fix(telemetry): a logged query never carries a credential (#3925)
pre_tool_rule retrieves against the RAW COMMAND TEXT and write_path_rule against the code being written, so whatever was on the command line or in the buffer is what record_retrieval stored in retrieval_logs.query. A command that exported a token stored the token. Storing it was not the worst of it. near_miss_samples is the readout the threshold docs tell you to open before moving a bar, so the value came back OUT into an agent's context on the next tuning pass — which is exactly how this was found, mid-way through #3853's threshold spike. SCRUBBED ON WRITE, at _build_payload — the single seam every source reaches the column through. A read-side filter would leave the secret in the table where a backup or a debug query still reaches it, and a per-caller scrub would be three places for one to be forgotten by whoever adds the fourth arm. REDACTED VISIBLY. `[redacted:<kind>]` rather than a silent deletion: a reader who cannot tell a scrubbed query from a short one is being lied to by the readout itself. DELIBERATELY CONSERVATIVE — vendor-prefixed credentials, values assigned to secret-NAMED variables, auth headers, PEM blocks. Things that are secrets by construction. Entropy heuristics and long-opaque-string detection start eating real queries, and a query is evidence: missing an exotic secret costs one redaction nobody made, while eating a query costs the ability to tune the bar at all. The guard pins BOTH directions, and the second half is the one that matters. A scrubber that eats evidence fails silently — it keeps looking like it works while turning the one instrument for tuning a threshold into unreadable stubs, which is the #2663 shape in a new place. So nine REAL queries from this install's near-miss samples must survive byte for byte. If a future pattern touches one, the pattern is too greedy. Verified against the real shapes before commit: six credential formats redacted (fabricated values), nine real queries unchanged, and the payload seam confirmed to store "export API_TOKEN=[redacted:assigned] && git push". This does NOT scrub rows already written. Purging those is separate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011cPyzNnegXHr5iRMzzy5KJ
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"""A logged query never carries a credential (#3925).
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WHY THIS EXISTS
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`pre_tool_rule` retrieves against the RAW COMMAND TEXT and `write_path_rule`
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against the code being written, so whatever was on the command line or in the
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buffer is what `record_retrieval` stores in `retrieval_logs.query`. A command
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that exported a token therefore stored the token.
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And storing it was not the worst of it. `near_miss_samples` is the readout the
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threshold documentation tells you to open before moving a bar, so the value
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came back OUT into an agent's context on the next tuning pass — which is
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exactly how this was found, during #3853's threshold spike.
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WHAT THIS PINS, IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, AND WHY THE SECOND HALF IS THE HARD ONE
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A scrubber has two ways to fail and only one of them is obvious.
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1. It misses a secret. Caught by the redaction cases below.
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2. It eats the EVIDENCE. This is the failure that would do more damage,
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because it is silent: the whole worth of a near-miss sample is reading the
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query that was actually refused, and a scrubber that chewed up ordinary
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commands would turn the one instrument for tuning a bar into unreadable
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stubs while still looking like it worked. That is the #2663 shape — a
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surface that reads fine and has quietly stopped saying anything.
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So the second block is not padding. Its cases are REAL queries taken from this
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install's `near_miss_samples` during #3853, and they must survive byte for
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byte. If a future pattern is added and one of them changes, the pattern is too
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greedy — tighten it rather than editing the expectation.
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The secret cases use FABRICATED values in the real formats. Nothing here is or
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was a live credential.
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"""
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import pytest
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from scribe.services.retrieval_telemetry import scrub_secrets
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# Fabricated, in the shapes that actually occur. The first is the shape that
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# was found stored: a shell assignment of a vendor-prefixed token.
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_SECRETS = [
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("vendor-prefixed token in a shell assignment",
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"TOK=flt_AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFF\npython3 - <<'PY'",
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"flt_AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFF"),
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("a Scribe fmcp_ key in an auth header",
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"curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer fmcp_ZZZZYYYYXXXXWWWWVVVV' https://x",
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"fmcp_ZZZZYYYYXXXXWWWWVVVV"),
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("a forge token in an export",
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"export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_1234567890abcdefghijABCDEF",
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"ghp_1234567890abcdefghijABCDEF"),
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("a value assigned to a secret-named variable",
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'REGISTRY_PASSWORD="hunter2-correct-horse"',
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"hunter2-correct-horse"),
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("an api_key in a query string",
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"curl 'https://api.example/v1/things?api_key=abcdef1234567890'",
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"abcdef1234567890"),
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("a private key block",
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"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowIBAAKC\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----",
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"MIIEowIBAAKC"),
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]
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# Real queries, from this install's near-miss samples during #3853.
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_EVIDENCE = [
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"git push origin dev",
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'git pull --rebase origin dev 2>&1 | tail -3; echo "=== HEAD ==="; git log --oneline -2',
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"python3 - <<'PY'\nimport pathlib\np = pathlib.Path(\"web/src/routes/admin/tuning/tuning.test.ts\")",
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"docker compose up -d",
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'package library\n\nimport (\n\t"context"\n\t"fmt"\n)',
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"import {\n fetchTransfers,\n retryTransfer,\n} from './api'",
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'grep -rn "useState" src/components/ | head -20',
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# The word "token" in ordinary prose is not a token.
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"explain how the token bucket rate limiter works",
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"wc -l src/*.py && date",
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(("label", "text", "secret"), _SECRETS,
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ids=[c[0] for c in _SECRETS])
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def test_a_credential_never_survives_into_the_query_column(label, text, secret):
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"""The value goes; something visible stays in its place."""
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out = scrub_secrets(text)
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assert secret not in out, (
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f"{label}: the credential is still in the text that would be stored"
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)
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assert "[redacted" in out, (
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f"{label}: the span was removed without saying so. A silent deletion "
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"leaves a reader unable to tell a scrubbed query from a short one, "
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"which is the readout lying about itself rather than protecting you."
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("query", _EVIDENCE)
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def test_an_ordinary_query_is_stored_exactly_as_it_was(query):
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"""Evidence survives byte for byte.
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These came out of real `near_miss_samples`. A threshold is tuned by reading
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them, so a pattern greedy enough to touch one has destroyed the instrument
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it was meant to make safe — tighten the pattern, never this expectation.
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"""
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assert scrub_secrets(query) == query
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def test_empty_and_missing_queries_pass_through():
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"""Some sources log no query at all; scrubbing must not invent one."""
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assert scrub_secrets(None) is None
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assert scrub_secrets("") == ""
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def test_the_write_path_scrubs_rather_than_the_read_path():
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"""The payload built for storage carries the redacted text (#3925).
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Pinned on `_build_payload` because that is the single seam every source
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reaches the column through. A per-caller scrub would be three places for
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one of them to be forgotten by whoever adds the fourth arm — and the one
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forgotten would be the one that stored a secret.
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"""
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from scribe.services.retrieval_telemetry import _build_payload
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payload = _build_payload(
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user_id=1, source="pre_tool_rule",
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query="export API_TOKEN=ghp_1234567890abcdefghijABCDEF && git push",
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threshold=0.68, limit=5, project_id=0, is_task=None,
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results=[], duration_ms=1.0,
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)
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assert "ghp_1234567890abcdefghijABCDEF" not in payload["query"]
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assert "[redacted" in payload["query"]
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# The rest of the command survives, or the row stops being evidence.
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assert "git push" in payload["query"]
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