4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusen	5e1996e77f	db: reconcile the models with the deployed schema (#3275) ... Milestone 328's acceptance test compared a database built by the real 0001..0087 chain against one built from the models, and found ~130 places where they disagree. This closes them. Almost all were the MODEL being wrong, so almost all of this is model edits with no DDL — the database already had these things, nothing in it changes, and no deploy is needed for this part: * 92 columns gained server_default. The models carried Python-side `default=` only, so the ORM filled the value and the column had no database default. Anything inserting outside the ORM behaved differently from production. * Eleven indexes that existed only in migrations are now declared: the three backup_run reporting indexes, the two date-ordered image_record browse indexes, import_task and presentation_review, and the three task_run history indexes. All use text() for their DESC ordering and postgresql_where for the partial one. * Two UNIQUE indexes that autogenerate silently proposed DROPPING, because neither is expressible as a UniqueConstraint: uq_tag_name_kind_fandom — an EXPRESSION index over (name, kind, COALESCE(fandom_id, 0)) uq_post_artist_external_id_null_source — PARTIAL, WHERE source_id IS NULL post.py already had a comment describing the second one. The comment was right; nothing declared it. * The two external_link enum CHECKs (host, status) — rule 36 territory, and absent from the model entirely. * Two indexes were named explicitly. A bare index=True generated ix_tag_alias_canonical_tag_id where the database has ix_tag_alias_canonical, so autogenerate proposed a drop+create of an index that was already there under another name. Same for tag_suggestion_rejection. Only ONE thing needed DDL, as 0088: tag.fandom_id is declared index=True but no migration ever created that index. Deliberately NOT here: image_record.sha256. The model says unique=True; 0001 created a plain index. Duplicates are possible today and the ORM believes otherwise. The fix depends on whether duplicates already exist — if they do, that is a dedupe decision, not a constraint — so it waits on an answer about live data. The real severity of #3275 is not the squash. It is that --autogenerate has been unsafe on this project: run against the old models it would have proposed dropping eleven indexes and two uniqueness guarantees.	2026-08-30 14:42:30 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Fable 5	a7abcc41ca	feat(triage): failed-processing triage — probe errored files, flag defects, recover (#125 C1-C3) ... An errored GPU job's stored reason is a suspicion; the file probe is the verdict. A 15-min beat sweep (triage_gpu_errors) runs verify_integrity's own probe (sha256 + decode) on each errored image ONCE and writes both verdicts: ImageRecord.integrity_status and the new GpuJob.triage_status ('defect' | 'file_ok', migration 0072). Every classification logs at WARNING so it surfaces in Logs/System Activity. - 'defect' rows are excluded from /retry_errors (re-running a known-bad file burns agent time re-minting the tombstone); response now reports defects_kept and the GpuAgentCard toast says so. - GET /api/gpu/errors: triage view — reason buckets (classify_reason), probe verdicts, per-job detail. POST /errors/triage runs the sweep now. - POST /api/gpu/errors/<id>/recover: reuses the Layer-2 refetch pattern — delete the defective copy + record (full cascade takes the tombstones too) and re-poll its subscription Source so a fresh copy re-imports and re-enters the pipeline; 'no_source' when nothing pollable resolves. - New 'Failed processing' card (GpuTriageCard) in Maintenance: verdict counts, reason summary, probe-now, defect list with thumbnails + per-image Recover. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CDgx8bQS5YrGRK76v8HUnM	2026-07-02 12:36:02 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.8	181f1c6a27	perf(gpu-queue): partial indexes + two-phase lease so leasing stays O(batch) ... The throughput bottleneck was curator-side, not the network. lease() claimed the lowest-id pending/expired jobs with `... ORDER BY id LIMIT n`, but with only a plain `status` index Postgres walked the primary key from id=1, skipping the entire prefix of already done/error rows before reaching pending ones. As `done` grew (69k+), every lease became an O(done) scan — leasing crawled, the DB saturated, and even /status (the queue GROUP BY count) stalled the agent. - Migration 0070 adds two partial indexes over just the live slice: pending rows indexed by id (hot path), and leased rows by lease_expires_at (crash-recovery + orphan sweep). They stay tiny no matter how large the done/error history. - lease() split into two phases so each uses a partial index: claim pending first (id-ordered, O(batch)); reclaim expired leases only when pending can't fill the batch. Same semantics (SKIP LOCKED, attempts++, expired reclaim). - Model __table_args__ declares the indexes so ORM and schema agree. - Test: a done-prefix at low ids must not stop the lease reaching pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ttrj5P7upUTueSfoJcxEqa	2026-06-30 21:12:12 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.8	b735432d02	feat(gpu): video-ready regions + the HTTP GPU-job queue engine (#114 slice 3) ... Answers "how are videos/all media handled by the GPU worker": a job is per ITEM, but the agent fans a VIDEO into per-frame instances (ffmpeg in the agent, the existing cadence), each stored with a timestamp — so a video becomes a BAG of frame embeddings (fixes the mean-embedding muddle) instead of one washed-out vector. Stills → frame_time NULL; animated GIF/WebP treated like short video. - image_region.frame_time (migration 0061, not yet deployed so folded in): the source frame's seconds for video/animated media; NULL for stills. RegionService passes it through. A whole frame is just kind='frame'. - gpu_job + GpuJobService (migration 0062): the durable work list that keeps the desktop agent HTTP-only — enqueue (dedupes (image,task)) / lease (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, re-claims expired leases so the queue self-heals) / heartbeat / complete / fail (re-queues until MAX_ATTEMPTS then 'error'). The server enqueues; the agent leases+submits over the web API; Redis/Postgres stay private. Tests: enqueue dedupe, lease-then-skip-when-held, expired-lease reclaim, scoped heartbeat, complete, fail-requeue-then-error. region test now covers frame_time. NEXT: the thin HTTP API (lease/submit/heartbeat) + bearer-token auth, then the agent container + control UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ttrj5P7upUTueSfoJcxEqa	2026-06-29 11:18:28 -04:00