feat(auth): forged browser requests are refused (#5031)
#5031 "Forged-request protection: SameSite cookie, per-session CSRF token on every non-GET, HTMX header". A page on another site could make a logged-in browser POST to Steward with the session cookie attached. - steward/auth/csrf.py: a per-session token, checked in one before_request for every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE (header X-CSRF-Token or form field csrf_token, constant-time compare). The bearer-authenticated host-agent ingest is exempt; /mcp never reaches Quart. - Every POST form renders {{ csrf_field() }}; base.html carries the token in a meta tag and adds it to every HTMX request; the dashboard's fetch() calls send it. - The session cookie is SameSite=Lax; login issues a fresh token. - PUBLIC_BASE_URL is now loaded from Settings at startup (it was only set when Settings → General was saved). - tests/test_csrf.py: refusal, acceptance, rotation, the ingest exemption, and a guard that every POST form in the templates carries the field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -82,7 +82,9 @@ def require_role(minimum_role: UserRole):
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def login_user(user) -> None:
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"""Write user identity into the session."""
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"""Write user identity into the session, with a fresh CSRF token."""
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from steward.auth.csrf import rotate
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rotate()
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session["user_id"] = user.id
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session["user_role"] = user.role.value
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session["username"] = user.username
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