Traefik: routers are graded from their latest scrape (router_state: crit on
any real 5xx share, warn on p95 past the latency critical cutoff or a high
4xx share). Failing and slow routers lead as cards that say why; healthy
ones fold into one table that stays open or shut across polls. Proxy
counts are stat tiles; certificates are graded by Settings -> Thresholds
(tls_days).
UniFi: WAN health is a stat strip (latency graded by the thresholds),
devices carry status dots, event categories and firewall actions are
badges, the alarm count reuses .count-badge (renamed from .nav-count).
SNMP: each device wears a status badge and its readings are stat tiles.
Agent fleet: the table comes first, with a Status column (Reporting /
Silent / Never reported, by the host page's stale_after_seconds), silent
agents first, hosts linked, last seen as |ago.
Audit: entries name their entity (one query per type, steward/audit/
service.py) and link it; something deleted since keeps the name its entry
recorded and says "(deleted)".
Tokens: charts read colours through chart-colors.js (stewardColor resolves
a token to the rgb the browser computed; Chart.js defaults take the page's
text and border colours), so host, history, Traefik and SNMP charts drop
their hex. Template hex colours reach 0 (HEX_CEILING = 0), the last rgba
pills go, and heavy weights (600/700/bold, 60 of them) become 500, the
house pair being 400/500; a guard keeps templates there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#5099 "A name containing a quote runs script when an admin clicks Delete".
Inline handlers like onclick="return confirm('Delete {{ rule.name }}?')" are
HTML-decoded before the JavaScript is parsed, so autoescaping did not stop a
name such as x');fetch(…);// from running.
- Every prompt (22 handlers, plus the docker prune and token revoke ones)
is now data-confirm="…", read through dataset by one submit listener in
base.html; nothing rendered is parsed as JavaScript.
- The remaining inline handlers take integers only (|int), and the time
range buttons pass this.dataset.range.
- tests/test_inline_handlers.py fails on any {{ }} in an inline handler that
is not |int, with a self-test; tests/_templates.py is the one template
walker the template guards now share.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#5031 "Forged-request protection: SameSite cookie, per-session CSRF token
on every non-GET, HTMX header". A page on another site could make a
logged-in browser POST to Steward with the session cookie attached.
- steward/auth/csrf.py: a per-session token, checked in one before_request
for every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE (header X-CSRF-Token or form field
csrf_token, constant-time compare). The bearer-authenticated host-agent
ingest is exempt; /mcp never reaches Quart.
- Every POST form renders {{ csrf_field() }}; base.html carries the token
in a meta tag and adds it to every HTMX request; the dashboard's fetch()
calls send it.
- The session cookie is SameSite=Lax; login issues a fresh token.
- PUBLIC_BASE_URL is now loaded from Settings at startup (it was only set
when Settings → General was saved).
- tests/test_csrf.py: refusal, acceptance, rotation, the ingest exemption,
and a guard that every POST form in the templates carries the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MCP-8 #4972 "Connect card, docs, and end-to-end integration test".
- AI access page: a "Connect a client" card with the /mcp URL (from
Settings → General → Public base URL, else the request host) and recipes
for Claude Code, Claude Desktop (mcp-remote) and other Streamable HTTP
clients, plus the reverse-proxy note. The token-created page shows the
same recipes with the new token filled in, ready to paste.
- docs/core/mcp.md: connecting, the reverse-proxy requirements, the
security model (token ceiling, default deny, check-mode default, secrets,
audit), tools by role, response conventions, adding tools.
docs/architecture.md describes the /mcp dispatch outside the blueprint
pipeline; docs/reference/code-map.md gains an MCP section.
- tests/integration/test_mcp.py: over HTTP, a viewer token lists no write
tools and is refused one by name; an operator token reads get_overview
and its maintenance-window create/end land in the audit log as
"<user> via MCP" with the token id. (Revoked → 401 was already covered.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First step of milestone 461 (MCP server). A token is the credential an
MCP client presents as `Authorization: Bearer stw_…` to act as its user.
- api_tokens table (0026): sha256 hash only, display prefix, role
ceiling, expiry, revocation, throttled last_used_at.
- steward/core/api_tokens.py: mint, list, revoke, resolve. Resolution
re-reads the user's current role and acts with the lower of that and
the token's ceiling, so demoting or disabling a user weakens or kills
their tokens with nothing to revoke by hand.
- /ai-access/ (sidebar → Automation → AI access): every user manages
their own tokens, can't grant above their own role, sees the token
once. Session-only: a share-link viewer is refused. Create and revoke
are audited.
- Integration tests drive the routes against real Postgres so their
transactions run for real (#884 escaped CI behind a mocked session).
Task #4965 "MCP-1 — Personal API tokens".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5.5