854d94f9 |
feat(platform): tini as PID 1, Hypercorn, a log-level setting, the image on CI's Python, an airgapped boot gate before push (#5159)
- Dockerfile: python:3.14-slim, the Python CI tests on (was 3.13). tini from apt is PID 1 (ENTRYPOINT tini -- entrypoint.sh): it reaps the zombies ssh and ansible leave and forwards SIGTERM. - cli: Hypercorn's serve() with one worker (run, stream and scheduler state is in-process), a 10 s graceful timeout, and SIGTERM/SIGINT as the shutdown trigger. Access and error lines go through Steward's logging. --debug keeps Quart's reloading dev server. - Logging: steward/core/logging_setup.py installs one root handler before anything logs (until now a library's basicConfig on import was the only configuration). Its level is the `log.level` setting (DEBUG/INFO/WARNING/ ERROR, default INFO), applied at boot and on save in Settings → General. - CI publish: build, then "The image boots with no internet" (rule 164, snippet #3552), then push, so a broken image never reaches a tag (rule 177). On an --internal network with its own Postgres, the image must migrate and answer /health, run tini as PID 1, serve first-run setup with its assets from /static and no third-party host, and exit 0 on SIGTERM. Logs and clean-up run always. Tests: tests/core/test_logging_setup.py; the smoke step itself. Not in this commit: the dependency lockfile (it conflicts with rule 154 and is waiting on the operator). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9fdd67a675 |
feat(retention): every growing table is pruned; the audit log has its own window; charts read the raw window from Settings (#5155)
- prune_by_age(column) registers a time-series column with the hourly cleanup; Traefik (metrics, access summaries, global stats) and UniFi (WAN, client, WLAN, DPI, events, alarms, speedtests) register theirs in setup(). - Alert events join monitor results and Ansible runs on data.retention_days, read from Settings each run; Ansible run log files older than it are deleted. - audit.retention_days (365) keeps the audit log longer, set on Settings > General. - metric_series.points reads metrics.retention.raw_days, so the chart's raw/rollup seam is where the rollup put it (RAW_DAYS removed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bf08169176 |
feat(ui): shared |bytes |rate |duration |ago filters and status_class from Settings → Thresholds (#5093)
#5093 "Shared format filters and status_class driven by Settings → Thresholds". - steward/core/formatting.py: human_bytes (binary units), human_rate, human_duration (two largest units), ago (a <time> titled with the absolute UTC time) and status_class(value, kind, thresholds) -> ok/warn/crit/unknown, which raises on a kind the thresholds don't name. - app.py registers them as the bytes, rate, duration and ago filters and the status_class global; threshold_style is now graded by status_class (and caps its weight at 500). - Replaces the copies: docker's _human_bytes/_human_uptime, core alerts' _duration, the host-agent fmt_bps/fmt_bytes macros, the Traefik and UniFi byte-rate arithmetic, the swarm-failures ago macro and two uptime spans. - Tests: a table per helper, and every template compiled against the app's filters, so an unknown filter fails CI rather than a page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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35fca57397 |
feat(notifications): JSON-safe webhook template, SMTP timeout and implicit TLS, test-send buttons (#5064)
#5064 "Notifications that arrive": - render_webhook: alert.* is escaped to sit inside a JSON string (a quote or newline in a rule name no longer breaks the body); raw.* is the plain value for |tojson; a missing value reads "no data"; the template runs sandboxed and the body is checked to be JSON before it is sent. - SMTP: 15s timeout; port 465 connects with implicit TLS, otherwise the box means STARTTLS; a From address setting (falls back to the username). - A webhook error no longer carries the URL, which is a secret. - Settings → Notifications: "Send a test email" / "Send a test webhook" send a sample alert with the form's values (unsaved) and show the result and the body that went out; template help names alert.* and raw.*. - Notification audits go through audit_request; the test send is audited as settings.notification.tested, with the channel and outcome only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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faa605cead |
feat(secrets): webhook URL and git tokens sealed; run output masks its secrets (#5037)
#5037 "Secrets at rest and in run output: webhook URL and git token encrypted, askpass via env, secret values scrubbed from logs". - webhook.url joins SECRET_KEYS; existing values are sealed at startup by migrate_plaintext_secrets. Settings -> Notifications no longer echoes the URL: it names the saved host, keeps it when left blank, and has a Remove box. - Git source http_token is sealed inside ansible.sources on save and at startup, opened in get_sources, and counted by the undecryptable-secrets scan as ansible.sources[<name>].http_token. - The askpass script holds no token: git runs it with STEWARD_GIT_TOKEN in its environment and printf prints it as data. - The executor masks every secret the run is handed (become/vault passwords, bootstrap passwords, sensitive run vars, and the per-host agent tokens the host_agent plugin now passes as redact) in each line before it is broadcast, logged or stored. - Bundled "Write agent config" tasks are no_log; a test fails if any bundled task templating steward_token lacks it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f944cdb9b0 |
feat(auth): LDAP and SSO users keep their source; directory TLS is real (#5036)
#5036 "SSO and LDAP: users keep their auth source, no merging into local accounts, is_active checked, LDAP TLS real and filter escaped". - users gain auth_source (local/ldap/oidc) and external_id (migration 0027). A provider account is found by (source, subject) only: the LDAP entry DN or the OIDC sub. A first sign-in whose username or email another account holds is refused with a message naming why; a disabled user stays out. - Local passwords sign in local accounts only. - LDAP: port 636 is LDAPS, otherwise StartTLS before any bind; the server certificate is checked against the system CAs or a CA pasted in Settings -> Auth. The login name is escaped into the filter (RFC 4515), and an empty password is refused before the directory sees it. - OIDC: the ID token must carry this sign-in's nonce and the userinfo sub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7a3f7869fe |
feat(auth): sessions end when they should; logins are throttled; Secure behind HTTPS (#5035)
#5035 "Sessions: lifetime applied, role and is_active re-read per request, logout is a POST, failed logins throttled". - steward/core/proxy.py: trusted_value / is_https / client_ip read X-Forwarded-Proto and -For only as far as the trusted proxy hops (Settings → General, default 1, 0 = trust none). - The session cookie is Secure, and HSTS is sent, only on requests that arrived over HTTPS by that rule; plain-HTTP and LAN use are unchanged and nothing redirects. - A login lasts Settings → General's session lifetime from when it began (session.permanent + a login_at stamp checked every request — the cookie's own age slides on every response). A deleted or deactivated user is logged out on their next request; a role change applies at once. - Logout is a POST (a form in the sidebar); GET /logout is gone. - Failed logins pause an address after login.max_failures within login.lockout_minutes (Settings → General; defaults 5 in 15 min), keyed by address so nobody can lock a user out by name. Failures are audited as auth.login_failed with the address. - to_access_cfg projects the new settings into app.config at startup and on save, beside the existing projections. - Integration tests seed real users and a login_at, since every request now re-reads the session's user. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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21338dbcd9 |
feat(mcp): docker and host-agent tools; TLS and crash-loop cutoffs in Settings
MCP-5 of milestone 461 "MCP server: Steward as an LLM-inspectable, LLM-operable hub". Contributed through each plugin's register_mcp_tools hook, so they exist only while the plugin is enabled. docker (viewer, read-only): - list_containers: filter by host, status, compose project, or problem (restarting, crash_looping, unhealthy, oom_killed, exited_nonzero); problems sort first and each row names what is wrong. - get_container: state, CPU/memory history across the raw/hourly seam, lifecycle events. A unique part of a swarm task name is enough. - list_swarm_services: replicas per node (agent-less placements as ghosts) and the swarm's nodes. - search_container_logs: text (% and _ literal), stream, range, context lines, paging by a full-precision `before` cursor; over-long lines keep both ends and say how much of the middle was cut. - get_docker_disk_usage: bytes per host, reclaimable first. - mcp_overview: failing containers and under-replicated swarm services join get_overview. host_agent: list_agents (reporting / stale / pending, version, OS), and an overview finding for agents registered over 30 minutes ago that never checked in. Settings > Thresholds gains the TLS-expiry warn/crit days (were 14/3 in code) and the crash-loop deaths-per-hour count (3), which get_overview and the docker tools now read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0da88c7076 |
fix(plugins): show load-failure reasons on the page the banner links to
The admin banner counts every plugin load failure, but settings/plugins.html only rendered failure reasons inside the plugin card macro -- which iterates discovered plugins. A plugin that failed BECAUSE it has no directory was therefore counted in the banner and shown nowhere on the page the banner links to. That dead end is what the operator hit: "1 plugin failed to load" on the dashboard, nothing wrong on the details page, and no way to clean it up. Folds the reason into the "Configured but not installed" rows rather than adding a competing section, and drives that list from the UNION of stored plugin.* settings and recorded load failures instead of stored settings alone. A failure with no stored row -- a plugin enabled by a DEFAULTS entry, which is exactly what plugin.http was -- would otherwise still be counted and still be invisible. Rows carry `removable`: only a plugin with a real stored row can be cleaned up, so a default-declared one shows the reason and an explanation instead of a Remove button that would delete nothing while the default reasserts it. Rows with a reason read as an error (red, "Failed to load"); rows that merely have leftover config stay a warning. A discovered plugin that failed is excluded -- its own card already shows the reason. Replaces find_orphaned_plugin_names outright rather than adding a second overlapping helper; it had one caller. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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59fece855d |
fix(plugins): remove the phantom http plugin; surface orphaned plugin settings
Operator saw the `http` plugin -- deleted when ping/dns/http were unified into the Monitor entity -- still reported as enabled, with no way to clear it. It was never an orphaned row. `plugin.http` was hardcoded in core DEFAULTS, so deleting the app_settings row did nothing: the default reasserted it on the next settings load. That is precisely why no cleanup UI could have fixed it. Rule 22 says the removed subsystem should have taken its setting with it. Purged the surviving references -- the DEFAULTS key, "http" in CAPABILITY_PLUGINS, the stale plugin_manager docstring example, and the capabilities blurb still advertising HTTP/uptime as a bundled capability -- plus a migration dropping any stored plugin.http row. Untouched: `http` as a MONITOR TYPE (icmp/tcp/dns/http) everywhere it appears, and http_001_initial, which is kept deliberately so existing DBs resolve the revision graph. For the general case, cleanup splits by provenance rather than being uniformly automatic or uniformly manual: Bundled plugins ship in the image and version atomically with core, so they cannot be transiently missing -- a plugin.* default with no bundled directory is unambiguously a bug. Guarded by a unit test that fails CI, which is the only part safe to automate. External plugins live in operator-mounted /data/plugins, where absence is ambiguous: unmounted volume, failed install, mid-upgrade. Auto-deleting their config would silently destroy unrecoverable credentials on a transient condition, so Settings now lists them under "Configured but not installed" with an explicit, confirmed, audit-logged Remove. The section hides entirely when empty, and the remove route refuses if the plugin is actually installed. Orphan detection reads STORED rows, never the DEFAULTS-merged view -- offering to remove a default-only key would be a lie -- and returns names only, since plugin config can hold credentials and listing orphans never needs their values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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07a841d91e |
feat(docker): per-container size+age log ring rotation [M79 step 4]
Bound docker_logs growth in the periodic cleanup task (same architecture as the metrics/events retention). run_docker_retention gains logs_retention_days + logs_max_bytes_per_container: it prunes lines past the age window, then keeps only the newest ~cap bytes per (host, container) via a window-function ring (exclusive-prefix sum, so the newest line always survives even if it alone exceeds the cap). Containers rotate independently. - settings DEFAULTS: docker.logs.enabled/exclude/retention_days(3)/ max_bytes_per_container(5MB) — operator preference: ~3 days / ~5 MB - cleanup.py reads the two windows fresh each run (rule 25, no restart) - integration rotate test: age prune + per-container byte cap + isolation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CAGR73DUowdVFVvYzLXC5C |
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8af297670e |
feat(metrics): roll plugin_metrics up to hourly to bound storage
plugin_metrics grows by (sources × resources × ~30s cadence); keeping 90d of raw
is a large table. Add a raw→hourly rollup (mirroring the Docker plugin) so only a
short raw window is kept at full resolution, with hourly averages archived longer.
- PluginMetricHourly model + core migration 0024 (plugin_metrics_hourly: avg/max/
count per source/resource/metric/hour, unique bucket constraint + lookup index).
- steward/core/metrics_retention.rollup_plugin_metrics: date_trunc('hour') agg of
raw older than the hour-aligned raw window, idempotent pg upsert into hourly,
delete the rolled raw, prune hourly beyond the rollup window.
- cleanup.py: plugin_metrics is no longer blanket-deleted at data.retention_days;
_run_metrics_retention drives the rollup with windows read live from settings.
- Settings: metrics.retention.raw_days (7) + rollup_days (90), tunable on the
Thresholds & Retention page (new "Host metrics retention" card).
- Chart read: _history_for_host merges the hourly rollup (older part of the range)
with raw date_bin (recent part, capped ≤1h), so 30d charts keep working —
recent at full resolution, older at hourly. Route passes raw_days from settings.
- Tests: unit (cutoff helpers) + integration (rollup aggregates/prunes; history
merges hourly + raw) against Postgres.
Speed was already handled by the indexes + SQL aggregation; this is the storage
lever (raw window ~10x smaller).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Jg27rgypiW2efULXJDtMC
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0940dc6972 |
feat(crypto): fail loudly on unpersistable secret key; flag undecryptable secrets
Follow-up to the incident where an unwritable /data made Steward silently mint a fresh ephemeral secret key on every boot, orphaning all encrypted secrets — only discovered when an Ansible run failed. Make both failure modes loud and visible. - config._resolve_secret_key: if a new key must be generated but can't be persisted (no STEWARD_SECRET_KEY, unwritable /data), raise RuntimeError and refuse to start, with an actionable fix (set STEWARD_SECRET_KEY, or make /data writable by uid 1000). Also raises a clear error if an existing key file can't be read. First-run on a writable volume still generates + persists normally. - core.settings: detect secrets stored as ciphertext that won't decrypt with the current key (scan_undecryptable_secrets at startup; _is_undecryptable helper). Cached in memory; set_setting discards a key on a fresh write so the banner clears without a restart. - app.py: run the scan after migrate_plaintext_secrets, log a warning, and inject undecryptable_secrets into the template context. - base.html: admin banner naming which secrets to re-enter, each linked to its settings tab. - compose.deploy.yml: document the uid-1000 /data write requirement and the STEWARD_SECRET_KEY option for multi-node Swarm. - Tests: secret-key resolver (reuse existing file, generate when writable, raise when unpersistable) and the undecryptable-secret detection helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Jg27rgypiW2efULXJDtMC |
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faecac3ec6 |
feat(docker): retention + hourly rollup for metrics/events with Settings windows
Bounds Docker time-series growth (the main scaling concern). New docker_metrics_hourly table + docker_006 migration; a plugin retention module (docker.run_retention capability) rolls raw docker_metrics older than the raw window into hourly averages (idempotent upsert), deletes the rolled raw rows, then prunes stale rollups + lifecycle events. Core cleanup.py drives it each hourly run via the capability (no plugin-model import), reading the three retention windows fresh from settings so changes apply without restart (rule 25). Settings → "Thresholds & Retention" gains a Docker retention card (raw / rolled-up / events windows, working defaults 7/90/30 days). Unit tests cover the hour-aligned cutoff/bucketing helpers; integration test exercises the real rollup-average + prune across both windows. Milestone 77 task #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Jg27rgypiW2efULXJDtMC |
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591706bd39 |
feat(settings): configurable monitoring thresholds
Move the hardcoded warn/crit cutoffs into Settings -> Thresholds (DB-backed, live, no restart). New thresholds.* keys + to_thresholds_cfg() + a threshold_style(value, kind) jinja global that reads them; latency reuses the existing ping good/warn keys, uptime is direction-aware (floors). Replace the _macros metric_style/uptime_style macros (now removed) with the global across Hosts-Overview, host_agent fleet + panel, Uptime/SLA widget, and the ping page uptime column — all now honor the configured cutoffs. Uptime keeps its green 'good' look when not degraded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9ce4cce5c5 |
feat(crypto): name the failing setting in wrong-key decrypt log
The "could not decrypt a stored secret" warning was generic, so an operator couldn't tell which of the six secret settings was encrypted under an old key. Thread the setting key through _decode → decrypt_secret(context=...) so the log now reads e.g. "Could not decrypt stored secret smtp.password (wrong/rotated key — re-enter it)". Pure diagnostic; decrypt behaviour unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0318f6423f |
feat(ansible): host provisioning via steward managed SSH identity
Turn the agent-install playbook into a full provisioning + maintenance path. Solves the bootstrap chicken-and-egg: first contact uses an operator-supplied password (one run, never stored), which creates a dedicated `steward` login account with NOPASSWD sudo + Steward's managed public key. Every run thereafter connects as `steward` with the managed key — fully unattended (scheduled prune, agent updates). - core/crypto: generate_ssh_keypair() — ed25519, OpenSSH formats. - settings: ansible.ssh_public_key (non-secret, displayed) + ansible.ssh_user (default steward); to_ansible_cfg extended. - settings UI + route: "Generate managed key" (private encrypted, public shown to copy) + SSH-user field. - executor: build_bootstrap() writes a 0600 vars file (-e @file) for the per-run user/password — never argv, never DB, never logged; drops the managed key when a bootstrap password is given; --user floor from the global ssh_user when no override. - runner.trigger_run: pass-through `connection` kwarg, deliberately NOT persisted on AnsibleRun.params (password stays out of the DB). - bundled/host_agent/provision.yml: create steward user + authorized_keys + /etc/sudoers.d/steward (visudo-validated) + agent install. - host_agent: /provision route + "Provision a fresh host" card (bootstrap user/password; injects pubkey + user + token as space-safe JSON hostvars). - Dockerfile: add sshpass (Ansible shells out to it for password SSH). - tests: keypair generation + build_bootstrap (secret stays off argv). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6e91bdc82b |
feat(security): encrypt sensitive settings at rest (Fernet)
Secrets (smtp.password, oidc.client_secret, ldap.bind_password, ansible ssh_private_key/become_password/vault_password) were stored plaintext in app_settings. Add transparent encryption-at-rest: - steward/core/crypto.py: Fernet keyed off the app secret (/data/secret.key), enc:v1: prefix marks ciphertext; passthrough for plaintext/empty/no-key, never reveals plaintext on a wrong key. - settings.py: SECRET_KEYS registry; set_setting encrypts on write; all read paths (get_setting / get_all_settings / load_settings_sync) decrypt transparently; migrate_plaintext_secrets() converts legacy rows in place. - app.py startup: init_crypto(SECRET_KEY) + one-time legacy-secret migration before settings load. - Add cryptography dependency. UI masking is unchanged (it checks decrypted truthiness). Key-loss caveat documented: secrets are unrecoverable if the app secret key is lost. Unit tests cover round-trip, empty/plaintext passthrough, and wrong-key safety. Task #580. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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88857be24e |
feat(ansible): runner robustness — cancel, concurrency, structured results, retention
Closes #550 (all four): - Cancellation: track live subprocesses; POST /ansible/runs/<id>/cancel (operator) SIGTERMs then SIGKILLs after a grace; new 'cancelled' status (+ migration 0019, ALTER TYPE in autocommit). Queued runs cancel cleanly before launch. Cancel button on run detail. - Concurrency: global semaphore (ansible.max_concurrent_runs, default 3, Settings→Ansible) caps simultaneous runs; excess show 'queued' (new status) until a slot frees. Semaphore bound lazily per running loop. - Structured results: parse PLAY RECAP into per-host ok/changed/unreachable/ failed/skipped + capture failed-task lines, stored in new results JSON column (migration 0020); rendered as a host-summary table on run detail. Keeps live streaming (no json-callback swap). - Retention: full output written to a persistent log artifact (/data/ansible/runs/<id>.log, env-overridable) beyond the 1 MB DB cap and across restarts; in-memory replay buffer bounded + GC'd after completion; Download-log route. Boot reconciliation now also sweeps stale 'queued'. Unit tests for recap parsing + cancel flagging. Status colors updated across run list / detail / schedules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b49496b57b |
feat(plugins): default-enable generic bundled plugins on fresh install
A fresh install enabled zero plugins — settings.py DEFAULTS had no plugin.*
keys, so to_plugins_cfg returned {} and every plugin had to be flipped on
by hand. Seed docker, host_agent, http, snmp as default-on (generic, non-
vendor-specific); traefik and unifi stay opt-in. Stored choices override
the default, so disabling persists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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0bf007173b |
feat(ansible): credentials — SSH key, become, vault, host-key checking (task 548)
Global Ansible credentials, applied to every run (manual + alert-triggered): - core/settings.py: ansible.ssh_private_key / become_password / vault_password (plaintext at rest, masked in UI — encryption tracked in #580) + host_key_checking (default off); surfaced via to_ansible_cfg into app.config[ANSIBLE] - executor.py: pure build_credentials() materializes creds into a 0600 temp dir (--private-key, --vault-password-file, become via -e @vars-file so the password never hits argv) cleaned up in finally; pure ansible_env() sets ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING. build_ansible_command stays param-only - settings/routes.py + ansible.html: admin-only Credentials section, masked-update (blank keeps current, explicit Clear checkbox), reload app config on save - tests: unit (build_credentials per cred + none; ansible_env toggle); integration vault round-trip (ansible-vault encrypt a vars file, run via executor with the vault password, assert it decrypted) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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88ab5b917e |
chore: rename project Roundtable → Steward
Renames the Python package directory, CLI command, env var prefix, docker-compose service/container/image, Postgres role/db, and all visible branding. Marketing form is "Fabled Steward". Clean break from the previous rebrand: drops the fabledscryer→roundtable import shim in __init__.py and the FABLEDSCRYER_* env var fallback in config.py and migrations/env.py. Env vars are now STEWARD_* only. Heads-up for existing deployments: - Postgres user/db renamed fabledscryer → steward in docker-compose.yml. Existing volumes need the role/db renamed inside Postgres, or override POSTGRES_USER/POSTGRES_DB to keep the old names. - Host-agent systemd unit is now steward-agent.service. Existing agents keep running under the old name; reinstall to switch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |