2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	8a4af589f1	docs: write the install path for someone who is not the operator (#3271) ... FC has no login — no User model, no session auth, nothing. That was a deliberate call for a single-operator tool and it stays (operator, this session), but it was nowhere in the docs, and the app stores live Patreon / SubscribeStar / Pixiv session cookies on accounts that carry a payment method. Anyone standing this up from the README could reasonably have put it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and considered it handled. So the no-auth posture is now stated three times, in the three places someone decides where to bind the port: README has a "Before you expose it" section above the install instructions, .env.example explains why there is no auth variable in it, and the compose header says it before the first service. SECURITY.md claimed the opposite. It listed "a multi-user sharing ACL — instances can be shared" among the things worth protecting; there are no accounts to share between. That was rule 47 applied to a codebase that does not implement it, and it would have told a researcher FC holds a boundary it does not. Replaced with the real posture, including that TLS without an authenticating layer in front changes nothing. Also corrected, all of it stale rather than wrong-at-the-time: - EXTENSION_API_KEY was dead config. config.py read it into a field nothing consumed; the real key is generated into app_setting on first use and managed in the UI. Removed from config.py, compose and .env.example. - .env.example pointed at docs/superpowers/specs/… — there is no docs/ dir — and described the extension key as "lands in FC-3", closed 2026-05-21. - The /import mount comment described an FC-5 ImageRepo migration run from "Settings → Maintenance → Legacy migration", a surface with no frontend. - README said the extension installs from Settings → Maintenance. It is on Subscriptions → Settings. README is now split: running FC above the line, developing FC below it, with requirements, first run, the extension, upgrading and troubleshooting on the running side. First run documents the one real gap it found — a new installer with a library on disk has no button to import it, only POST /api/import/trigger, because the manual-scan UI was retired 2026-07-02 when that stopped mattering for an established install. Filed as #3367. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-09-02 00:16:23 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	dbc4e8b0c6	docs: AGPL-3.0, plus SECURITY and CONTRIBUTING (#3269) ... The repo had no LICENSE, which meant all rights reserved by default: nobody could legally run or modify it, and "public availability" was a contradiction no amount of install documentation could fix. This is the hard blocker in milestone 328; everything else in it is quality. AGPL-3.0, at the operator's explicit choice, for the reason the operator gave: this should not become something another party runs as a hosted proprietary service. Section 13 is what makes it fit — for a self-hosted web app, distribution otherwise never happens, so the GPL's obligation would never actually bite. AGPL reaches the case that matters here: running a MODIFIED copy as a service for others. LICENSE is the FSF text fetched from gnu.org and verified byte-identical (34,523 bytes, 661 lines, §13 "Remote Network Interaction" present), not retyped. README's old "Personal project; use at your own discretion" said nothing legally and is replaced with what the licence actually asks — including the part worth being clear about, that running an unmodified copy for yourself carries no obligation whatsoever. SECURITY.md names what this software actually holds, because that is what makes a report serious here: live third-party session cookies for accounts with payment methods attached, the extension API key, the multi-user sharing ACL, and arbitrary downloaded media that gets decoded and fed to models. It also states the plain-HTTP posture up front, so "served over HTTP" and "no HSTS" are understood as the documented design rather than filed as findings. There is no private disclosure channel yet, so the reporting instruction is to open an issue containing NOTHING but the fact that a report exists, and wait for a private contact. Awkward on purpose: an issue tracker is public the moment it is written to, and every self-hosted instance stays vulnerable until its operator can update. Worth replacing with a real contact address — that decision is the operator's, since it publishes one. CONTRIBUTING records the two things that actually catch people: ruff's order-by-type import sorting, and that a model change and its migration belong in the same commit. The second is not style — the models and the chain silently diverged for a long time (#3275) and autogenerate was unsafe as a result. Pre-publication scan, since the repo is about to get attention: .env.example is placeholders only (`changeme_*`), `.env` is gitignored with an `!.env.example` exception, no credential-shaped literals are committed, and there are no private IPs or operator home paths. The only hostnames are the project's own forge, which is public by design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-08-31 14:53:06 -04:00