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`2026.8.28.1249` becomes `2026.08.28.1249`. Note #3127 §1 and rule 148 both specify the padded form. The old reasoning was that each segment should read as a plain integer, and it never held — comparison strips leading zeros on parse anyway, which the same paragraph said. What stripping actually bought was this project emitting `2026.8.28.1432` while a sibling emitted `2026.08.28.1432`: two shapes one character apart, which is the hard kind of difference to notice. Two obviously different formats would be safer than two nearly identical ones, and identical is safer still. Nothing already published is reordered: comparison is numeric per dot-segment, so `08` and `8` are equal. strip0 goes, and with it three of the four git calls per version — git's format-local takes the whole format string, and splitting it into pieces only ever existed to strip the padding between them. It also fixes a real edge the old helper mangled. A commit at 03:22 UTC derived `322` for its HHMM field, silently turning a four-digit field into three; it now derives `0322`. Verified against a real commit rather than reasoned about. Checked before relying on it, since step 8 feeds this to Firefox: the extension's comparator is `parseInt(n, 10)` with an explicit radix, so `08` reads as 8 and there is no octal hazard (rule 150). Two tests added. One pins the padded shape — the only thing keeping the family's projects emitting one string is an assertion that they do. The other asserts version and revision describe the same commit: they are derived independently, and a divergence would mean an instance naming one commit while carrying another's bytes, which is unfalsifiable from outside because both values still look well-formed.