feat(auth): forged browser requests are refused (#5031)
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#5031 "Forged-request protection: SameSite cookie, per-session CSRF token
on every non-GET, HTMX header". A page on another site could make a
logged-in browser POST to Steward with the session cookie attached.

- steward/auth/csrf.py: a per-session token, checked in one before_request
  for every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE (header X-CSRF-Token or form field
  csrf_token, constant-time compare). The bearer-authenticated host-agent
  ingest is exempt; /mcp never reaches Quart.
- Every POST form renders {{ csrf_field() }}; base.html carries the token
  in a meta tag and adds it to every HTMX request; the dashboard's fetch()
  calls send it.
- The session cookie is SameSite=Lax; login issues a fresh token.
- PUBLIC_BASE_URL is now loaded from Settings at startup (it was only set
  when Settings → General was saved).
- tests/test_csrf.py: refusal, acceptance, rotation, the ingest exemption,
  and a guard that every POST form in the templates carries the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-06 10:44:19 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 1d9ac2b46a
commit 96126b1c83
46 changed files with 272 additions and 90 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
{% set active_tab = "auth" %}
{% include "settings/_tabs.html" %}
<form method="post" action="/settings/auth/">
<form method="post" action="/settings/auth/">{{ csrf_field() }}
<div style="display:grid;gap:1.25rem;max-width:640px;">
{# ── OIDC ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── #}