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bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5.5 3474cdff46 feat(mcp): connect card, MCP docs, and an end-to-end roles/audit test over HTTP
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MCP-8 #4972 "Connect card, docs, and end-to-end integration test".

- AI access page: a "Connect a client" card with the /mcp URL (from
  Settings → General → Public base URL, else the request host) and recipes
  for Claude Code, Claude Desktop (mcp-remote) and other Streamable HTTP
  clients, plus the reverse-proxy note. The token-created page shows the
  same recipes with the new token filled in, ready to paste.
- docs/core/mcp.md: connecting, the reverse-proxy requirements, the
  security model (token ceiling, default deny, check-mode default, secrets,
  audit), tools by role, response conventions, adding tools.
  docs/architecture.md describes the /mcp dispatch outside the blueprint
  pipeline; docs/reference/code-map.md gains an MCP section.
- tests/integration/test_mcp.py: over HTTP, a viewer token lists no write
  tools and is refused one by name; an operator token reads get_overview
  and its maintenance-window create/end land in the audit log as
  "<user> via MCP" with the token id. (Revoked → 401 was already covered.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 08:25:41 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5.5 1c60fb6b4d feat(api): personal API tokens and the AI access page
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First step of milestone 461 (MCP server). A token is the credential an
MCP client presents as `Authorization: Bearer stw_…` to act as its user.

- api_tokens table (0026): sha256 hash only, display prefix, role
  ceiling, expiry, revocation, throttled last_used_at.
- steward/core/api_tokens.py: mint, list, revoke, resolve. Resolution
  re-reads the user's current role and acts with the lower of that and
  the token's ceiling, so demoting or disabling a user weakens or kills
  their tokens with nothing to revoke by hand.
- /ai-access/ (sidebar → Automation → AI access): every user manages
  their own tokens, can't grant above their own role, sees the token
  once. Session-only: a share-link viewer is refused. Create and revoke
  are audited.
- Integration tests drive the routes against real Postgres so their
  transactions run for real (#884 escaped CI behind a mocked session).

Task #4965 "MCP-1 — Personal API tokens".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 07:15:23 -04:00