Files
FabledScribe/tests
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5 43ed7f4db7
CI & Build / Python lint (push) Successful in 3s
CI & Build / Plugin hooks (push) Successful in 11s
CI & Build / TypeScript typecheck (push) Successful in 55s
CI & Build / integration (push) Successful in 1m4s
CI & Build / Python tests (push) Successful in 1m45s
CI & Build / Build & push image (push) Successful in 26s
fix(access): tag a record as the user doing it, not as its owner (#4249)
`set_record_systems` is not a dumb setter. It runs its own `can_write_note`
and then links only the Systems the given user can READ. Four of twenty
call sites handed it the record's owner instead of the acting user, which
did two quiet things at once: the access check became trivially true, since
an owner can always write their own record, and the System filter used the
owner's visibility rather than the actor's.

On a single-user install neither is observable. With a share it is an
editor acting with the owner's reach — the shape rule 47 exists to prevent,
and the same reasoning routes/notes.py already spells out for
`set_supersedes` two lines away.

This is NOT a permission change. Every one of the four sites establishes
the caller's write access first: routes/lessons.py and routes/snippets.py
call `can_write_note(uid, …)`, mcp/tools/processes.py does the same, and
mcp/tools/snippets.py reaches `set_record_systems` only after
`update_snippet` has raised PermissionError if the caller may not write. So
nobody gains or loses the ability to edit anything. What changes is whose
reach the tagging runs with, which is exactly the kind of difference that
survives review because every call site reads fine on its own.

The four:

  routes/lessons.py:243      owner_uid      -> uid
  routes/snippets.py:211     owner_uid      -> uid
  mcp/tools/snippets.py:486  note.user_id   -> uid
  mcp/tools/processes.py:196 note.user_id   -> uid

The last one was written earlier in this same session, an hour before the
sweep that found it, with a comment confidently explaining why the owner
was correct. That is the argument for the guard rather than for care: the
unified stance was known and still got it wrong at the next opportunity.

So the guard is the point again. `test_every_tagging_write_acts_as_the_caller`
walks every `set_record_systems` call in src/ and asserts the first argument
is a bare local named `uid` or `user_id` — an attribute access is a record's
owner by construction. Verified against `git show HEAD:` as well as the
working tree: clean now, four offenders on the code it replaces.

Reads are deliberately untouched. `list_record_systems(owner_uid, …)` gates
on reading the NOTE, which the caller can do anyway, so it returns the same
list either way; it is a different operation and churning it would add noise
without changing behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01821k5B3Ysecp9fNYs92Kuy
2026-09-21 16:09:41 -04:00
..