11 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	3590c478f5	docs+ci: folder import stays retired, and fix a readiness probe that never probed ... Two unrelated things, both found while closing out milestone 328. **Folder import (#3367).** The operator's call, this session: the import-from-file surface was abandoned on purpose and is not coming back — "it has its own complexities that we didn't need." The README and the compose comment both described the missing button as a rough edge with a tracking issue, which promised a fix that is not coming. Both now say the retirement is the decision, name Subscriptions as the supported way to fill a new install, and describe /api/import/trigger as an unsupported escape hatch for anyone who wants to script one. **The CI readiness probe.** ci.yml's integration job and baseline.yml both waited for Postgres with `(echo > /dev/tcp/$PG_IP/5432)`. Those steps run under `sh -e` — act's default shell — where /dev/tcp is not a magic path but a filename that does not exist. The probe could therefore never succeed: run 18035, a GREEN run, spends 05:20:53 → 05:22:53 in that loop and exits it by exhaustion, not by connecting. Every integration run has been paying a flat 120s for a check that established nothing, and proceeding regardless. Replaced with a socket connect in python (present in the image, no package needed), and exhausting the budget is now a named failure instead of a silent fall-through — rule 156. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TTjbZZ6JirCMSaJzQV1RhA	2026-09-02 00:51:25 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	8a4af589f1	docs: write the install path for someone who is not the operator (#3271) ... FC has no login — no User model, no session auth, nothing. That was a deliberate call for a single-operator tool and it stays (operator, this session), but it was nowhere in the docs, and the app stores live Patreon / SubscribeStar / Pixiv session cookies on accounts that carry a payment method. Anyone standing this up from the README could reasonably have put it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and considered it handled. So the no-auth posture is now stated three times, in the three places someone decides where to bind the port: README has a "Before you expose it" section above the install instructions, .env.example explains why there is no auth variable in it, and the compose header says it before the first service. SECURITY.md claimed the opposite. It listed "a multi-user sharing ACL — instances can be shared" among the things worth protecting; there are no accounts to share between. That was rule 47 applied to a codebase that does not implement it, and it would have told a researcher FC holds a boundary it does not. Replaced with the real posture, including that TLS without an authenticating layer in front changes nothing. Also corrected, all of it stale rather than wrong-at-the-time: - EXTENSION_API_KEY was dead config. config.py read it into a field nothing consumed; the real key is generated into app_setting on first use and managed in the UI. Removed from config.py, compose and .env.example. - .env.example pointed at docs/superpowers/specs/… — there is no docs/ dir — and described the extension key as "lands in FC-3", closed 2026-05-21. - The /import mount comment described an FC-5 ImageRepo migration run from "Settings → Maintenance → Legacy migration", a surface with no frontend. - README said the extension installs from Settings → Maintenance. It is on Subscriptions → Settings. README is now split: running FC above the line, developing FC below it, with requirements, first run, the extension, upgrading and troubleshooting on the running side. First run documents the one real gap it found — a new installer with a library on disk has no button to import it, only POST /api/import/trigger, because the manual-scan UI was retired 2026-07-02 when that stopped mattering for an established install. Filed as #3367. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-09-02 00:16:23 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	bc4eba636d	fix: the documented install path pulled :dev, not :latest (#3270) ... docker-compose.yml pinned :dev on all five app services — web, worker, scheduler, maintenance-long, ml-worker. The README documents `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` as the production path, and -f means "use only this file", skipping the override and its build: directives. So Compose pulled image:, and image: was the rolling development channel. The documented way to install this product shipped development builds. It went unnoticed for a structural reason rather than a careless one: nobody who works on the project takes that path. The operator deploys from a swarm stack file; contributors get docker-compose.override.yml, which sets build: for all five services, and build: wins over image:. The broken path is reachable only by a stranger following the README — which is exactly the audience that did not exist until now. :latest, per rule 147: main IS production. It is also what the agent stack (agent/docker-compose.yml) already pinned, so this makes the two stacks agree rather than introducing a new convention. Both paths verified with `docker compose config`, which merges and prints without starting anything: dev path — build: present on all five, image: not pulled -f production — 0 build: directives, five :latest images resolved Also checked the base file for anything a stranger could not satisfy: no host-absolute volume paths, no operator-specific port bindings, no device mappings. The tag was the only defect in the consumer path. The comment on web.image is deliberately long (rule 32). A line reading :latest inside a file a developer is debugging with is exactly the line someone flips back to :dev to test something and then commits, and the consequence — strangers silently installing bleeding edge — is invisible to everyone who works here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-08-31 16:55:43 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 5	dbc4e8b0c6	docs: AGPL-3.0, plus SECURITY and CONTRIBUTING (#3269) ... The repo had no LICENSE, which meant all rights reserved by default: nobody could legally run or modify it, and "public availability" was a contradiction no amount of install documentation could fix. This is the hard blocker in milestone 328; everything else in it is quality. AGPL-3.0, at the operator's explicit choice, for the reason the operator gave: this should not become something another party runs as a hosted proprietary service. Section 13 is what makes it fit — for a self-hosted web app, distribution otherwise never happens, so the GPL's obligation would never actually bite. AGPL reaches the case that matters here: running a MODIFIED copy as a service for others. LICENSE is the FSF text fetched from gnu.org and verified byte-identical (34,523 bytes, 661 lines, §13 "Remote Network Interaction" present), not retyped. README's old "Personal project; use at your own discretion" said nothing legally and is replaced with what the licence actually asks — including the part worth being clear about, that running an unmodified copy for yourself carries no obligation whatsoever. SECURITY.md names what this software actually holds, because that is what makes a report serious here: live third-party session cookies for accounts with payment methods attached, the extension API key, the multi-user sharing ACL, and arbitrary downloaded media that gets decoded and fed to models. It also states the plain-HTTP posture up front, so "served over HTTP" and "no HSTS" are understood as the documented design rather than filed as findings. There is no private disclosure channel yet, so the reporting instruction is to open an issue containing NOTHING but the fact that a report exists, and wait for a private contact. Awkward on purpose: an issue tracker is public the moment it is written to, and every self-hosted instance stays vulnerable until its operator can update. Worth replacing with a real contact address — that decision is the operator's, since it publishes one. CONTRIBUTING records the two things that actually catch people: ruff's order-by-type import sorting, and that a model change and its migration belong in the same commit. The second is not style — the models and the chain silently diverged for a long time (#3275) and autogenerate was unsafe as a result. Pre-publication scan, since the repo is about to get attention: .env.example is placeholders only (`changeme_*`), `.env` is gitignored with an `!.env.example` exception, no credential-shaped literals are committed, and there are no private IPs or operator home paths. The only hostnames are the project's own forge, which is public by design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017QHszn9H8VBvx5Ke8x1hvw	2026-08-31 14:53:06 -04:00
bvandeusen	d38585ed94	docs: true up the tag scheme against what the pipeline publishes (318 step 9) ... A doc describing a tag scheme the pipeline stopped using is worse than no doc — it is a confident wrong answer, and #3159 named it as the drift that had just bitten rule 148. build.yml (each edit ×3, once per build job): * The derived-values block claimed three values including a `tag` subcommand that no longer exists, and said "on dev the date tag is computed nowhere else". There are two values and no date tag. * The BASE-IMAGE FRESHNESS paragraph argued from a pin that no longer exists — "a date tag has to keep serving the bytes it served (fabledcurator:2026.7.17 still resolves to July's image)". Milestone 318 removed the argument's premise rather than answering it: with no version tags there is no immutable name a refresh could contradict, and rule 145 already allows a moving tag to be republished. Deleted the argument, kept a line saying why there is nothing to argue about (#3159's phrasing: the workflow becomes obviously correct instead of carefully correct). * The repoint comment said ":c-<sha> and the date pin". There is no date pin. * "its set is too narrow — the direction that serves stale bytes on a pin" now names the failure that actually exists: the reuse check hits and the channel serves a web image bundling the previous XPI (#3156). README gains a "Versions and tags" section — the three tags, why there is no fourth, and the fact that with no registry name carrying it, the instance's own report is the only answer to "which build is this?". Also fixes two stale claims: three workflows (four since release.yml) and "AMO signing runs on main only", which has been false since milestone 271 step 6 signed on both channels. ci-requirements.md was missing milestones 313 and 318 entirely: no artifacts.sh, no label-keyed reuse, no FC_VERSION. Added those, plus the #3156/#3202 membership test (can changing this file change the published bytes — not is it copied in), and corrected packaging.sh's "two consumers" to three now that artifacts.sh reads it. docker-compose.yml needed nothing — it names `:dev` directly and never offered a pin target. Note #3127 and rule 145's relation notes are updated in Scribe.	2026-08-29 00:09:52 -04:00
bvandeusen	fe48e77821	ci(extension): retire the manual-bump guard, true up the docs (step 5) ... The guard asked whether a packaged extension file changed without the version moving. Since step 4 nobody moves the version by hand, so it was checking a fact that had stopped existing — and it was not merely dead weight: it would have failed the lane on every real extension change, demanding a bump that decides nothing. Removed rather than left running beside the new mechanism (rule 22). What replaces it is thinner and true. The extension-version lane now asserts the derivation resolves on this commit, that the derived value is the plain dotted-numeric shape AMO accepts, and that MAJOR.MINOR agrees between manifest.json and package.json. MAJOR.MINOR is the one part still hand-set, and packaging.sh reads it from manifest.json ALONE, so a divergence ships a version package.json disagrees with. The lane keeps fetch-depth: 0 — checking that the derivation survives a real checkout is half its remaining value. Deliberately not checked there: that the derived value beats what is already signed. That guard belongs in build.yml, where it compares against the real ext-* releases. Comparing against origin/main in a lane would be wrong, because dev legitimately derives a LOWER value whenever main is ahead on the extension, and a lane that fails for being behind is a lane people learn to ignore. packaging.sh is down to two consumers from three. version.spec.js's "ci.yml derives its pathspec" test would have gone red on that, so it is rewritten to assert the property rather than the consumer: no workflow inlines an :(exclude)extension/ literal, across all three. That keeps the #2397 anti-regression value while surviving consumers coming and going. A second test pins build.yml to packaging.sh version and fails if it goes back to grepping the committed value — which is not a style regression but the #3092 bug itself. build.yml joins extension.yml's trigger paths, since the suite now asserts against it. The lockstep test narrows from the whole version string to MAJOR.MINOR. The committed patch numbers are inert now; asserting on them would fail for a difference that changes nothing. Docs. extension/README.md's Release section described extension.yml signing on main and committing the XPI into frontend/public/ — untrue since 2026-05-25, and it told the reader to hand-bump both files, which is now exactly the wrong instruction. Rewritten, with a Versioning section that says plainly that editing the patch number does nothing and why the key is commit time rather than a count. ci-requirements.md drops the third packaging.sh consumer and names every job that needs full history. Root README no longer claims the extension is signed on main only.	2026-08-27 11:29:44 -04:00
bvandeusen	bfc5135f19	docs: true up README — status, the five pieces, CI (#3070) ... README.md was last touched in 4aff9c5 (2026-05-14) and several of its most visible lines had gone false: - "Pre-v1. Not yet functional." — FC has been continuously deployed for months. Replaced with what main/dev actually mean for what's running. - "Node 22 pre-installed" — ci-requirements.md and extension.yml both say node 24, and frontend/package.json requires >=24. - "Runner label python-ci — a runner with Python 3.14, ruff and Node 22 pre-installed ... The runner image (runner-base:python-ci) is built from CI-Runner/CI-python/" — describes runs-on as selecting the toolchain. It doesn't: runs-on is a scheduling label, and every job names its own container.image (ci-python:3.14, or node:24-bookworm-slim for the extension lane). - "Both ci.yml and build.yml use this label" — there are three workflows. The CI section now points at ci-requirements.md rather than restating it, so the two can't drift apart again; that file is current and is the one the CI-runner process expects. Added a "What's in here" table for the five deployable pieces — the extension, the GPU agent and the ML image were unmentioned, three of the five. Also corrected the RELEASE_TOKEN write:release scope, which is no longer "for future release-cutting workflows": it backs the ext-<version> releases that cache the signed XPI. Refs #3070	2026-08-27 07:39:49 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.7	4aff9c557d	chore: docker compose ergonomics — rename dev override, bake dev defaults ... - Renamed docker-compose.dev.yml → docker-compose.override.yml so Docker Compose auto-merges it. `docker compose up` (no -f) now Just Works for local development. - Removed the `env_file: .env` requirement from every service in the base file. Operators no longer need to create a .env to bring the stack up. - Baked sane dev defaults directly into docker-compose.yml via ${VAR:-default} interpolation: DB_USER=fabledcurator DB_PASSWORD=fabledcurator_dev DB_NAME=fabledcurator SECRET_KEY=dev_secret_key_not_for_production_change_me LOG_LEVEL=INFO (overridden to DEBUG by the dev override) Defaults are insecure but explicitly named so. For production, override via shell env vars or a .env file at the project root. - README quick-start simplified to a single `docker compose up -d`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-14 18:27:25 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.7	ff122c55eb	ci: switch runner label from fabledcurator-ci to python-ci ... Generic python-ci runner is reusable across the family (FabledScribe, FabledSteward, NhenArchiver, StashHandler, etc.) rather than scoped to just this project. Runner image lives at CI-Runner/CI-python/ in the operator's workspace; pattern mirrors CI-Runner/CI-go and CI-Runner/CI-flutter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-14 08:45:48 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.7	edb3fafd4d	ci: add image-build workflow + document required runner label and RELEASE_TOKEN ... Pushes :dev on every dev push; pushes :main and :latest on main. Uses RELEASE_TOKEN (a broader-scoped Forgejo PAT covering write:package, read:package, write:release, write:issue) so the same secret can serve future release-cutting and issue-management workflows. README now documents the fabledcurator-ci runner label and the required RELEASE_TOKEN scopes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-14 07:52:55 -04:00
bvandeusenandClaude Opus 4.7	06f8f834dc	chore: initialize repo with comprehensive .gitignore and README skeleton ... Establishes the FabledRulebook-required ignore patterns (docs/superpowers/specs, docs/superpowers/plans) plus Python/Node/Vite/extension/volumes/IDE rules from spec §6.1 before any other code lands, so accidental adds can't leak. Also ignores .claude/settings.local.json (per-user local overrides; shared .claude/settings.json may be committed in the future). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-14 07:25:59 -04:00